The Archivist: The Islamic State's Security Apparatus Structure in the Provinces - Centralized control vs. Provincial autonomy
04 August 2017By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Introduction
Like any state-like governance project, it is hardly surprising that the
Islamic State (IS) should have bureaucracy dedicated to the maintenance of
internal security in the territories under its control. This field of
responsibility falls broadly under the Diwan al-Amn al-Aam (Public Security
Department), one of a series of diwans set up by IS in the wake of its
Caliphate declaration in June 2014. Little, however, has come to light
regarding the internal structure of IS' security apparatus. The exclusive IS
documents discussed in this piece, obtained by Syrian rebels from the former
north Aleppo IS stronghold of al-Bab, should help to illuminate this issue in
much more depth than ever before. The documents raise a number of questions
relating to our understanding of IS, which will be explored as part of this
analysis.
Centralized control vs. Provincial autonomy
As mentioned in the introduction, the Diwan al-Amn al-Aam is one of a number
of diwans set up as part of the Caliphate system of IS, arguably representing
the most sophisticated stage of governance that has ever existed on the ground
for a jihadist organization controlling territory. IS territory has been
divided into a number of wilayas ('provinces'), with each province under the
stead of a governor (wali). Within IS documents, the wilayas in Iraq and Syria
seem to be broadly classified into two halves: the eastern wilayas and western
wilayas, the former presumably referring to Iraqi provinces and the latter to
Syrian provinces. The documents explicitly refer to the western wilayas in
defining the security centre of a given province. The concept of the security
centre in a province though is also found in many documents from Iraq such as
the wilayas of Ninawa and Fallujah.[1]
Each province should have more local departments of the various diwans of IS,
such as offices for services, education, and public security. These
departments should exist both at the wider provincial level (e.g. the central
education office for a given wilaya) and sub-provincial level (e.g. the
education office in a sector of a wilaya). The diagram below should help the
reader visualize this broad framework for public security in a sample wilaya X
with sample sectors A, B and C.
One of the most important questions for any researcher looking into IS is how
far there is centralized control of administration and bureaucratic
functioning. Is there a system in which central ministries- the greater diwans
exert tight control over the policies, functioning and composition of their
provincial and sub-provincial offices, or are the more local institutions more
or less left to their own devices in terms of day to day management and
appointments of officials and personnel with only some very general policy
dictates and guidelines from the central ministries? The concept of
decentralization, for instance, has been espoused by Iraqi researcher Hisham
al-Hashimi, who told Niqash that "each offshoot of the IS group has a lot of
autonomy."[2]In these documents, an impression of a high degree of autonomy
might arise at first sight when one notices that the organizational connection
of the amir of the security centre is described as being with the provincial
governor. One should compare with a document found in Fallujah that mentions
the formation of a number of Diwans (i.e. sub-departments) within the wilaya
that should be connected with the wali, his deputy or the general
administration official of the province.[3]
Yet the documents under consideration indicate that the central Diwan al-Amn
al-Aam decides not only on the general policies, but also the internal system
of organization, with which the provincial administration must comply.
Further, while the amir of the public security centre in a given province must
be mutually agreed upon by the provincial governor and the greater Diwan (with
the higher body of the Delegated Committee intervening in the event of a
disagreement), the amir of the public security centre cannot simply appoint
whosoever he likes for the positions of his deputy, heads of the
administrative divisions in the centre and heads of the sectors. The
appointments must all be submitted to the greater Diwan for approval (with the
position of deputy also being submitted to the provincial governor).
Similarly, transfers and removals for these officials cannot be done without
the greater Diwan's approval. The central Diwan can also issue orders for
arrest and tracking that the provincial security centre must comply with, and
has a right to order for cases (presumably of a much more serious type) to be
transferred to it by the provincial security centre. Regular central oversight
is another notable aspect of these documents, with the provincial security
centre required to submit monthly reports to the greater Diwan. Meanwhile, the
provincial administration is barred from redistributing certain equipment
handed to the provincial security centre by the greater Diwan, as well as
electronic devices in the security centre. In events of military crisis where
mobilization of administrative personnel is required, limits are placed on the
provincial administration as to the proportion of security personnel that can
be mobilized (20%).
In short, going by these documents, it can hardly be said that the greater
Diwan adopts a policy of laissez-faire towards provincial and sub-provincial
affiliates.
A Ba'athist Hand?
It has become a common theme to attribute the rise of IS since 2010-2011 and
its apparent success for a time to the role of former officers from the
military and intelligence services of Iraq's Ba'athist regime.[4] It may thus
be tempting to look at the security structures outlined in these documents, be
impressed by the apparent sophistication, and then attribute this supposed
sophistication to former Ba'athist officer influence. Superficially, one may
want to compare the structures with the intelligence services under Saddam
Hussein and try to find parallels.
