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18 January 2011 By M. Shahid Alam Pakistan's English print media – faux liberal and
elitist – have been in furor over the recent political
murder of Salman Taseer, governor of Punjab, by his
own bodyguard. Ostensibly, the governor was
assassinated for his obstreperous stand against the
judgment of a lower court to hang Aasia Bibi, a
Christian woman, for blasphemy against the Prophet. One columnist in the Express Tribune, with
high melodrama, proclaimed that the governor's murder
was the ‘death of reason' in Pakistan. What reason and
whose reason, Pakistanis might well ask, since
Pakistan's faux liberal elites have been strangulating
the raison d'être of Pakistan's creation for some
sixty four years. More likely, the Tribune
columnist feared the death of a different kind of
reason: Pakistan's wealthy and faux liberal elites, by
carrying their treachery to extremes, by agreeing to
rain death on Pakistanis from the skies, are losing
the argument in Pakistan. Going off on a limb, the governor began attacking
Pakistan's blasphemy law, which has been abused by
some Pakistanis to settle personal scores. Is it a
fault in the law or its execution? Or is the cause a
generally lawless society, where abuses of law
starting at the highest levels of society are rampant;
and Pakistan's Christians are not their only
unfortunate victims. Nevertheless, the governor
erratically took up the cause of Aasia Bibi, and began
railing against the blasphemy law, although every
previous death sentence under this law has been
reversed by the higher courts of the country. In the midst of a war against ‘extremists,' it was
unwise of the governor to call the law against
blasphemy a ‘black law.' Did he wish the law amended
or repealed? If he believed it was ‘black law,'
perhaps he wanted it to be repealed. Pakistanis
worried that this was only the start of a campaign to
repeal the law – and open the floodgates for Salman
Rushdi-style smearing of the Prophet. Another law
maker from the ruling pro-Western Pakistan People's
Party had announced her intentions to introduce a bill
in the parliament to amend the law. Was this an
initiative inspired by foreign embassies, some
Pakistanis speculated, not unjustifiably in a country
where Western embassies routinely poke their nose in
the country's domestic affairs. There are causes galore to champion in Pakistan.
The disappearing of thousands of Pakistanis over the
past decade – some renditioned to the USA under
General Musharraf, the previous dictator – has been
crying out for redress. Before the national elections
of 2008, the governor's ruling party had pledged to
look into the cases of the disappeared Pakistanis.
Once in office, that promise was forgotten. Indeed,
the disappearances – especially in Baluchistan – have
escalated. Legitimately, Pakistanis may ask, Why
didn't this crying shame provoke the governor's ire –
as well as a thousand other instances of victimization
of the poor and disenfranchised? This murder is unfortunate: no reasonable person
could disagree with that. Any death outside the law –
and not a few inside the law – is unfortunate and a
shame. Yet, should we see this murder only as the
expression of growing religious fanaticism in
Pakistan? One discordant fact to consider is that the
slain governor had faced the ire of the Barelvi ‘ulama
(religious scholars), who support the popular Sufism
of shrine-worship, have worked with the government
against hard-line Islamists, and, themselves have been
repeated targets of terrorist attacks. It betrays extreme naiveté by Pakistan's English
columnists to examine the governor's murder in
isolation, abstracted from the context and the history
of betrayals and conflicts that have bedeviled
Pakistan especially over the last decade. To say this
is not to excuse the governor's murder but that is the
only path to understanding why it happened, and why
the assassin is being lauded by wide swathes of
Pakistanis as a hero. Scan issues of the New York Times or any US
newspaper for a story on Pakistan in the years
immediately preceding September 2001 and – luckily for
Pakistanis then – your pickings will be slim. Those
were ‘normal times,' in a manner of speaking. On
January 4 and 5, however, Salman Taseer's murder was
splashed as a banner head by the web edition of the
NYT. US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton,
described his murder as a "great loss." The US
ambassador in Pakistan, Cameron Munter, echoing his
boss, lauded Taseer as "a champion of tolerance." Now,
the NYT has published an op-ed by the slain
governor's daughter. In another ill-advised move, Pope
Benedict called on Pakistan to repeal its
anti-blasphemy law. It would appear that the slain
governor was in the good graces of the Empire. The times are not ‘normal' when the murder of an
appointed and figurehead provincial governor in
Pakistan resonates so loudly in American media and
draws attention from the US Secretary of State and the
Pope. Pakistan's plunge into abnormal times began
shortly after September 11, 2001, when the country's
military rulers backed by its elites decided to join
America's war against the Taliban. At first, Pakistan's military government offered
