How Can Iraq Avoid Another Hawijah? America Is Responsible For The Events In Iraq And Their Outcome
08 May 2013
By Osman Mirghani
Today, the situation in Iraq is reminiscent of the
events that led to a virtual civil war in 2006—at
least in the opinion of former US ambassador to Iraq,
Ryan Crocker, who published an article in the
Washington Post a few days ago. Regardless of the
extent to which America is responsible for the events
in Iraq and their outcome, many agree with this view,
and believe that that Iraq is already on the edge of
an abyss. Should it fall in, Iraq could possibly find
itself facing worse conditions than ever before. This
is especially true in light of growing sectarian and
regional complexities, such as attempts by elements
within Al-Qaeda to extend their foothold between Syria
and Iraq, harming the situation in both countries.
The latest provincial elections were accompanied by
clashes and bombings, revealing—and perhaps
deepening—the current crisis in Iraq. Electoral
participation, which did not exceed 50% and went as
low as 33% in Baghdad, reflected the tense political
situation. The government is divided, and the
criticism being directed at Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki
by his opponents and former allies regarding his
unilateral decision-making gives the impression that
he wants to establish a new dictatorship and that his
policies will further entrench sectarian divides. The
decision to postpone elections in the two largest
Sunni provinces, Anbar and Nineveh, merely serves to
amplify sectarian issues. Indeed, this led some to
accuse the prime minister of intentionally provoking
extremism by continuously ignoring the demands of
protesters and demonstrators, and resorting to the use
of excessive force against protesters at Fallujah and
later Hawijah. These responses left dozens of
protesters dead, including children, as reported by
international organizations. Similarly, a number of
military personnel were killed.
Maliki claims that he has been patient with the
protests and sit-ins, and that if these protesters had
been in another Arab country, they would have been
subject to aerial bombardment. This is strange and
inaccurate rhetoric, considering his use of violence
against demonstrators and his suppression of protests
against him since the demonstrations in Baghdad over
two years, stretching until the Hawijah sit-in. This
represented a wink and a nudge from Maliki,
particularly as he made this statement to a Syrian
news channel; he is one of those supporting a regime
that truly does bomb its people from planes.
Alternatively, if he was trying to prepare the ground
for such action targeting protesters, then it matters
little that protesters are now being killed by
bullets, while those in Syria are being killed by
shells.
Maliki also sought to connect internal protests with
external influences, saying that the events are tied
to "some sectarian policies in the region." He thereby
completely failed to acknowledge that his policies are
responsible for the deterioration of the situation in
Iraq, and are polarizing the country along sectarian
lines. The reality is that—despite repeated warnings
of sectarianism, calls for partition and attempts to
disrupt Iraq—his policies are a contributing factor.
His government is based on sectarian participation and
union, and his policies further contributed to
mobilizing Iraq's Sunnis. These policies even created
animosity among some of his Shi'ite allies, especially
those who are aware of the importance of building
partnerships in order to ensure that Iraq avoids
sectarian warfare and further bloodshed.
It is striking that Maliki's view of the protests was
consistent with the Iranian perspective, which
classified the events as "regional polarization." In
this context, there were a number of news reports that
the Iranian minister of intelligence, Heydar Moslehi,
had warned of plans to "preoccupy the resistance front
with internal disputes and crises" when he met with
Shi'ite leaders in Baghdad last month. He also called
on these leaders to take note of schemes that targeted
Iraq or Syria, and highlighted the importance of
regrouping.
Maliki was clearer, when, in an interview with the
Associated Press, he warned that if the Syrian
opposition are victorious, "there will be civil war in
Lebanon, divisions in Jordan and a sectarian war in
Iraq." An analysis of this speech and his discourse
implies that Maliki believes the fall of the Assad
regime and the rise of the Sunnis in Syria will lead
to a strengthening of Iraq's Sunni community, and,
following that, a sectarian war. Such discourse does
not solve Iraq's crises; rather, it only further
complicates them, placing them firmly within the
framework of regional and sectarian alliances and
polarization.
Although the crisis in Iraq is being affected by
events in Syria, this does not mean that the former is
a result of the latter, particularly as the Iraqi
crisis preceded the Syrian one by a number of years.
Maliki, who ignored the demands of Iraq's Sunnis and
their complaints of marginalization and exclusion,
entrenched the sectarian tensions in the country. He
failed to establish the rule of law—something he named
his own political party after. He did not succeed in
engendering an atmosphere of security, stability and
freedom, in which Iraqis could be prosperous. He was
preoccupied with political maneuverings, and sought to
control all security services and military
institutions. Maliki should have been devoted to
creating an environment of civil peace and increased
political participation in the face of any attempts to
divide Iraq along sectarian lines. Worse still, he
stood up to defend the Syrian regime, which has
previously been accused of exporting terrorists to
Iraq.
Iraq, which has paid a massive price by all accounts
over the last ten years, is not in need of sectarian
tensions and divisions, which are susceptible to
international involvement. The way in which the
government dealt with the recent events increased the
calls for Sunni secession—an option that does not
solve the problem. It should be noted that in the
past, when a Shi'ite territory in the south was
announced, this approach was rejected by Sunnis. Some
of them, however, still have a sense of frustration
and marginalization.
Iraq is in dire need of political leadership that
transcends personal calculations and immediate gains.
Only then—through unity and cohesion—can the nation be
rebuilt and strengthened. It should be open to all
parts of society, and confront everything that
contributes to sectarianism. The alternative is a
gradual slide towards civil war and fragmentation.
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EsinIslam.Com
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