In reality though, this narrative is only intuitive, rather than supported by
evidence. The concept of an internal security apparatus is actually well
established in jihadist organizations. In its cabinets of ministries declared
in 2007 and 2009, IS' predecessor- the Islamic State of Iraq- counted a public
security department among its ministries.[5] In a similar vein, the concept of
a security committee features in traditional frameworks for the al-Qa'ida
organization, and a security committee was also a part of Ansar al-Islam's
emirate project in Iraq prior to the U.S. invasion in 2003.[6] More recently,
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, a jihadist entity comprising former al-Qa'ida affiliate
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, reported on its own security apparatus activities
through its Iba' News Agency, documenting a widespread campaign of arrests and
crackdowns on IS terrorist cells in Idlib.[7]
Global jihadist organizations, by nature, are always likely to attract the
hostility of many if not most nation states, which normally realize that these
groups in the long-run intend to overthrow the modern order of nation states.
In addition, rivalries can develop between these groups and with other
non-state actors. These jihadist organizations, therefore, need to be
especially aware of the risk of infiltration and leaking of sensitive
information to their enemies. Having a security apparatus is the logical way
of addressing this problem. For IS, the imperative to have an effective
security apparatus has been all the more paramount on account of the vast
U.S.-led international coalition arrayed against it, and the control of large
swaths of territory and important population centres spanning the Iraq and
Syria borders.
Even so, it is questionable how successful the IS security apparatus has
actually been in counter-espionage/counter-intelligence. It is true that there
have been no successful internal revolts in IS territories that have driven
the group out of areas under its control. Retaking territory from IS has
required forces to enter from outside. Yet such a measure of success for IS
primarily comes down to IS' monopoly on force over would-be armed opponents
inside the territories it controls, having disarmed many rivals in conquered
areas through imposition of repentance programs, and inspiring terror through
brutal executions of accused spies and collaborators with the coalition and
other enemies, with some cases broadcast in IS propaganda. On another level,
IS has not been able to prevent many senior cadres from being killed in raids
and airstrikes intended to target the leadership, suggesting a considerable
degree of intelligence penetration and leaking of valuable information to the
coalition by locals, the very thing counter-espionage is supposed to stop.
Within the documents, one particular department identified as part of a
provincial security centre's structure is the security of the mujahideen
administration, intended to track cases of doctrinal corruption. This issue
has in fact been a serious problem for IS, particularly on the issue of takfir
(declaring someone/something to be of disbelief in Islam) and how widely it
should be applied.[8] In the realm of the use of the Internet, no evidence has
yet emerged to show that IS was able to develop software and tools to wiretap
and monitor communications by civilians over local Internet networks. Instead,
the introduction of measures that gradually banned personal Internet
connections in people's homes suggests a reactive approach that fell short of
a technological breakthrough.[9]
In light of these considerable failings, the narrative that former Ba'athists
were able to create a highly effective security apparatus in IS seems less
convincing once examined more closely. Along with the 13 documents found that
detail the security structure was a brief document, in the form of a letter
from the greater Diwan al-Amn al-Aam to the amir of the security centre Aleppo
wilaya, providing notice on a new framework for the security apparatus. The
structures detailed in the 13 documents appear to reflect this new framework,
notice of which is dated to June 2016. If the framework for the security
apparatus had to be revised, the implication is likewise a reactive approach
to security problems facing IS, not a highly successful security apparatus to
begin with.
The Future
As IS continues to lose territory, the security apparatus structures as
detailed are unlikely to persist, as they are intended for a situation of real
territorial control and governance. Instead, there will probably be
simplification as the organization reverts more and more to insurgent and
terrorist tactics.
Limitations
One must bear in mind what these documents do not tell us as much as what they
do tell us. For instance, given that there was a change in the security
framework in 2016, no documents have yet turned up that can describe the exact
changes that took place. We only seem to have the security structure as
described in these documents without a detailed comparison with past models.
Did the previous frameworks allow for greater autonomy for the provincial
security centres, or did the central Diwan have even more powers over the
provincial security centres? Can we say with certainty that the framework in
the eastern wilayas was/is exactly the same as the western wilayas, despite
similarities noted in the security documents that have turned up from Iraq?
Two documents from May 2016 in my raw archives are intelligence reports from
the "intelligence division" of the "general [/public] police" addressed to the
overall security official of Aleppo province.[10] Do the "general [/public]
police" and its intelligence department as detailed in these documents
constitute sub-sections of the security offices in the sectors? What exactly
is the relation with the "Islamic police" if any? The documents we are
examining in this piece do not shed light on this matter.
These are just some questions relating to the limitations of our findings and
the documents under consideration that are worth pondering. We should also
note that we do not yet have a detailed outline of the internal structure of
the greater Diwan al-Amn al-Aam.
In any case, below are the documents translated in full. Any particular
comments will be given in the endnotes.
-
Letter from the Diwan al-Amn al-Aam to the public security centre head in
the Aleppo wilaya
Islamic State
Diwan al-Amn al-Aam
No. 1056
Date: 24 Sha'aban 1436 AH/1 June 2016 CE
In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
To: Aleppo wilaya
Subject: New framework
Praise be to God alone and prayers and peace be upon the one after whom there
is no prophet. As for what follows:
The brother the amir of the Aleppo security centre, may God protect him.
