The
Myth of American Pressure: The Kissinger Era - Lessons
Learned and Recommendations
29 November 2010By Osamah Khalil
Recent reports that the Obama administration offered
Israel unprecedented incentives to continue its
limited 10-month moratorium on settlement construction
for an additional 60 days have sparked an outcry among
Palestinians and their supporters. However, in this
policy brief Al-Shabaka Co-Director Osamah Khalil
argues that the administration's actions fit into a
much broader historical pattern of public American
pressure on Israel and private concessions.
Recent reports that the Obama administration offered
Israel a series of incentives to continue its limited
ten-month moratorium on settlement building have
sparked an outcry among Palestinians and their
supporters. Although the concessions for halting the
construction of new settlements for only 60 days are
unprecedented, Washington's inability to maintain
consistent pressure on Israel fits into a much broader
historical pattern. The conventional wisdom is that
when Washington has exerted pressure on Israeli
governments they have eventually succumbed to American
demands. However, a closer reading of the historical
record and declassified American archival documents
reveals a more complex dynamic between the two allies.
In this policy brief, Al-Shabaka Co-Director Osamah
Khalil examines four major crises in the "special
relationship" between the U.S. and Israel: the 1949
Lausanne Conference; the 1956 Suez Crisis; the October
1973 War; and the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. He
demonstrates that while Israel has on occasion
publicly acceded to American demands, privately it has
received concessions and agreements that rewarded its
intransigence and improved its negotiating position at
the expense of Palestinian rights. Khalil argues that
American pressure was negligible when compared to the
policy options available to the different presidential
administrations. Finally, he offers recommendations
for Palestinians and their supporters.
The Lausanne Conference
The pattern of public American pressure and private
concessions to Israel was established early on. In
April 1949, the Lausanne Conference was convened in
order to translate the separate armistice agreements
between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and
Transjordan signed after the 1948 Palestine War into a
final peace. Among the key issues to be negotiated was
the fate of over 750,000 Palestinian refugees who were
either expelled by or fled from Zionist militias
during the war. In accordance with UN General Assembly
Resolution 194, Washington advocated for a substantial
repatriation of Palestinian refugees to their homes.
Israel, however, was reluctant to consider
repatriating more than a token number of refugees.
Israel's intransigence at Lausanne led to a sharp
exchange of letters between President Truman and
Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion.
Truman was incensed by a report that American attempts
to negotiate an agreement were being rebuffed by Tel
Aviv and that Israeli officials had informed American
representatives that they intended to "bring about a
change in the position" of the administration "through
means available to them in the United States."1
Truman's letter warned that should Israel continue to
reject America's "friendly advice," Washington would
"regretfully be forced to conclude that a revision of
its attitude toward Israel has become unavoidable."2
Although the Israelis appeared to reject Truman's
claims, their position at Lausanne softened over the
next two months, including an offer to repatriate
100,000 refugees.3 However, the number was still
deemed insufficient by the Arab states and by
Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Acheson called for
the Israelis to repatriate a "substantial number" of
refugees — roughly 250,000 — with the remainder to be
resettled in the neighboring Arab states where they
had sought shelter and to receive some compensation.4
A State Department memorandum drafted after the
Israeli reply to Truman recommended four actions for
the administration to pursue, including: blocking the
release of the remainder of a $100 million
Export-Import loan, removing the tax-exempt status
that U.S.-based Jewish groups enjoyed to raise funds
for Israel, refusing Israeli requests for technical
assistance and expertise, and not supporting the
Israeli position in international organizations.5 Of
these recommendations, the Truman administration opted
to delay, but not block, the release of the remainder
of the loan. In addition, the State Department decided
not to use Israel's application for membership to the
United Nations -– a key Israeli goal -– as an
opportunity to pressure Tel Aviv at Lausanne. Rather,
Washington believed that Israel's admission to the UN
would compel concessions by the Arab states in the
negotiations.6
By late August the loan issue escalated. Responding to
an inquiry by the Israeli government, the
Export-Import Bank replied that it had approved the
loan and the delay was due to the State Department.
Eliahu Elath, Israel's ambassador to the U.S.,
responded angrily to the news, and informed an
American delegation at a luncheon in Washington that
such actions "could only be interpreted as attempted
duress." Elath added that "such tactics would not
succeed. In fact, they could be expected to have the
opposite result."7
Acheson discussed the situation with President Truman
the day after the luncheon. By early September, $2.35
million of the $49 million was released to Israel.8
This amateurish attempt at diplomatic pressure was the
last one the Truman administration would undertake
with Israel. It would also establish a consistent
pattern of American behavior toward Israel: although
Washington had an array of policy options available,
the Truman administration and its successors lacked
the political will to employ them effectively and
consistently.
