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19 September 2010
By Ellen Brown
The stock market shot up on September 13, after new
banking regulations were announced called Basel III.
Wall Street breathed a sigh of relief. The megabanks,
propped up by generous taxpayer bailouts, would have
no trouble meeting the new capital requirements, which
were lower than expected and would not be fully
implemented until 2019. Only the local commercial
banks, the ones already struggling to meet capital
requirements, would be seriously challenged by the new
rules. Unfortunately, these are the banks that make
most of the loans to local businesses, which do most
of the hiring and producing in the real economy. The
Basel III capital requirements were ostensibly
designed to prevent a repeat of the 2008 banking
collapse, but the new rules fail to address its real
cause.
Why Basel III
Misses the Mark
Two years after the 2008 bailout, the economy
continues to struggle with a lack of credit, the
hallmark of recessions and depressions. Credit (or
debt) is issued by banks and is the source of
virtually all money today. When credit is not
available, there is insufficient money to buy goods or
pay salaries, so workers get laid off and businesses
shut down, in a vicious spiral of debt and
depression.
We are still trapped in that spiral today, despite
massive “quantitative easing” (essentially
money-printing) by the Federal Reserve. The money
supply has continued to shrink in 2010 at an alarming
rate. In an article in The Financial Times
titled “US Money Supply Plunges at 1930s Pace as Obama
Eyes Fresh Stimulus,” Ambrose Evans-Pritchard quoted
Professor Tim Congdon from International Monetary
Research, who warned:
“The plunge in M3 [the largest measure of the money
supply] has no precedent since the Great Depression.
The dominant reason for this is that regulators
across the world are pressing banks to raise capital
asset ratios and to shrink their risk assets. This is
why the
US is not recovering properly.”
In a working paper called “Unconventional Monetary
Policies: An Appraisal”, the Bank for International
Settlements concurred with Professor Congdon. The
authors said, “The main exogenous [external]
constraint on the expansion of credit is minimum
capital requirements.” (“Capital” means a bank’s
own assets minus its liabilities, as distinguished
from its “reserves,” which apply to deposits and can
be borrowed from the Federal Reserve or from other
banks.)
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is “the
central bankers’ central bank” in Basel, Switzerland;
and its Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
is responsible for setting capital standards
globally. The BIS acknowledges that pressure on banks
to meet heightened capital requirements is stagnating
economic activity by stagnating credit. Yet in its
new banking regulations called Basel III, the BCBS is
raising capital requirements. Under the new
rules, the
mandatory reserve known as Tier 1 capital will be
raised from 4 percent to 4.5 percent by 2013 and will
reach 6 percent in 2019. Banks will also be required
to keep an emergency reserve of 2.5 percent.
Why Is the BCBS Raising Capital
Requirements: When Existing Requirements Are Already
Squeezing Credit?
Concerns about the credit-tightening effects of Basel
III were reported in a
September 13 Huffington
Post article by Greg Keller and Frank Jordans, who
wrote:
“Bankers
and analysts said new global rules could mean less
money available to lend to businesses and consumers. .
. .
“European
savings banks warned that the new capital requirements
could affect their lending by unfairly penalizing
small, part-publicly owned institutions.
“‘We see
the danger that German banks’ ability to give credit
could be significantly curtailed,’ said Karl-Heinz
Boos, head of the Association of German Public Sector
Banks.
“Insisting that French banks were ‘among those with
the greatest capacity to adapt to the new rules,’ the
country's banking federation nevertheless said they
were ‘a strong constraint that will inevitably weigh
on the financing of the economy, especially the volume
and cost of credit.’
“
Juan Jose
Toribio, former executive director at the IMF and now
dean of IESE Business School in Madrid, said the rules
could hamper the fragile recovery.
“‘These
are regulations and burdens on bank results that only
make sense in times of monetary and credit expansion,’
he said.” For
smaller commercial banks and public sector banks
(government-owned banks popular in Europe), the
credit-constraining effects of Basel III are a serious
problem. But larger banks, said Keller and Jordans,
“were quick to praise the agreement and insisted they
would meet the required reserves in time.” The larger
banks were not worried, because “The largest U.S.
banks are already in compliance with the higher
capital standards demanded by Basel III, meaning their
customers won't be directly affected.” Their
customers, of course, are mainly large corporations.
“Small businesses that rely on borrowing from
community banks,” on the other hand, “may be more
affected . . . . They will try to make up for the
higher capital requirements by lending at higher rates
and stiffer terms.” If the big banks that
brought you the current credit crisis can already meet
the new requirements, what exactly does Basel III
achieve, beyond shaking down their smaller
competitors? As David Daven remarked in a September
13 article called “Biggest Banks Already Qualify Under
Basel III Reforms”:
“Indeed, on the day
Lehman Brothers collapsed, THEY would have been in
compliance with the Basel III standards.”
Punishing
Your Local Bank for Wall Street’s Misdeeds What precipitated the
credit crisis and bank bailout of 2008 was not that
the existing Basel II capital requirements were too
low. It was that banks found a way around the rules
by purchasing unregulated “insurance contracts” known
as credit default swaps (CDS). The Basel II rules
based capital requirements on how risky a bank’s loan
book was, and banks could make their books look less
risky by buying CDS. This “insurance,” however,
proved to be a fraud when AIG, the major seller of
CDS, went bankrupt on September 15, 2008. The bailout
of the Wall Street banks caught in this derivative
scheme followed. The smaller local
banks neither triggered the crisis nor got the bailout
money. Yet it is they that will be affected by the
new rules, and that effect could cripple local
lending. Raising the capital requirements on the
smaller banks seems so counterproductive that
suspicious observers might wonder if something else is
going on. Professor Carroll Quigley, an insider
groomed by the international bankers, wrote in
Tragedy and Hope in 1966 of the pivotal role
played by the BIS in the grand scheme of his mentors:
“[T]he powers of financial capitalism had another
far-reaching aim, nothing less than to create a world
system of financial control in private hands able to
dominate the political system of each country and the
economy of the world as a whole. This system was to be
controlled in a feudalist fashion by the central banks
of the world acting in concert, by secret agreements
arrived at in frequent private meetings and
conferences. The apex
of the system was to be the Bank for International
Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, a private bank
owned and controlled by the world’s central banks
which were themselves private corporations.”
The BIS has now become
the apex of the system as Dr. Quigley foresaw,
dictating rules that strengthen an international
banking empire at the expense of smaller rivals and of
economies generally. The big global bankers are one
step closer to global dominance, steered by the
invisible hand of their captains at the BIS. In a
game that has been played by bankers for centuries,
tightening credit in the ebbs of the “business cycle”
creates waves of bankruptcies and foreclosures,
allowing property to be snatched up at fire sale
prices by financiers who not only saw the wave coming
but actually precipitated it. |