As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu
Work on the new framework will begin as soon as the wali reviews it as we have
sent him a copy through the official post.
May God reward you best.
Diwan al-Amn al-Aam
Islamic State
Diwan al-Amn al-Aam
The public security official
Documents outlining the internal system
The internal system for the security centres in the wilayas.
Index:
Chapter One: General definitions
-Section One: Definitions
Chapter Two: The organizational guide to the security centre
-Section One: Security centres in the wilayas
-Firstly: Framework of the security centres in the wilayas
-Secondly: The organizational composition for the security centre in the
wilaya
-Section Two: The security offices in the sectors
-Firstly: The organizational framework for the security offices in the sectors
-Secondly: The organizational composition for the security offices in the
sectors
Chapter Three: The official relations for the Diwan and its centres
-Section One: The official relations for the Diwan
-Firstly: The Diwan's relation with the walis
-Secondly: The Diwan al-Amn's relation with the security centre in the wilayas
-Thirdly: The Diwan al-Amn's relation with the Diwan al-Jund[11]
-Section Two: The official relation for the security centre with the wilaya
-Firstly: The security centre's relation with the wali
-Second: The security centre's relation with the amirs of the sectors and
regions
-Thirdly: The security centre's relation with the repentance office
Chapter One: Definitions
The definition of the following technical expressions in this system is given
alongside each one:
. Diwan: Diwan al-Amn in the Islamic State.
. Amir of the Diwan: Amir of the Diwan al-Amn
. Centre of the Diwan: Subdivision of the Diwan in the western wilayas in the
Islamic State.
. Organizational unit/Administrative unit: group of personnel who undertake
identical and defined assignments that independently appear on the
organizational framework and exist at the level of a sector, administration,
division, branch, far' or office etc.
. Administration: organizational administrative unit in the Diwan that may
comprise a group of divisions or offices.
. Division: organizational administrative unit in the Diwan affiliated with a
higher organizational unit than it: the administration. It may comprise a
group of branches.
. Branch: organizational administrative unit in the Diwan affiliated with a
higher organizational unit than it: the division.
. Far': a technical term used to indicate the admin units in their different
sizes, either in an independent geographic place or for independent activity.
. Office: small organizational unit in the Diwan established in the fields of
administrative, officer or oversight jobs; or it is big and for the large part
affiliated with the highest administration.
. Organizational framework: the structure that clarifies the administrative
divisions of which the Diwan is composed- organized in the form of levels on
top of each other- and the authority and responsibility of every division. And
it is the structure through which orders and instructions flow from the higher
level to the lower level and in which the competency of taking decisions and
the centres of authority and responsibility become clear. Also defined as: the
official organizational form for the Diwan, which clarifies how the basic
organizational and divisional structure has been put in place and how the job
positions relate to the higher, lower and horizontal levels in what serves the
implementation of the defined missions.
. Job positions framework: The pyramidal structure for job positions in their
identical administrative levels quantitatively and qualitatively from the
perspective of the specialities and responsibilities within the one
organizational unit. Also defined as follows: representation of the
distribution of job positions in the organizational framework apparatus
(administration, office, division etc.).
. Job position designation: technical term expressing the purpose of the
existence of the job position and it is mostly composed of two words: the
first word expresses the fundamental speciality and the second the unit
speciality that arises from it like accountant of imports and director of
financial administration and amir of the general administration for oversight
and inspection.
. System of course of work: outline clarifying how the operation of the
official party shows the distribution and connection of its activities to
realize the missions and aims for which the organizational unit or
administrative apparatus was established.
Chapter Two[12]: Organizational guide to the security centre
Section One: Security centres in the wilayas
First: Framework of the security centres in the wilayas
Second: The organizational structure for the security centre in the wilaya:
1. The amir of the centre
Name of the administrative unit Amir of the centre
Organizational connection The wali
The job position designation for the official of the administrative unit Amir
of the security centre in a wilaya
Points of oversight All administrations and offices of the security centre
General aim Oversight of the work of the security apparatus in the wilaya
. Tasks of the amir of the security centre
Oversight of the works of the administrative units in the centres and works
of the offices.
Oversight of implementing the general security plan within the wilaya
according to the policies decided by the Diwan.
Certifying the balances and budgets for the centre and its offices.
Submitting to the amir of the Diwan and the wali a candidate for the
position of deputy [amir of the centre].
Submitting to the amir of the Diwan candidates for the positions of amirs of
the administrations, divisions and offices.
Referring monthly reports to the Diwan and wilaya concerning the work of the
centre and its offices and their review of the security situation in the
wilaya.
Writing to the wilaya in urgent matters or in the event of administrative
problems with the officials.
Continual inspection and persistent visits to the security offices and quick
tracking of the course of their work.
Continual and lasting contact with the wilaya and Diwan.
Verifying complaints raised against those affiliated with the security
centre or forming internal committees to review them.