Suez 1956: A Successful Example?
The most prominent example of the successful
application of American pressure on Israel was during
the 1956 Suez War. Using Egyptian President Gamal
Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal as a
pretext, France, Britain, and Israel jointly planned
and invaded Egypt in late October. In a rare moment of
Cold War superpower agreement, Washington and Moscow
demanded that the invasion end and the tripartite
forces withdraw. Indeed, the Dwight D. Eisenhower
administration considered a series of actions to
pressure Israel that were similar to those presented
to President Truman. While Israel agreed to withdraw
under American and Soviet pressure, far from damaging
U.S.-Israeli relations, the Suez crisis led to closer
cooperation.9
Of particular importance was the understanding reached
between the U.S. and Israel over the Straits of Tiran,
the narrow waterway which connects the Gulf of Aqaba
and the Red Sea. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
concurred with Israel's position that it had the right
to send ships through the Straits and an attempt by
Egypt to renew the blockade would be an act of war,
giving Israel the right of self-defense under the UN
Charter. The long-term implications of this agreement
would be profound. As tensions increased in the spring
of 1967, Nasser's decision to close the Straits would
be cited by Israel as the rationale for its surprise
attack on Egypt in June 1967.10 During the Suez
crisis, Lyndon Johnson was Majority Leader of the U.S.
Senate and he opposed the Eisenhower administration's
pressure on Israel to withdraw from the Sinai without
a peace agreement.11 Eleven years later as President,
Johnson was unwilling to repeat what he viewed as
Eisenhower's mistake.12
In the wake of the Suez War, Nasser's influence grew
dramatically not just in the region but across the
"Third World." However, Eisenhower and Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles were convinced that Egypt had
become an unwitting pawn of the Soviet Union and were
unmoved by Nasser's claims of a policy of "positive
neutrality" in the Cold War. Although publicly aimed
at preventing the influence of "International
Communism" in the "general area of the Middle East,"
what became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine had a
much more specific target: containing Nasser. While
Ben-Gurion's hopes for a formal military alliance with
the U.S. were never realized during the Eisenhower
administration, due largely to American plans for a
regional defense pact that was hindered by the
Arab-Israeli conflict, the U.S. and Israel found
common cause in diminishing Nasser. As Washington
sought support throughout the region for the
Eisenhower Doctrine, Israel began to develop its
"periphery pact," developing alliances with non-Arab
countries, including Turkey, Iran, and Ethiopia.13
The Kissinger Era
Unlike the Suez crisis, the October 1973 War led to a
tense superpower showdown. The initial Egyptian and
Syrian attack managed to surprise the Israeli military
causing heavy casualties, however, Israel
counterattacked and eventually took the offensive.
When the Egyptian Third Army was almost encircled,
Moscow threatened to intervene unless a cease-fire was
declared. While the combination of American pressure
and Soviet threats finally forced Israel to halt its
advance, Washington interceded largely because of the
possibility of a superpower confrontation.
Although the cease-fire revealed how effectively
American pressure on Israel could be applied when
larger American interests were at risk, the U.S.-led
negotiations conducted over the next two years
demonstrated the implications of such actions on
Palestinian rights.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger focused his efforts
on Egypt, relying on "step-by-step" shuttle diplomacy
rather than a comprehensive negotiation involving all
parties, and was reluctant to expand the negotiations
to include the Syrians or the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO).14 This was more than just a
tactical approach. Washington perceived Egypt to be
the most prominent Soviet ally in the region, and
Kissinger hoped to drive a wedge between Moscow and
Cairo. He found a willing partner in Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat, who also sought to break with
the Soviet Union and end hostilities with Israel.15
The negotiations were augmented by significant
shipments of U.S. military aid to Israel. Kissinger
argued that the aid was designed to make Israel feel
more secure and willing to make concessions,
especially as Moscow was rearming Syria and Egypt. Yet
in negotiating the second Sinai disengagement,
Israel's position hardened. Although Kissinger
emphasized the benefits of removing the most prominent
and populous of the Arab states bordering Israel from
the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Soviet orbit,
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was unmoved. By
March 1975, Kissinger was frustrated by Israeli
intransigence and returned to Washington, leading
President Gerald Ford to call for a "reassessment" of
U.S. policy in the region.16
Washington's reassessment lasted roughly three months.
