10 March 2011 By Kusha Sefat In delineating the differences
and similarities between the recent Egyptian uprising
and the one that resulted from the disputed
presidential election in Iran, Pouya Alimagham points
to an interesting and important point. The Egyptian
regime, while enjoying broad international support,
fell in just 18 days. This contrasts the Iranian
regime's ability to systematically squash a grassroots
uprising that at one point included three million
protesters. Alimagham notes that Iran's resilience in
the face of mass protest deservers some consideration.
An equally important point is
Iran's attitude (and what enables this attitude to
persist) in contrast to most other states in the
region engulfed in mass demonstrations. Both Mubarak
and Bin Ali immediately conceded by offering
"reforms." Fearing their own uprising, states like
Jordan and Saudi Arabia conceded in advance, with the
latter offering its citizens $36 billion in benefits.
(Ghadaffi never backed down, but he may lose his life
over it). Iran, on the other hand, is taking steps
that sharply contrast the conciliatory attitudes of
other regional states. Domestically, and in the midst
of broad international sanctions, Iran is undertaking
a significant and comprehensive economic reform plan
which is likely to hurt and further anger the core of
the opposition (middle class urbanites).
Internationally, during the last round of talks in
Istanbul, Iran added two preconditions for moving
forward with the P5+1: suspension of sanctions and
acknowledging Iran's right to enrichment, effectively
asking the West, in the words of Reza Marashi: "Now
what are you going to do?" This is more than a case of
resilience and defiance toward domestic opposition and
the West. Rather, it raises questions on state
capabilities. That is, in contrast to Egypt and
Tunisia, what capabilities does the Iranian state have
to withstand grassroots uprisings, and how were these
capabilities gained? As one veteran conservative
Iranian diplomat put it, "we do not bow down to any
power, unless that power is really powerful." It seems
that the US, together with European allies and
domestic opposition can shake Iran, but are not
powerful enough to break it. Yet, only thirty years
ago the Shah of Iran, who similar to Mubarak and Bin
Ali enjoyed broad international support, was ousted by
domestic opposition alone. This points to a
qualitative shift in Iran's capabilities over the past
30 years facilitated by one primary factor that
distinguishes it from all other states' in the region
and the former Pahlavi regime: the experience of
revolutionary crisis. It is, as such, worth trying to
understand Iran's capabilities in a revolutionary
context and in doing so, the appropriate comparison
would be to others states with successful social
revolutions, namely France, Russia, and China. There has been much debate about
revolutions, particularly since the beginning of the
Egyptian protest. But rarely has this debate touched
on what a successful revolution really looks like,
what capabilities revolutionary states gain, and how.
To look at Iran through the prism of revolutionary
crisis, it is worth going back to Theda Skocpol's
seminal work on social revolutions. Skocpol
illustrates some of the conditions that must exist for
revolution to take place. These conditions existed in
Iran prior to its revolution but no longer do, yet
they continue to exist today in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, etc. Further, Skocpol
illustrates the course that a revolutionary movement
must take in order for that state to benefit from the
fruits of revolution and gain strategic capability;
otherwise what is left has more in common with coup
d'état. In comparing France, Russia, and
China Skockpol identifies that both domestic and
transnational conditions must exist for revolution to
take place. While domestic and transnational
conditions influence one another, if the particular
state faced with domestic pressure is also at a
disadvantage internationally (politically, militarily,
and ideologically) then the conditions for
revolutionary crises are in motion. Like Egypt and
Tunisia today, France, Russia, China, and Iran were
all at a transnational disadvantage prior to their
uprisings. France's competition with England exhausted
its capacity to raise new loans and sent the economy
into a severe recession and resulted in the bankruptcy
of state's financial institutions. Russia was
entangled with a comparable, if not worse, vicious
cycle of international competition. By 1915, the
magnitude of Russian defeats in WWI had been
acknowledged and the dominant strata of the Russian
society lost confidence in the Tsar and his autocracy.
China and Iran were both characterized by political
dependency which as Skockpol points out is the most
severe case of transnational disadvantage. While,
through their revolutionary crisis, France, Russia,
China, and Iran overcame their transnational
disadvantages, Egypt and Tunisia are currently
characterized by political dependency and are firmly
under Washington's strategic umbrella. This means that
in addition to domestic pressure caused by the uneven
spread of capital, the international conditions for
revolution are also ripe in Egypt and Tunisia. The
same is not true with respect to Iran. How was Iran able to move up the
transnational scale via its revolutionary crisis?