Certifying the implementation plans in the short and medium term.
Writing to the amir of the Diwan or whoso represents him in mishaps and
taking up the directives regarding them.
Receiving those assigned to the security centre and knowing the extent of
the possibility of benefiting from them and directing them.
Issuing statements for distribution and decisions concerning the security
centre.
Undertaking all the tasks and responsibilities entrusted to him as amir of
the security centre in what concerns progress, improvement and development of
the centre's situation in a general, lasting and continual sense.
Taking all the necessary decisions to ensure compliance with the general
authorized policies and ensuring work to realize the strategic goals and
develop general outlines of action for the centre.
Dividing and distributing tasks, responsibilities, powers and job positions
according to competency and who is more preferable for the general interest,
and that is in accordance with the words of the Prophet (SAWS): "Whoso has
been entrusted with something from the affairs of the Muslims and has
appointed a man even as he sees one who is more competent than him for the
Muslims, has betrayed God and His Messenger"- narrated by al-Hakim in his
Mustadrik.
Making all the admins, foundations and committees comply with the systems of
work authorized by the Diwan and that is to ensure competent, high quality
work and that there should be no trace of any of the types of administrative
neglect or flabbiness.
Oversight of the good performance of the workers.
Investigating problems that hinder the movement of work and putting in place
solutions for them and suggesting methods of developing work.
Regularly meeting the amirs of the administrations, divisions and offices.
Tracking the extent of the compliance of the administrations, divisions and
offices with the plans and programs ensuring the success and development of
the work in the centre.
Issuing implementation notices regarding how to apply the systems of work
authorized by the Diwan.
2. Deputy amir of the centre
Name of the administrative unit Deputy amir of the centre
Organizational connection Amir of the centre
Job position designation for the official for the administrative unit Deputy
amir of the security centre
Points of oversight All administrations and offices of the security centre
General aim Deputy role of the amir of the centre
. Tasks of the deputy amir of the centre:
Tracking all the works of the administration units in the centre and the
works of the offices.
Carrying out some of the special tasks of the amir in the event of being
entrusted to do them by him and total representation of him in all tasks in
the event of his absence.
Overseeing the files and fields he is entrusted with by the amir of the
centre.
Representing the amir of the centre in overseeing the works of the centre
according to the powers delegated to him by the amir.
Overseeing the course of work of the plans and systems implemented in the
security centre and authorized by the Diwan.
Tracking the extent of the compliance of the administrations, divisions and
offices with the plans and programs ensuring the success and development of
the work in the centre.
Undertaking any other tasks entrusted to him by the amir of the centre.
3. Administration of the security of the mujahideen
Name of the administrative unit Administration of the security of the
mujahideen
Organizational connection Amir of the centre
Job position designation for the official for the admin unit Amir of the
administration of the security of the mujahideen
Points of oversight All divisions affiliated with the administration of the
security of the mujahideen
General aim Protecting the security of the mujahideen in the wilaya
Tasks of the administration of the security of the mujahideen:
Preventive security
Counter-espionage
Monitoring suspect and bad members (disappointingly and agitated)
Following cases of the corruption of doctrines
Note: the administration of the security of the mujahideen works on the level
of the centres of the Diwans and committees in the wilaya, and the security of
the army in the event that the army is affiliated with the wilaya.
4. Intelligence administration
Name of the administrative unit Intelligence administration
Organizational connection Amir of the centre
Job position designation for the official for the admin unit Amir of the
intelligence administration
Points of oversight All divisions affiliated with the intelligence
administration
General aim Administration of the intelligence groups and obtaining the
desired information in different [types][13]
. Tasks of the intelligence administration:
Administration of the intelligence groups in its purview.
Gathering and analyzing information and submitting it to those with the
power of decision-making.
Working on the files that are ordered to be worked on with due process.
Studying negative phenomena that represent a danger to the security of the
Dawla and referring them to be dealt with.[14]
Catching espionage networks and using all Shari'i means available to uncover
them.
Investigation and studies.
4/a: Information and archive division
Name of the administrative unit Information and archive division
Organizational connection Intelligence administration
Job position designation for the official of the administrative unit Amir of
the information and archive division
Points of oversight All divisions affiliated with the information and archive
division
General aim Administration of information, analyzing it and preserving it
Tasks of the information and archive division:
Administration of information, collecting it, analyzing it, preserving it
and securing it in accordance with principles.
Gathering information from the security offices in the sectors.
Applying means of work put in place by the Diwan.
Tracking and receiving information from the media, and bringing it together
in the form of daily reports.
Classifying information according to principles that must be dealt with.
Transferring information to the relevant parties with the writing of a
suggestion or notice concerning the extent of the truth of the piece of
information and its danger.
Establishing a secure archive for the wilaya.
5. Verification and prison administration.
Name of the administrative unit Verification and prison administration
Organizational connection Amir of the centre
Job position designation for the official for the administrative unit Amir of
the verification and prison administration
Points of oversight All offices affiliated with the verification and prison
administration
General aim Undertaking tasks of verification and what concerns it from
detention, verification and prosecution
. Tasks of the verification and prison administration:
Administration of the prisons affiliated with the wilaya.