Although existing arms contracts were honored, new
shipments to Israel were halted during this period and
Kissinger met with leading foreign policy specialists
to discuss a new comprehensive approach to achieving
peace. However, the Israeli government countered with
its own pressure. In May, seventy-six U.S. senators
signed a letter to Ford, calling on him to be
"responsive" to Israel's request for $2.59 billion in
military and economic aid. Ford would later write that
although the senators claimed the letter was
"spontaneous," that "there was no doubt in my mind
that it was inspired by Israel."17 In his memoirs,
Rabin would concede that the letter was the result of
an Israeli public relations campaign.18 Without
domestic political support, Ford and Kissinger
abandoned the reassessment and resumed negotiations.19
The Sinai II agreement was signed in September, but
only after significant concessions by Washington. This
included $2 billion in aid to Israel and abandoning
any attempts for substantial negotiations on the
Syrian or Jordanian fronts. In other words, Israel's
occupation of the West Bank and Golan Heights were
further entrenched not to win an Israeli withdrawal
from the Sinai Peninsula, but merely in order to
establish a buffer zone between Israeli and Egyptian
forces. In addition, Israel won a commitment from
Washington to prevent future Soviet intervention in
the region as well as placement of American civilian
monitors in the Sinai. Most damaging to Palestinian
interests was the secret memorandum of understanding
Kissinger signed with Israel related to the PLO.
Although the PLO was recognized by the UN and the Arab
League as the "sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people," Washington agreed not to
"recognize or negotiate with" the PLO as long as it
refused to recognize Israel's right to exist and
rejected UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 242
and 338.20 Kissinger's success helped set the stage
for the 1978 Camp David Accords negotiated by
President Jimmy Carter.21
Madrid 1991
From the perspective of Washington, the end of the
Cold War and the success of the U.S.-led coalition in
expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait appeared to offer
an opportunity to finally resolve the Arab-Israeli
conflict. In the spring of 1991, Secretary of State
James Baker began galvanizing support for an
international peace conference. However, Israeli Prime
Minister Yitzhak Shamir was reluctant to participate
in the conference, and even more resistant to the
"land for peace" formula. At the same time, Israel
requested $10 billion in loan guarantees to assist
with the settlement of Jewish immigrants from the
Soviet Union. In an attempt to pressure the Shamir
government, President George H.W. Bush requested that
Congress delay approval of the loan guarantees for
120-days. However, when Congressional leaders rebuffed
the request, Bush held an unprecedented news
conference in September where he denounced the
influence of the Israel lobby on Capitol Hill.22 The
gambit appeared to work, as Israel agreed to attend
the conference as well as to the presence of a joint
Palestinian-Jordanian delegation.23
Held at the end of October in Madrid, Spain, the
conference marked the first time Israelis and
Palestinians would engage in direct negotiations.
However, with the U.S. unwilling to serve as more than
a facilitator of the meetings, the negotiations bogged
down and eventually became victim to the Israeli and
American political calendars. Shamir's Likud party was
voted from power in June 1992 and the loan guarantees
were eventually approved by Congress in October. A
month later, Bush lost his bid for reelection.24
Ultimately, the Madrid process would be undone not
only by American inattention and Israeli intransigence
but also by the PLO, which chose to sign a secret
agreement negotiated in Oslo, Norway unbeknownst to
the Palestinian negotiating team in Washington.
Instead of demanding an end to the occupation and an
independent state, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat settled
for an interim agreement that initially guaranteed
limited autonomy for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank
city of Jericho.25 Final status talks were to be
concluded within five years, during which Israel was
to maintain overall sovereignty for the OPT.26
Although it is often cited as another example of
successful American pressure on Israel, in reality the
Bush administration obtained few concessions from
Shamir's government and even fewer tangible results.
While the loan guarantees were delayed, they were
eventually approved and the Bush administration's
attempts to freeze settlement construction were
unsuccessful. Nor did Shamir's attendance at the
conference constitute his acceptance of the "land for
peace" formula, as he admitted in an interview with
the Israeli paper Ma'ariv after the June 1992
election. Shamir explained that, "I would have carried
on autonomy talks for ten years and meanwhile we would
have reached a half million people in Judea and
Samaria [i.e., the West Bank]."27 Indeed, Shamir's
strategy has been adopted by successive Israeli
governments.
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
What lessons can Palestinians and their supporters
draw by examining these crisis moments in U.S.-Israeli
relations? Perhaps most important is to differentiate
between the perception that pressure is being applied
by Washington and the reality. In each of the
historical cases, both the U.S. and Israel had an
interest in overstating the political pressure brought
to bear. For Washington, the audience was typically
the Arab states who looked to the United States as the
only power capable of securing concessions from
Israel. On occasion, as with Bush's 1991 press
conference, the discussion of the Israel lobby was
also for domestic consumption. Meanwhile, Israel's
attempts to exaggerate American pressure have been
aimed not just at its own domestic audience and the
competition between the major political parties, but
toward its American supporters as well.