Revolutions are not static, but are processes. An
important factor in revolutionary crisis are external
wars, which as Skocpol notes are central and
constitutive. Revolutionary France ultimately lost the
Napoleonic Wars. Nevertheless, mobilization for war
and military interventions in the midst of the
unstable internal realm of France created a
centralized bureaucratic mechanism at the disposal of
the state. The same is true with the Russian
revolution and WWII, the Chinese revolution and the
Sino-Japanese War, and the Iranian revolution during
the Iran-Iraq war. In the case of the latter, the war
was as much part of the revolutionary crises as the
ousting of the Shah. In Iran, practically all internal
opposition which resisted the dominant discourse of
the war were wiped out, leading to a sense of
stability in the face of an Iraqi incursion which
confirmed the Islamic Republic as the true and
undisputed legitimate authority of Iran. By the end of
the war, a highly centralized, effective, and flexible
government had prevailed. Internationally (militarily,
politically, and ideologically) Iran started
accumulating strategic capabilities, a process which
excelled after the fall of Iraq and reached its apex
during the Hezbollah-Israel war. Militarily, Iran has established
itself as a significant player in the region. During
the Iran-Iraq war, and in the absence of an effective
military arsenal, the "culture of martyrdom" was
institutionalized in Iran. The primary goal was to
defend Iran with unorthodox tactics by deploying
volunteers imbued with revolutionary ideals,
exercising innovative and human wave tactics. This
gave birth to the Revolutionary Guards and Iran's new
defense doctrine of asymmetrical warfare. While the
chances of waging a successful war against Iran by the
US have significantly and continuously diminished
since the revolution, in terms of actual fungible
power, Tehran sees itself as having the upper hand in
the region. This is in strong contrast to Iran's
capabilities prior to its revolution and, currently,
to any other state in the Mid East (Israel is firmly
under America's strategic umbrella and similar to
Egypt and Tunisia, is faced with sever transnational
disadvantages). Politically, Iran is losing many
battles, particularly in the Security Council. Yet,
Tehran sees itself as wining exactly where it wants
to, namely in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the
Palestinian Territories, by choosing sides that seem
to always come out on top. Ideologically, Iran may be
facing some problems in the region, particularly with
the emergence of a "Turkish model." However, it must
always be remember that universalistic creeds, such as
Islam, allow and encourage people from very diverse
particularistic background to convert and work
together as fellow citizens, comrades, or brothers.
These universalistic ideologies allow the political
elites to mobilize masses for political struggle. Like
Jacobeans and Bolsheviks, this gives the Iranian state
access to crucial additional resources for
politico-military struggles against its opponents,
both domestically and internationally. Shah's
nationalism, for example, was limited to Iran and
could have never cultivated the intimate ties that
exist between Iran and Hezbollah. Moreover, many state
supporters who came to the streets of Tehran,
numbering in the millions, may have been motivated by
material gain or forced to come out, but it would be
hard to deny that a significant portion of them were
ideologically driven. In short, like France, Russia,
and China, Iran has constructed a highly centralized
and flexible state apparatus which enables it to
better handle domestic uprisings. In addition, like
these other states, Iran has emerged out of its
revolutionary crisis with a higher standing on the
international scale. That is to say, Tehran is no
longer at a transnational disadvantage, and thus the
transnational conditions for a successful uprising in
Iran no longer exist to begin with (The U.S. is no
longer powerful enough to put Iran in a transnational
slump). While Tehran is having trouble with the spread
of equal capital to its people due to mismanagement
and a lack of specific infrastructure, its
international capabilities are likely to be sustained
through high oil prices. As such, Tehran's
capabilities allow it to be both defiant and
resilient. Iran's success in squashing grassroots
movements has less to do with the Green Movement's
right or wrong strategies (frankly, I can't imagine
how Mohandes Mir Hussain Mousavi could have played his
cards any better – with the exception of calling for
the most recent protest which may have been a fatal
mistake). At the end of his very interesting article,
Alimagham notes that the Iranian opposition must try
new approaches, including "strikes, encampments in
Iran's own Liberation Square and, most importantly,
garnering the support of Iran's armed forces-all of
which were tactics vital to success in Egypt." I am much less optimistic about
whether any of these are going to work in the face of
Iran's strategic capabilities, both domestically and
internationally. And as such, I have my own suggestion
to Iranians living abroad who desperately want to help
their compatriots in Iran. Instead of trying to devise
tactics and strategies for the Green Movement (this
movement already has some of the brightest and best
strategists in Iran), it would be worth their while to
encourage the U.S. administration to establish a
strategic relationship with Tehran. This cannot be
achieved by suggesting new strategies to President
Obama either. A range of strategies have been tried
since the inception of the Islamic Republic. What is
needed is a new perspective that recognizes Iran as a
fact that is here to stay. If and when this
perspective is adopted, and relations established, I
think everyday life will get much easier for everyday
Iranians, and some of the concerns of the Greens will
be met. This may not be what people want to hear, but
if you agree with the logic of this argument, it is
the most honest recommendation. Kusha Sefat has been a media
consultant in Iran over the past three years, and will
start a doctoral program in sociology at the
University of Cambridge in October. Comments 💬 التعليقات |
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