Governance in Islamic State Provinces Beyond Iraq and Syria
28 December 2016By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Following is a prepared statement delivered for a Washington Institute for
Near East Policy conference on the Islamic State beyond Iraq and Syria in June
2016:
THAT THE ISLAMIC STATE presents itself as a state project should by now be a
familiar notion, and within the "central" provinces (wilayat) of IS in Iraq
and Syria, the project has achieved its most sophisticated stage in the
realization of a governance system foremost embodied by diwans
("departments"), responsible for various aspects of administration, which
emerged following the announcement of the Caliphate on June 29, 2014. The
Diwan al-Taalim, for instance, is responsible for the education system,
managing schools and devising the curriculum to be taught. It also oversees
the provision of public services, such as water supplies and road maintenance,
while the Diwan al-Hisba takes on a variety of other interesting functions,
including the enforcement of Islamic morality in public, consumer protection,
and even the granting of permits for people to leave IS territory temporarily.
The functions of diwans may overlap at times; thus, regulation of Internet use
may fall to both the Diwan al-Hisba and Diwan al-Amn. That said, not every
bureaucratic body is known as a diwan. The Hijra Committee, for example,
oversees the arrival of new migrants to IS—even providing financial assistance
for those who cannot meet expenses but know someone within IS who can vouch
for them—as well as managing IS border crossings, such as in the northern
Aleppo countryside village of Dabiq, through which businessmen and drivers can
visit IS territory for a limited time. Dabiq is better known for being
featured in apocalyptic Islamic State propaganda as a showdown site between IS
and the West, and has an IS magazine named for it.
The existence of the IS administrative bodies is hardly unprecedented, at
least on paper. The first incarnation of IS's predecessors who claimed to be a
state—the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), declared in October 2006—had two
cabinets of government ministries, the first announced in 2007 and the second
in 2009. These cabinets included some ministries overlapping with the
present-day diwans, such as ministries for oil, health, and public security.
In practice, however, these ISI ministries amounted to little in terms of
governance, even though documentary evidence emerging from the period shows a
developed internal bureaucracy and criminal organization adept at generating
revenue within areas of operation, as well as limited dependence on foreign
donors. Indeed, the limitations in governance were acknowledged by ISI itself,
in a treatise the group published by Sharia Committees head Abu Othman al-Tamimi,
titled "Informing the People about the Birth of the Islamic State of Iraq,"
which invoked the precedent of the Prophet, whose enemies far exceeded him in
knowledge and capabilities when he set up his first state entity following the
hijra to Medina.
As part of its claim to be the Caliphate, demanding the allegiance of the
world's Muslims and desiring the conquest of the entire world, IS has sought
to expand beyond Iraq and Syria, giving an impression of territorial control.
This impression is most apparent in the declaration of official affiliates in
the form of new wilayat, deriving from declarations of allegiance to IS from
the areas in question. The Middle East and North Africa region was the target
of the first major wave of IS expansion announced in November 2014, with
wilayat declared in Sinai, Libya, Algeria, Bilad al-Haramayn (Saudi Arabia),
and Yemen. As the sites of official provinces of IS, one might expect these
areas to display signs of IS governance, mimicking the system in Iraq and
Syria. In fact, the picture suggests realization of IS governance in these
provinces is limited; the most successful initiative so far has been in Libya,
but, even there, IS's fortunes have varied over time.
Generally speaking, a significant obstacle to the realization of IS governance
in the provinces beyond Iraq and Syria has been the lack of real and
contiguous territorial control. For comparison, note that IS governance in
Iraq and Syria gradually became more complex. With the development in Syria of
a network of strongholds and contiguous territory over the first half of 2014,
centered on the city of Raqqa, and then with the seizure of Mosul and other
cities in Iraq in June 2014, the territory came to span the borders and served
as an important basis for the caliphate declaration. In at least two of the IS
provinces, however—the Algeria province (Wilayat al-Jazair) and Bilad al-Haramayn
(Wilayat Nejd, Wilayat al-Hejaz, and Wilayat al-Bahrain)—one cannot seriously
speak of any real territorial control, and it is doubtful the original
motivation behind accepting allegiance pledges to form these provinces could
be seen as achieving territorial control and implementing governance. Rather,
the Algeria province primarily seems to have symbolic value as a renowned
historic arena of jihad, besides presenting a chance to poach affiliates of
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Only very sporadic reports emerge of
IS activity in Algeria, mostly relating to attacks on the Algerian army. The
importance of Bilad al-Haramayn, of course, lies in its being home to the two
holiest sites in Islam at Mecca and Medina. While IS has carried out a number
of attacks in Saudi Arabia and expanded the scope of operations into Kuwait,
claiming a suicide bombing there targeting Shiites, this points only to the
existence of terrorist cells, not territorial control or governance.
A more developed case, though not approaching a meaningful level of governance
comparable to Iraq and Syria, is that of IS Sinai, which evolved from the
pledge of allegiance of Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (Supporters of the Holy House).
The Sinai affiliate has been able to conduct a number of hardhitting attacks
targeting the Egyptian security forces, and it placed the bomb that downed a
Russian airliner taking off from the Sharm al-Sheikh resort. The Sinai
affiliate controls no major strongholds or significant contiguous territory in
the peninsula, however. Documentary evidence mainly points to its distributing
statements to the local population, such as warnings against cooperation with
the Sisi regime or such-and-such individual on the grounds that he works with
the regime, rather than administrative documents such as one sees from Iraq
and Syria. Meanwhile, the Sinai media wing mostly advertises military
operations and executions of spies, only occasionally featuring governance in
what might be deemed proto-hisba activity, with the Hisba Department and
Islamic police confiscating and destroying illicit goods like cigarettes and
drugs. A more recent photo series also featured a medical clinic, but the
exact location was not given, and it seems probable it is a facility set up to
provide treatment for the Sinai affiliate's own fighters.