While the influence of the Israel lobby in these
crisis moments particularly on Congress cannot be
dismissed, it should not be overstated either. In each
case, the different Presidential administrations had
an array of policy options available to them, but they
were unwilling or unable to muster the political will
to adopt more aggressive approaches. This behavior was
often driven by the desire of American policymakers
for the most politically expedient solution, dictated
largely by the political calendar and intensified
media attention, rather than a long-term resolution.
As a result, Israel benefited from the reticence of
the different administrations and their pre-existing
biases toward supporting the Israeli position.28
Moreover, Israel used Washington's desire to achieve
its strategic goals regionally and internationally in
order to obtain concessions at the expense of the
weakest party in the conflict — the Palestinians.
American pressure on Israel has been successful when
larger American interests have been at risk. For
example, during the 1956 and 1973 Wars in the midst of
the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union,
Washington had very immediate and definite interests
at stake which required it to press its demands in
earnest. Moreover, Israel also had an interest in
preventing the intervention of Soviet forces into the
region, which made it more receptive to American
pressure.
Without a superpower competitor, the threat to
American interests from Israeli actions might be
substantial, but from the perspective of Washington
they were not unmanageable or insurmountable. In other
words, when the Palestinians and their supporters
among the Arab states were angered by American
policies or actions in support of Israel, once they
agreed to a process mediated by the U.S. they had
nowhere else to go –- and Washington knew it. This was
particularly true of the regimes that relied on
American military and economic aid to secure their
rule, who found that the price for their participation
in the peace process was an increasing number of
concessions demanded by Washington in order to placate
Israel.
Kissinger's influence on today's policymakers cannot
be underestimated. His reliance on piecemeal, interim
negotiations accompanied by high-level shuttle
diplomacy has become the standard for successive
administrations. Indeed, the apparent lesson learned
is that the U.S. State Department must appear to be
actively engaged, even when the results of such public
activity are negligible. This has been repeatedly
demonstrated in the attempts over the past decade to
revive the Oslo Peace Process, in which merely the
appearance of process is now considered more important
than the actual process or achieving peace.
While Washington was able to extract some concessions
from Israel over the years, these were eclipsed by
Arafat's decision to accept the deeply flawed Oslo
Accords. Although the PLO was weak as an organization
in 1993, the Palestinian cause was arguably at its
height in international sympathy and support due to
the first intifada and the diplomatic efforts
surrounding the PLO's acceptance of the two-state
solution and 1988 Declaration of Independence.
Rather than attempting to galvanize popular support
among its Palestinian base and internationally around
its goals, Arafat and the Tunis-based leadership opted
for its own short-term and ultimately self-defeating
solution. In short, the Palestinian leadership saved
itself and the Israeli occupation at the expense of
its own people inside and outside of Palestine.
The historical pattern described in this brief has
also been observed with the Obama administration. Both
the administration and the Netanyahu government have
advanced the perception that President Obama has put
unprecedented pressure on the Israelis to halt the
construction of settlements in the OPT. Yet over the
past year it has become evident that like its
predecessors, the Obama administration has sought to
reward Israeli intransigence and violations of
Palestinian rights by increasing and expanding its
support for Israel, rather than curtailing it. This
included additional funding for the "Iron Dome"
project, Washington's shielding of Israel at the UN
after the assault on the Freedom Flotilla, and
supporting Israel's admission into the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).29
Moreover, the recently reported concessions for a mere
60-day extension of the settlement "freeze," including
maintaining Israeli control over the Jordan River
Valley, once again demonstrates Israel's ability to
secure private concessions at a time of supposedly
heightened American pressure.30
What then constitutes real pressure? As the Truman and
Eisenhower administrations determined, the U.S. has a
number of ways to pressure Israel, or any other state,
which is reliant on it for military, political, and
economic support. This includes blocking or suspending
the delivery of economic and military aid, removing
the tax-exempt status from U.S. based donations for
groups that donate to Israel, denying requests for
technical or military assistance and expertise, and
withholding support for Israel in international and
regional organizations. To date, Washington has rarely
considered these options. Rather, it has chosen to
reward Israel's intransigence with increasing amounts
of aid, in the vain hope that if Israel feels secure
it will be willing to make concessions.
At a minimum, Palestinians and their supporters should
advocate for the U.S. to deny tax deductible status to
organizations that fund and support Israeli
settlements in the OPT. They should also continue to
insist that Washington hold Israel accountable to U.S.
and international law, including continued settlement
activity and construction of the wall in the West Bank
and East Jerusalem, the use of American weapons on
Palestinian civilians, the repeated violations of
Palestinian human rights, as well as to live up to its
commitments as a member of the UN and the OECD, and as
a signatory to numerous international treaties. The
real pressure that Palestinians must look to and rely
on is not from Washington toward Israel, but from the
Palestinian people to the world community by
continuously asserting that only by realizing their
rights can a just and lasting peace be achieved.
©
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