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Writers Articles And Opinions |
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30 June 2010 By Stephen Lendman
On August 10, 1997, in The New
York Times Magazine, David K. Shipler headlined,
"Robert McNamara and the Ghosts of Vietnam" saying:
Looking back, one of the key war
architects admitted "how dangerous it is for political
leaders to behave the way we did" about a war that
shouldn't have been fought and couldn't be won.
In his 1995 book, "In Retrospect:
The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam," former Defense
Secretary McNamara wrote: "....we were wrong, terribly
wrong. We owe it to future generations to explain
why."
In 1965, he knew the war was lost
and said so, telling Lyndon Johnson: "I don't believe
they're ever going to quit. And I don't see....that we
have any....plan for victory - militarily or
diplomatically," spoken as he began escalating
dramatically, knowing the futility and criminality.
Johnson was also uneasy, telling
his close friend, Senator Richard Russell, that he
faced a Hobson's choice saying: "I'm damned if I do
and damned if I don't," the former being impeachment
if he quit, the latter certain defeat that destroyed
him. After three heart attacks, he died a sick, broken
man, four years after he left office, two days before
Richard's Nixon's second inauguration, a man soon to
face his own moment of truth, omitting what should
have brought him down and his successors.
America's
Longest War - As Unwinnable as Vietnam, Reshuffling
the Deck Chairs to Delay It
McChrystal's out, Petraeus is in,
New York Times writers Alissa Rubin and Dexter Filkins
announced the switch June 23, headlining, "Petraeus Is
Now Taking Control of a 'Tougher Fight," saying:
He's taking over to execut(e) the
strategy (he engineered) with Gen. Stanley A.
McChrystal....directly responsible for its success or
failure, risking the reputation he built in Iraq," not
a winning surge, but by buying off Sunni tribal chiefs
and key Baathists not to fight, a much tougher
strategy in Afghanistan, the traditional graveyard of
empires, defeating Alexander the Great, Genghis Kahn,
the Brits and Soviets among others, America likely
next, but will Petraeus be around when it happens.
More on that below.
Waging a War on
Terror
September 11, 2001 was the
pretext for a global one, a so-called "just war" to
defend America against "outside enem(ies),"
manufactured to appear real - "radical Islam,"
including the Taliban, attacked on October 7, 2001,
four weeks after 9/11, planned months in advance in
anticipation of what then CENTCOM Commander General
Tommy Franks called a "terrorist, massive,
casualty-producing event," arousing enough public
anger to launch it.
It's America's longest war under
a president saying he'd end it as a candidate, then in
office tripled US forces from 32,000 - 94,000, but
promised to begin exiting by summer 2011. He just
reneged, saying:
"We didn't say we'd be switching
off the lights," adding that "we said we'd begin a
transition phase that would allow the Afghan
government to take more and more responsibility,"
meaning America is there to stay, by August at a
planned 132,000 force level (and as many or more
civilian contractors) under Petraeus, stepping down
from his CENTCOM post to take command, perhaps
unleashing greater than ever lethal force "until the
insurgents are genuinely bloodied," the preferred New
York Times strategy in its June 25 editorial, raising
Gideon Polya's December 2009 body count of 3.4 million
"post-invasion non-violent excess deaths" and another
1.1 million violent ones - genocide by any measure.
Under McChrystal, it was death
squad terror, mostly against civilians, what he was
trained to do as head of the Pentagon's Joint Special
Operations Command (JSOC), what Seymour Hersh called
an "executive assassination wing" post-9/11, what
Rolling Stone writer Michael Hastings called "a
handpicked collection of killers, spies, geniuses,
patriots, political operators and outright maniacs,"
Petraeus perhaps mandated to escalate with greater
than ever counterinsurgency (COIN).
Yet America's longest war is
unwinnable, according to McChrystal's Chief of
Operations, Major General Bill Mayville, saying: "It's
not going to look like a win, smell like a win or
taste like a win. This is going to end in an
argument," already a defeat, US polls showing growing
numbers against it, what Ray McGovern calls "Vietnamistan,"
the analogy needing no elaboration, what looks like
Obama's last stand, Petraeus his best shot according
to some. For others, it's mission impossible, what no
one in Washington will accept so war rages on without
end.
Also the cost, Iraq and
Afghanistan topping $1 trillion, or $1 million per
soldier annually, plus tens of billions more in black
budgets (one estimate saying over $56 billion a year)
with no end of spending in sight, including hundreds
of millions to corrupt warlords according to a June
congressional Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs of the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform report titled, "Warlord, Inc.,
Extortion and Corruption Along the US Supply Chain in
Afghanistan."
Its findings show "a vast
(Pentagon supply chain) protection racket run (through
Host Nation Trucking contracts) by a shadowy network
of warlords, strongmen, commanders, corrupt Afghan
officials, and perhaps others," undermining
Washington's war-winning strategy by "funding the
insurgency."
The investigation learned the
following:
-- mainly warlords protect
America's supply chain, contracted by Host Nation
Trucking (HNT);
-- they run a protection racket -
specifically, "extortion, bribes, special security,
and/or protection payments;"
-- the latter, in turn, go to
insurgents to ensure safe passage;
-- corrupted Afghan officials
extort millions, the largest NHT private security
provider saying it has to pay $1,000 - $10,000 monthly
in bribes to "nearly every Afghan governor, police
chief, and local military unit (through) whose
territory supplies pass," HNT reporting the same
thing;
-- Afghanistan's logistical
nightmare undermines DOD's counterinsurgency (COIN);
-- the Pentagon lacks effective
oversight of its supply chain and security contractors
protecting it; and
-- it ignored warnings about
protection racket payments and the effects on its
operations.