air bases and land and air passage to the US military;
this was only the thin end of the wedge. A country
that had so wantonly surrenders such vital portions of
its sovereignty would scarcely hesitate to barter the
rest of it – at the right price. And so more deals
were made, inflicting horrible wounds on the people of
Pakistan that cry out for justice. Pakistan's elites have never been too greedy when
dealing with the Empire. At the rate of a billion US
dollars a year, they were quickly cajoled into
fighting the Afghan resistance operating out of
Pakistan; they opened Pakistan and its institutions to
infiltration by the CIA and American mercenaries; and
many venal vendors of opinion were mobilized to
demonize the Afghan resistance and their sympathizers
inside Pakistan. Under US prodding, Pakistan's rulers have divided
the country's population into ‘moderates' and
‘extremists,' – America's ‘good' and ‘bad' guys –
depending on whether they supported or opposed the US
occupation of Afghanistan. As the Afghan and Pakistani
resistance – inside Pakistan – have come under savage
attacks from the US and Pakistan military, they too
have responded with fury targeting the country's
security infrastructure but also – unfortunately –
many civilians. Sadly, Pakistan's decision to join America's war
was predictable. Soon after its creation, the
Pakistani state fell into the lap of lumpen elites –
landlords, military officers and bureaucrats – picked
by the British and trained for several generations in
traditions of subservience to their white masters.
Instead of building on indigenous strength, these
denatured elites bought their survival by cultivating
economic, military and cultural dependence on the
United States. Like many former European colonies,
Pakistan is not yet free. Only the forms of foreign
control, always working through domestic tyrannies,
have changed: and the foreign hand that wields the
whip now is in American rather than British hands. The struggle of Pakistanis for their country has
just barely begun. It is part of a larger Islamicate
struggle nearly all of whose constituent parts face
the same problem: they labor under elites who have
tied their systems of knavery to foreign exploiters
and to one great power in particular. For most of its more than sixty years, Pakistan has
been ruled by predatory elites who, in order to
ingratiate their masters, have tried to mimic their
manners, to hate what they hate, and to pretend to
love what they love. So permeated are these elites
with self-inflicted degradation, their multitudinous
factions wrangle among themselves to undersell their
country, and to place a lower value on the lives and
honor of their own people. Wikileaks has now offers a peek into how
Pakistan's rulers pander to their masters. In August
2008, commenting on the subject of US drone attacks
against Pakistanis, the current prime minister assured
his American interlocutors, "I don't care if they [the
Americans] do it as long as they get the right
people [the resistance]. We'll protest in the National
Assembly and then ignore it." The military dictator
who preceded him had boasted in his autobiography that
his government had garnered US dollars 50 million by
capturing and selling Pakistanis to secret US
agencies. Pakistan's suborned English media pretend that the
murder of the Punjab governor is an isolated act.
Their myopia blinds them to the war into which
Pakistan's elites have dragged the country, as they
batten their foreign bank accounts, their jets warming
their engines to fly them off to foreign destinations
should Pakistan become too hot for them to carry on
their game of deceit and treachery. Still, the murder of the Punjab governor was
unnecessary: it was also contrary to the best
traditions of Muslim history. The governor had acted
unwisely in denouncing the blasphemy law, but that did
not make him guilty of blasphemy. If his intent was to
start a campaign to have the law repealed, the public
protests had sent out a clear signal to the government
that such a move would be unacceptable, even
dangerous. It was certain to plunge the country into
further chaos. Also, the President could have acted
more wisely and settled the matter by reprimanding
Salman Taseer or, better, retiring him from the office
of governor. In better times, Muslim judges in Spain often
forgave Christians who blasphemed the Prophet by
declaring that they were insane or drunk when they
blasphemed. They were awarded the death punishment
only when they blasphemed repeatedly, demonstrating
both sanity and intent to use blasphemy to challenge
Muslim rule. Pakistan's Supreme Court should urge the
lower courts to look more carefully into cases of
blasphemy to rule out malicious intent by those who
bring such charges. It would not dishonor the Prophet
to forgive a poor Christian woman of blasphemy – if
that is what she had done in a fit of anger. It is
what the Prophet would have done himself. M. Shahid Alam is professor of economics at
Northeastern University. His latest book is Israeli
Exceptionalism: The Destabilizing Logic of Zionism (Palgrave
Macmillan, November 2009). He may be contacted at:
alqalam02760@yahoo.com. Read other articles by M.
Shahid, or visit M. Shahid's website. |