Tracking cases of prisoners.
Sorting and distinguishing cases (non-security cases or those that don't
need detention).[15]
Undertaking verification in security cases.
Supplementing the rulings issued by the judges.
Issuing arrest requests against whoso has been involved in cases in which
verification has been done.
Issuing requests for inspection and tracking.
Bringing cases against detainees before judges.
6. Technology and informatics administration
Name of administrative unit Technology and informatics administration
Organizational connection Amir of the centre
Job position designation for the official of the administrative unit Amir of
the technology and informatics adminiistration
Points of oversight All technology offices affiliated with it
General aim Deal with the electronic devices of detainees and work to stop
electronic penetrations for devices that are used (connections, devices and
Internet)
. Tasks of the technology and informatics administration:
Recovery and maintenance division:
Recovery: restoring and recovering deleted files and data and extracting the
hidden and encrypted from them from all electronic devices.
Maintenance: maintenance of all electronic devices and preparing them for
security work, removing tracking devices[16] and repairing broken apparatuses.
Systems and networks division:
Working to prepare safe operating systems for electronic devices that are
used.
Securing and protecting devices connected to the Internet through
recommending safe programs.
Applying plans to encrypt and archive sensitive data to protect them from
damage and espionage.
Programing Internet networks and establishing local servers and networks and
managing them and securing their connections and encrypting their data.
Office to regulate connections:
Regulating Internet connections.
Issuing Internet licenses to the parties allowed to use it.[17]
Regulating the selling and buying of Internet apparatuses and its
necessities.
Tracking and monitoring the licensed places and sending regular patrols to
monitor the course of work and make sure those licensed are complying with the
instructions and conditions.
7. Economic security administration
Name of administrative unit Economic security administration
Organizational connection Amir of the centre
Job position designation for the official of the administration unit Amir of
the economic security administration
Points of oversight Economic security administration
General aim Working to preserve economic security
. Tasks of the economic security administration:
Verification in relevant cases.
Investigating cases concerning economic security.
Assuming responsibility for verifying cases of financial corruption and
embezzlement and arresting the accused in those cases or placing them under
disposition without arrest.
Monitoring the financial situations of the soldiers of the Dawla, verifying
and gathering information about the reasons for the increase of the wealth of
a soldier of the Dawla whether it derives from his presence in the Dawla or
not.
Verifying with the suspect from the soldiers of the Dawla in cases of
financial corruption deriving from his work or other actions connected with
his work.
Verifying in cases and problems coming from the areas and sectors and taking
the necessary procedures in verification, inspection and controlling those
problems and cases found, taking hold of them and arresting the one shown to
be involved by evidence.
Cases of forging currency and precious metals through verifying in them and
referring the accused either to the ordinary judiciary or the security one
according to the quantity of forgery and its type.
Cases of smuggling antiquities and rikaz resources[18] of which a fifth part
belongs to the Dawla and which issues instructions banning their circulation
and excavation without the license of the Dawla.
Cases of hoarding that impact the economic situation of the land and the
Muslims' livelihood.
Monitoring strategic commodities in the markets and submitting the necessary
suggestions to the authorized parties to take the appropriate measures on the
matter of their availability, beginning from encouraging the merchants to make
them available, and concluding with the Dawla's importation of them or
intervening in the border crossings to pressure the neighbouring systems to
exchange them for other commodities coming out of the lands of the Dawla like
necessities of agricultural production from fertilizer, pesticides and other
goods.
8. Administration of administrative affairs.
Name of administrative unit Administration of administrative affairs
Organizational connection Amir of the centre
Job position designation for the official of the administrative unit Amir of
the administration of administrative affairs
Points of oversight All divisions affiliated with the administration
General aim Heeding the administrative and financial needs of the centre
. Tasks of the administration of administrative affairs:
Administration of the centre's capabilities according to principles
followed.
Financial works of the administration.
Administration of human resources.
Addressing work needs.
Undertaking all actions that help the centre's foundational works.
Section Two: Security offices in the sectors
1. Organizational framework for the security offices in the sectors
Notes:
1. Some of the offices may have in them a technology and informatics division
according to the need defined by the amir of the security centre.
2. Some of the offices will not have in them an implementation division
according to the need defined by the amir of the security centre.
Second: organizational structure for the security offices in the centre.
1. Amir of the security office
Name of the administrative unit Amir of the security office
Organizational connection Amir of the centre
Job position designation for the official for the administrative unit Amir of
the security office
Points of oversight All divisions affiliated with the office
General aim Overseeing the security work in the sector
Tasks of the amir of the security office:
Overseeing the works of the administrative units in the office
Overseeing the implementation of the general security plan within the office
and making use of the policies decided by the Diwan.
Deciding on the budgets and balances concerning the office.
Nominating the candidate for deputy amir of the security office to the amir
of the centre.