The situation in Yemen arguably provided an ideal environment for the growth
of IS, with the chaotic conditions of a civil war and Sunni-Shiite sectarian
tensions culminating in the takeover of the capital, Sana, by the Zaidi Shiite
Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement, which is supported by Iran. In addition, one
could read an October 2014 statement by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
as sympathetic to IS in its denunciation of the idea that the latter was a
movement of khawarij (Kharijites, referring to a sect in early Islamic history
renowned for extremism) and its call for solidarity in the face of the
coalition alliance against IS. This statement might have led IS to believe it
could win over elements within AQAP to develop affiliates in Yemen. For at
least three months after the official declaration of Yemen as part of the IS
provinces, however, there was no evidence of IS activity there; then
statements began to be distributed in the name of various IS provinces within
Yemen, primarily making clear the intent to target Houthis with mass attacks.
This was also a theme in the IS nashid (hymn), "Oh Son of Yemen."
The evidence for IS governance in Yemen is limited, and it appears the
fortunes of the IS affiliates in this regard were likely hurt considerably by
internal dissent that came to light in December 2015, when dozens of members,
including several high-ranking officials, rejected the overall wali appointed
by IS over Yemen. This ultimately led to an intervention by the IS Distant
Provinces Administration, which expelled from the ranks those perceived to be
the ringleaders of the conspiracy, with a further statement expelling those
who persisted in their dissent. How many abandoned their dissent is not clear.
As with the Sinai affiliate, the advertised material mainly points to military
operations—which have also targeted the Persian Gulf–led coalition forces,
particularly in the southern port city of Aden. From Aden, documentary
evidence also points to attempts by IS members to impose Islamic law, but the
evidence is poorly crafted and amateurish. Also as in the Sinai, a photo
series emerged of a medical clinic, supposedly under the Diwan alSiha, but
this clinic actually appears to be meant for the treatment of IS fighters.
Thus, IS administrative structures that exist in Yemen mainly seem directed
toward internal management of the ranks, rather than governance over the
population.
The remaining case to consider is that of Libya, which has seen much more
successful IS governance develop than the other affiliates in the Middle East
and North Africa. Originally, IS governance in Libya was concentrated in the
city of Darnah in eastern Libya, which, to be sure, was never controlled
entirely by IS. This administration developed out of a pledge of allegiance to
IS by a local jihadist group called Majlis Shura Shabab al-Islam, which moved
quickly in October 2014 to set up institutions in Darnah mimicking the IS
bureaucratic system in Iraq and Syria, such as an Islamic court and Diwan al-Hisba,
under the moniker of "Cyrenaica province." A Diwan al-Taalim branch also
emerged in the area, and documentary evidence attests to the existence of a
Diwan al-Dawa wa al-Masajid (responsible for religious outreach and control of
the affairs of mosques). This presence in Darnah city was destroyed, however,
in June 2015 by the Mujahedin Shura Council of Darnah and Its Suburbs, which
is linked to al-Qaeda; and since then, IS has been unable to reclaim a
foothold in the city.
Further out to the west, IS has been able to consolidate territory on the
Mediterranean coastline based around the city of Sirte, which, unlike Darnah,
is a true stronghold of IS, falling under its Wilayat Tarabulus (Tripoli
province), while the easternmost towns on that stretch of territory are
defined as part of Cyrenaica province. In part, the dominance of IS in the
Sirte area originated in the defection to it of local Libya Ansar al-Sharia
networks that had already been involved heavily in governance, going as far
back as June 2013.
Considerable documentary evidence points to a sophisticated governance system
in the Sirte area along the lines of what is observed in Syria and Iraq,
including a functioning judiciary (Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim) that deals
with matters ranging from marriage contracts to real estate; an Islamic police
force; a Dawa and Masajid branch responsible for outreach to the population
and control of the affairs of the mosques; repentance programs and sharia
sessions as part of a cooptation of local personnel structures; conciliation
initiatives; and the introduction of the zakat taxation system (falling under
the Diwan al-Zakat wa al-Sadaqat). The Sirte area, therefore, represents the
most developed IS governance project outside of Iraq and Syria; it is thus
hardly surprising that Adnani mentioned the city alongside Mosul and Raqqa in
a speech released in late May 2016 that partly attempted to hit back at the
coalition's claims of progress against IS on account of territorial losses.
Indeed, IS control of the Sirte area is coming into doubt in the face of rival
local forces beginning to direct their efforts against it.
Elsewhere in Libya, IS has found itself a military combatant in Benghazi
against forces loyal to Khalifa al-Haftar, while a more covert presence was
maintained in Sabratha, to the west of Tripoli city, as part of the running of
a suspected training camp for militants, only to be targeted by U.S.
airstrikes in February 2016. Meanwhile, the Fezzan province that represents
Libya's third major region has shown no sign of governance projects, and, as
with Algeria province, information has been very sporadic.
In short, IS's ability to realize governance (tamkin) has been very limited
thus far in the wider region beyond Iraq and Syria—an observation that has
implications for IS's credibility on the global stage, particularly in
appealing for support from the wider jihadist movement. Since IS puts such
great emphasis on being a state, the lack of success in replicating elsewhere
its administration in Iraq and Syria may hurt its appeal in the long run. This
absence of effective governing initiatives may also have affected the central
leadership's calculations in terms of willingness to declare new wilayat.
Although operations have been officially claimed in both Somalia and Tunisia,
for instance, IS notably has not declared a province in either of these
places, perhaps because the central leadership realizes a failure to show its
development as a state rather than just a terrorist threat will make the
declaration of new provinces seem like little more than cheap propaganda
ploys.
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