In addition, Afghanistan's
location and environment present enormous challenges.
The country is landlocked, the terrain unforgiving,
including desert sandstorms in summer, floods in
spring, impassible mud at times, and mountain roads
leaving no room for error. Summer heat reaches 120
degrees. Winters are usually snowy and frigid cold.
Avalanches often block the only tunnel linking Kabul
to the north. Routes can stay closed for days. Poor
infrastructure, including few paved roads, creates
more hazards, exacerbated by easily planted and
concealed explosives along supply routes as well as
regular insurgent attacks - "the harshest logistics
environment on earth," according to one US official on
the ground.
According to General Duncan
McNabb, head of US Transportation Command, "....what I
worry (most) about at night (is) our supply
chain....always under attack," compounded by all the
above obstacles and limited processing capacity at
distribution hubs. Iraq, by comparison, is easy with
its "decent infrastructure," manageable terrain, and
access to the Persian Gulf.
Subcommittee chairman Rep. John
F. Tierney (D. MA) said the Pentagon "would be well
served to take a hard look at this report and initiate
prompt remedial action," affecting "a good portion of
a $2.16 billion contract's resources into a corruptive
(fog of war) environment," lacking oversight to fund
warlords and insurgents, what David Petraeus now
confronts as commander, a man New York Daily News
writer James Gordon Meek said (on June 24) the Taliban
"endorses," calling him a wimp after his fainting
spell before Congress, no smarter than McChrystal, his
firing a "divine victory," according to its spokesman,
in a war no US president or general can win.
A Final
Comment
After nearly nine futile years,
Afghanistan looks less winnable than ever, one of many
signs the rising NATO death and injury toll, Pentagon
spokesman Bryan Whitman downplaying it saying:
"We have more forces in
Afghanistan, ISAF and US forces, than at any other
time. The level of activity is high, so as we conduct
our operations and engage with the enemy, the
opportunities for hostile contact are going to go
up."
In fact, escalation strategy was
stability. Instead, spiraling violence intensifies,
what Petraeus won't likely curb better than McChrystal,
sacked not for deriding his superiors, for his
leadership, growing popular resistance, and for losing
an unwinnable war, one more Afghan deaths can't win.
Nor can a change of command under
a politically ambitious man, perhaps contemplating a
2012 run against Obama, using war as the way to the
White House, win or lose in his new post. If
successful, his popularity will soar. If not, he'll
exit early and blame a failed administration policy,
saying as president he'll turn it around, what won't
matter as long as voters buy it. Excuses can come
later. For now, McChrystal's out. Petraeus is in,
Obama saying, despite setbacks and growing public
doubts, his strategy won't change.
In his Rose Garden announcement,
he said: "We have a clear goal. We are going to break
the Taliban's momentum," what he told West Point
cadets last December 1, announcing the surge, then
adding:
"After 18 months, (they'll) begin
com(ing) home....our cause is just, our resolve
unwavering. We will go forward with the confidence
that right makes might, and with the commitment to
forge an America that is safer, a world that is more
secure, and a future that represents not the deepest
fears but the highest of hopes," a goal more distant
now than ever after nine futile years, waging war
against peace - the supreme international crime, to be
escalated under a general perhaps believing a greater
body count leads straight to the White House,
replacing the current incumbent who ordered it.
A final note. On June 18, the
State Department awarded Blackwater (now Xe Services)
a $120 million Afghanistan "diplomatic security"
contract for its Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif consulates.
The firm has another $200 million one to train Afghan
forces, and works in country for the CIA, Pentagon,
diplomatic corp, and by providing protective services
for visiting Washington and foreign officials.
Yet Blackwater is notorious for
its lawlessness, for rewarding and encouraging its
field employees to destroy Iraqi life, its founder
Erik Prince implicated in murder, his top deputies
facing indictment for numerous crimes, its Iraq and
Afghan operatives charged with killing noncombatants,
the company involved in other scandals, the State
Department nonetheless telling CBS News that:
"Under federal acquisition
regulations, the prosecution of the specific
Blackwater individuals does not preclude the company
or its successive companies and subsidiaries from
bidding on contracts."
Blackwater at times gets no-bid
ones, its horrific record a plus in obtaining them,
including a potential new assignment worth up to $1
billion, to train the Afghan National Police. It's
been bid on, not yet awarded, but who more qualified
than the world's most powerful, well-connected
mercenary army, notorious for operating below the
radar with no accountability, and being handsomely
rewarded for its lawlessness, much the way the
Pentagon takes care of its own, and how Washington
works overall.
Stephen Lendman lives in
Chicago and can be reached at lendmanstephen@sbcglobal.net.
Also visit his blog site at sjlendman.blogspot.com and
listen to cutting-edge discussions with distinguished
guests on the Progressive Radio News Hour on the
Progressive Radio Network Thursdays at 10AM US Central
time and Saturdays and Sundays at noon. All programs
are archived for easy listening.
http://www.progressiveradionetwork.com/the-progressive-news-hour/.
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