Referring monthly reports to the centre concerning the office's work and its
review of the security situation in the sector.
Writing to the centre in urgent matters or in event of administrative
problems.
Continual inspection and persistent visits to security personnel and quick
tracking of the course of their work.
Lasting and continual connection with the centre.
Receiving those assigned to the office and getting to know the extent of the
possibility of benefiting from them and directing them.
Undertaking all the tasks and responsibilities he is entrusted with as amir
of the security office in what ensures the progress, improvement and
development of the office's situation generally and in a lasting and continual
sense.
Making all divisions comply with the systems of work set by the Diwan.
Monitoring the soundness of the workers' performance.
Investigating problems that impede the movement of work and putting in place
solutions for them and suggesting methods of developing work.
Regular meetings with the amirs of the divisions and offices
Tracking the extent of the compliance of the admins, divisions and offices
with the plans and programs that ensure the success and development of work in
the centre.
Issuing arrest orders in urgent matters.
2. Deputy amir of the amir's office.
Name of administrative unit Deputy amir of the amir's office
Organizational connection Amir of the security office
Job position designation for the official for the administrative unit Deputy
amir of the amir's office
Points of oversight All divisions affiliated with the office
General aim Role of deputy of the amir of the security office in his tasks
Tasks of the deputy amir of the security office:
Tracking all works of the administrative units in the office.
Undertaking some of the amir's special assignments in the event of being
entrusted to undertake them by him and comprehensive representation of him in
all missions in the event of his absence.
Overseeing the files and fields entrusted to him by the amir of the office.
Overseeing the course of work of the plans and systems implemented in the
security centre and authorized by the Diwan.
Tracking the extent of the compliance of the admins, divisions and offices
with the plans and programs ensuring the success and development of work in
the office.
Undertaking any other missions entrusted to him by the amir of the office.
3. Intelligence division
Name of administrative unit Intelligence division
Organizational connection Amir of the security office
Job position designation for the official for the administrative unit Amir of
the intelligence division
Points of oversight All offices affiliated with the division
General aim Administration of intelligence groups and obtaining the desired
information through different means
Tasks of the intelligence division:
. Administration of the intelligence groups in its purview.
. Gathering, analyzing and referring information.
. Working on files ordered to work on with due process.
. Recruiting eyes.[19]
. Studying negative phenomena that represent a danger to the security of the
Dawla and referring them to be dealt with.
. Catching espionage networks and using all available legitimate means to
uncover them.
. Inquiry and studies.
3a: Archive and information office
Name of the administrative unit Information and archive office
Organizational connection Amir of the intelligence division
Job position designation for the official of the administrative unit Amir of
the information and archive office
Points of oversight Offices affiliated with the division
General aim Administration of information, analyzing it and preserving it
Tasks of the information office
Admin of information, collecting it, analyzing it, preserving it and
securing it according to principles.
Applying means of work put in place by the Diwan.
Classifying information according to the principles that must be dealt with.
Referring information to the specific parties with writing of a suggestion
or notice regarding the extent of the truth of the piece of information and
its danger.
Establishing a secure archive for the office.
4. Verification and prison division
Name of administrative unit Verification and prison division
Organizational connection Amir of the security office
Job position designation for the official for the administrative unit Amir of
the verification and prison division
Points of oversight Offices affiliated with the division
General aim Undertaking tasks of verification and things related to it from
detention, verification and prosecution
Tasks of the verification and prison division
Admin of prisons affiliated with the security office in the sector.
Tracking cases of prisoners.
Sorting and distinguishing cases (non-security cases or not requiring
detention).
Undertaking verification in security cases
Supplementing the rulings issued by the judges
Issuing arrest requests against those involved in cases in which
verification has been done.
Issuing inspection and tracking requests
Bringing cases against detainees before judges.
5. Implementation division
Name of administrative unit Implementation division
Organizational connection Amir of the security office
Job position designation for the official for the administrative unit Amir of
the implementation division
Points of oversight ...
General aim Arrests and assaults
Tasks of the implementation division
Carrying out the orders of arrest and inspection issued by the authorized
parties and what concerns the arrest operation from procedures
Flying checkpoints.
6. Administrative affairs division
Name of administrative unit Administrative affairs division
Organizational connection Amir of the security office
Job position designation for the official for the admin unit Amir of the
administrative affairs division
Points of oversight ...
General aim Heeding the administrative and financial needs of the office
Tasks of the administrative affairs division:
Administration of the office's capabilities according to principles followed
Financial administration works
Administration of human resources
Heeding work needs
Undertaking all actions that help the foundational works of the office.
Chapter Three[20]: The official relations for the Diwan
Section One: The official relations for the Diwan
First: The Diwan's relation with the walis
. The Diwan has the right to put in place the general plans and policies for
the Diwan and centres and the wilaya must apply them.
. The Diwan has the right to put in place the internal system in its entirety,
and put in place the mechanism for modifying it, and the wilaya must comply
with applying the internal system entirely.
With regards to appointment:
. The appointment of the amir of the centre is done by agreement between the
wali and the Diwan and the Delegated Committee decides if the two don't agree
on a person and the submission of a replacement is put forth in opposition to
that person.
. The appointment of the security official and officials of the main
administrations in the security centre and the security officials of the
sectors is not to be done except after the agreement of the Diwan.
. Concerning the rest of the personnel of the apparatus, the Diwan is to be
notified.
With regards to removal:
. The removal of the security official, officials of the main administrations
in the security centre and the security officials of the sectors is not to be
done except after the Diwan's agreement. With regards to the rest of the
personnel of the apparatus, the Diwan must be notified of the reasons for
removal.
. The Diwan has the right to remove one of the workers in the security centre
through the wali.
With regards to reassignment (transferring outside the security centre): the
one to be reassigned is to be referred to the Diwan by order of the wali with
the recommendations for the purpose of verification and knowing the reasons
for reassignment and the adoption of the final decision.
With regards to placement:
The wali is to send the personnel to submit to a course in the Diwan which has
the decision to accept or not.
. The Diwan may reward any of the workers in the centres
. The Diwan is not to rebuke any of the workers in the centre except through
the wali.
. The Diwan can support the centre through additional cash for it to be spent
on developing the security and intelligence work and is not in the usual
stipulations of spending, provided that a letter is sent to the wali
concerning what has been spent for the centre.
. The wilaya may not redistribute the electronic devices (computers, cameras,
eavesdropping devices) etc. to outside the security centre because of the
negative consequences and risks from it as the devices may have information in
them that can be recovered even after being deleted.
. The wilaya has no right to redistribute to outside the security centre cars
and pistols handed by the Diwan to the centre as an entrustment.
. The wilaya may not hand over silencers to any of the workers in the wilaya
from the security centre and others besides them except after agreement of the
Diwan.
Second: the Diwan al-Amn's relation with the security centres in the
wilayas
. The security centre must comply with the system of work and directions
issued by the Diwan.
. Lasting and continual exchange of information.
. The centre must refer monthly reports to the Diwan with its review of the
centre's work.
. The security centre must respond to the Diwan's inquiries.
. The security centre is obliged to implement the orders of arrest, tracking
and observation issued by the Diwan.
. The security centre is obliged to implement the Diwan's order to extend the
period of detention of any of the prisoners so long as the period does not
exceed at most a week after the decision to release him.
. The security centre has a right to contact and correspond with the Diwan
without going through the wali.
. Power of release:
The Diwan can request for any of the prisoners to be released but the wilaya
may refuse on condition of informing the Diwan of the reasons.
The amir of the centre does not have the right to remove, transfer or reassign
officials of the main administrations and security officials of the sectors
except after the agreement of the Diwan, and concerning the rest of the
workers in the centre, the Diwan is to be notified with statement of reason.
. The Diwan has the right to withdraw and transfer any of the cases and
prisoners detained in that case from the security centre to the Diwan.
. Continual connection with the security centres in the wilayas and visiting
them on a regular basis and reviewing their work.
. Regularly meeting with the amirs of the centres and directing them.
. Continual oversight and tracking of the work of the security centres.
. Receiving monthly reports from the centres and discussing with them the
reports.
Section Two: The official relation of the security centre with the wilaya
Firstly: The relation of the security centre with the wali:
. The security centre in the wilaya is affiliated with the wali
administratively and financially.
With regards to transfer:
The wali has the right to transfer any of the security officials inside the
centre in coordination with the amir of the centre, except the security
official and officials of the main administrations in the security centre and
the security officials of the sectors.
. The centre must refer monthly reports to the wilaya with its review of the
centre's work and the wali must safeguard the secrecy of the reports, so no
one else must review them without necessity, and he is to destroy them as soon
as possible.
Conditions for mobilizing security personnel:
. The wilaya must mobilize the security in the last stage of the stages of
mobilization.
. The wilaya must not mobilize the officials of the main administrations and
security officials of the sectors.
. In the event of general mobilization there is to be mobilization of an
accepted number (20%) in so far as it does not hinder their work in
intelligence, implementation, analyzing information, guarding prisons etc.
. The wali has the right to review all security information but may not
delegate anyone to review it except his deputy.
. The centre must submit any report the wali demands provided the centre
classifies its correspondences like there is a report that only the wali can
review so it writes 'secret', and so on. And the Diwan puts forth the
regulations of the correspondences and the wilaya must comply with it.
. The amir of the centre has the right to transfer, remove or reassign one of
the security officials in the centre except the officials of the main
administrations and the security officials of the sectors, which must be done
only after the agreement of the Diwan.
. The amir of the centre has the right to affiliate new personnel to the
security centre according to the regulations of the Diwan al-Amn.
. The wali is the one who defines the means of implementing rulings of death
penalty (publicly or secretly) and the place of implementation.
. Only the security apparatus is to oversee the implementation of the rulings
of death penalty issued against prisoners in security cases.
Second: the security centre's relation with the amirs of the sectors and
areas:
. The security office in the sector is not affiliated with the amir of the
sector in all administrative and financial issues.
. The amir of the sector is not to mobilize, transfer, remove, appoint or
rebuke members of the security apparatus in the sector.
. The amir of the sector has the right to monitor and track by himself and
does not have the right to delegate anyone with that, and he is to refer his
counsels to the amir of the security centre or the wali.
. The amir of the sector has the right to review the prisons by himself and
has no right to delegate anyone with that.
. The amir of the sector may inquire about the situation of one of the
detainees and the security office in the sector must respond with the
available and allowed information.
. The amir of the sector may request a basic security study from the security
office.
. The amir of the sector may not request inventories, names or copies from the
cases or security information.
. The amir of the sector may raise opposition to the means of security work in
his sector to the amir of the sector or the wali but may not obstruct security
work.
. The amir of the sector may not issue an order of arrest or release to the
security office.
. The amir of the sector and security official of the sector must work
together to safeguard the security in the sector.
. The security official of the sector must coordinate with the amir of the
sector in the most important cases that concern the sector.
Third: the security centre's relation with the repentance office
. The repentance security division has the right to enter all repentance
centres and review all files of those who repent, verify with them and take
all information particular to them.
. There is the right to take a copy of the archive of those who repent.
. It [the security centre] has the right to place a means of securing the
information and the office must comply.
. The security centre has the right to arrest suspects from those present in
the repentance centres.
Notes
[1] E.g. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi,"Archive of Islamic State Administrative
Documents (continued)," aymennjawad.org (Specimens 17J and 18V), January 11,
2016 (http://www.aymennjawad.org/2016/01/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents-1).
[2] "Newsletters Found in Anbar Indicate How Extremist Group Organizes
Itself," Niqash, June 16, 2016 (http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/security/5294/Newsletters-Found-In-Anbar-Indicate-How-Extremist-Group-Organises-Itself.htm).
[3] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi,"Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents
(continued)," aymennjawad.org (Specimen 16W), January 11, 2016 (http://www.aymennjawad.org/2016/01/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents-1).
[4] E.g. Liz Sly, "The hidden hand behind the Islamic State militants? Saddam
Hussein's," Washington Post, April 4, 2015 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-hidden-hand-behind-the-islamic-state-militants-saddam-husseins/2015/04/04/aa97676c-cc32-11e4-8730-4f473416e759_story.html?utm_term=.c892c1a31f38).
[5] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "The Evolution in Islamic State Administration:
The Documentary Evidence," Perspectives on Terrorism, August 5, 2015 (http://www.aymennjawad.org/17687/the-evolution-in-islamic-state-administration).
[6] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "A Complete History of Jama'at Ansar al-Islam,"
aymennjawad.org, December 15, 2015 (http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/12/a-complete-history-of-jamaat-ansar-al-islam).
[7] "The security office for Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham arrests a cell comprising 7
members of the Dawla organization in Idlib city, bringing the number of
khawarij arrested by the Hay'a today to 32 members," Iba' News Agency, July
12, 2017 (https://justpaste.it/iba12july2017).
[8] Bryan Price and Muhammad al-'Ubaydi, "CTC Perspectives: The Islamic
State's Internal Rifts and Social Media Ban," CTC, June 21, 2017 (https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/ctc-perspectives-the-islamic-states-internal-rifts-and-social-media-ban).
[9] For a sample of the most recent Internet regulations, see e.g. regulations
introduced in the Mosul area in July 2016. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Archive of
Islamic State Administrative Documents (continued), aymennjawad.org (Specimens
18V and 18Z), January 11, 2016 (http://www.aymennjawad.org/2016/01/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents-1).
[10] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Islamic State Administrative
Documents (continued...again)," aymennjawad.org (Specimens 32G and 32O),
September 17, 2016 (http://www.aymennjawad.org/2016/09/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents-2).
[11] A section by this title does not turn up in the subsequent pages. Appears
to be a clumsy error as there is a section on mobilizing personnel, a matter
tied of course to the Diwan al-Jund.
[12] Typo in the original has this marked "Chapter Three." The error has been
corrected in the translation.
[13] Typo in the original. "Types" is the additional word meant here. Added in
as a correction.
[14] E.g. From other documents I have obtained, in July 2016 the security
centre in Aleppo province submitted a report to the greater Diwan. This report
constituted a study of some of the Kurdish villages in Aleppo province and the
supposed danger they represent to the Islamic State on account of PKK/SDF
loyalties among the populations.
[15] E.g. Mere violations of Islamic morality by civilians- such as smoking
cigarettes- will not be considered security cases.
[16] E.g. Removing GPS from phones, a measure introduced early on after the
declaration of the Caliphate (December 2014). See Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi,
"Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents," aymennjawad.org (Specimen
X), January 27, 2015 (http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/01/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents).
[17] This matter has also been regulated at times by the Diwan al-Hisba.
[18] E.g. Precious metals.
[19] i.e. Recruiting spies.
[20] Original text reads Chapter Four. Typo corrected in the translation.
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