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Writers Articles And Opinions |
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24 April 2009 By Khalid Amayreh
Fatah remains rife with discord, its leaders
stumbling along the road of the Palestinian cause
Despite numerous promises and assurances for political
reform within the Fatah movement, the mainstream
faction of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)
is still unable to hold its long overdue Sixth
Congress.
The
last time the supposedly annual Fatah convention was
held was in Algiers in 1988 when Yasser Arafat
declared the "independence of Palestine".
Fatah leaders, including its formal leader Mahmoud
Abbas, and Secretary-General Ahmed Qurei, have been
vowing to hold the Sixth Congress for several years.
However, no sooner had a date for holding the
conference been designated than postponement was
decided due to "unforeseen circumstances" and "in
order to ensure the success of the conference".
The
recurrent -- and seemingly endless -- postponements
have created a lot of frustration and disenchantment
within Fatah's rank and file, especially at the
grassroots and intermediate levels. Activists and
regional leaders have been accusing the "leadership"
of flying in the face of the movement and preferring
to appease certain regional and external powers.
Curiously, such accusations are met by fresh
assurances that the Sixth Congress will be held sooner
rather than later. But in March, a preparatory
committee representing various wings within the
movement abruptly adjourned its meetings in Amman
without reaching a consensus even on who will
participate in the conference.
Sources within Fatah reported that, "instead of making
progress towards holding the conference, we progressed
towards making more disagreements."
According to these sources, the "fiasco" in Amman
reflected the chronic differences between Fatah
President Abbas and the movement's other leaders, such
as Farouk Al-Qaddumi, head of the PLO Political
Department; the so-called Arafites (loyalists of
former Palestinian Authority/PLO leader Yasser Arafat)
and "the anti-Oslo figures" who are opposed to
recognising Israel and revoking the Palestinian
National Charter.
The
same sources revealed that the main contentious point
impeding reaching a consensus agreement that would
have paved the way for holding Fatah's convention was
a "single-headed determination" by Abbas to "impose"
his supporters as "candidates" for key positions in
various Fatah institutions, such as the movement's
paramount Executive Committee.
Among those allies is Diab Al-Ali, a fiercely anti-Hamas
figure who holds the title of "commander of the
Palestinian national forces" in the West Bank. Last
year, it was widely reported that Al-Ali held a secret
meeting with Israeli army commanders at the Jewish
colony of Beit El near Ramallah during which he
reportedly told the Israelis that "we and you are
allies and we have a common enemy and that is Hamas."
Al-Ali was also quoted as saying that he was willing
and ready to reoccupy Gaza with Israeli backing.
Disquieted by the break of the committee's
deliberations in Amman, Abbas assured a number of
prominent and independent-minded Fatah figures,
including Ahmed Qurei, Salim Zaanoun, and Mohamed
Rateb Ghoneim, that he would see to it that they be
granted "membership by default" in Fatah's Executive
Committee on the grounds that they are part of the
movement's "historical leadership".
Abbas, the sources added, was hoping that winning the
"lesser opponents" such as Qurei would help him win in
the expected confrontation with Qaddumi. The latter is
a prominent critic of the Abbas leadership and the
close security coordination between the Israeli army
and Palestinian security agencies.
In
addition to the "groupings phenomenon", which has
always existed within Fatah but was often suppressed
thanks to the charismatic character of Arafat, there
is a serious contention within the movement over the
moribund peace process with Israel. Officially, Fatah
is still advocating the two-state solution whereby a
viable Palestinian state would be established in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its
capital.
However, the intensive building by Israel of Jewish
colonies all over the West Bank, and especially the
heightened pace of Judaisation in East Jerusalem, is
pushing many in Fatah away from the two-state
solution.
This
issue, namely the failure of the political process
with Israel, is likely to militate against the Abbas
leadership if Fatah members are allowed to freely
elect a new leadership. This is also the reason why
Abbas is reportedly trying hard to impose his
supporters on the conference and exclude as much as
possible those who are likely to vote against him.
More
to the point, a failure of the Abbas camp at the
conference would have larger ramifications since it
would mean a vote of no confidence in the peace
process with which Abbas had linked his entire
political career.
At
the very least, Abbas's opponents would insist that
the peace process be steered in such a way that would
be compatible with Palestinian national constants,
including full Israeli withdrawal from 100 per cent of
the occupied territories, and repatriation of
Palestinian refugees to their original homes and towns
from which they were expelled when Israel was created
in 1948.
Hence, it is expected that "all necessary efforts be
made" to ensure that opponents of the peace process
won't take over Fatah. But undemocratic manipulation
before and during the conference would only perpetuate
disunity within Fatah and might also lead to a real
implosion within the movement.
An
additional important point of contention facing Fatah
is the widespread disillusionment in the movement with
the Western-backed government of Salam Fayyad. This
government, which only has the legitimacy of the
status quo, has been harshly criticised by young Fatah
members as serving the "American-Israeli agenda" as
well as the interests of "the mercenaries and
merchants of the peace process" (i.e. Abbas
loyalists).
On
numerous occasions, Fatah leaders demanded that Abbas
sack Fayyad and form a government composed of Fatah
members and independents. They argued that Fatah was
being seriously sidelined by the Fayyad government and
that all the "flaws and defects" of the government
were being blamed on Fatah, which eventually would
contribute to weakening their movement while
strengthening Hamas.
Abbas denounced the charges as "false" and "libellous",
arguing that the continued existence of the Fayyad
government ensured that the accusers and tens of
thousands of other civil servants would continue to
receive salaries at the end of the month. While this
rationale serves to silence some critics, it is
obvious that the "alliance" between Fayyad and Abbas
also serves to weaken Fatah in the eyes of many
Palestinians.
According to recent Palestinian opinion polls, Abbas
is steadily losing popularity in favour of Hamas and
especially imprisoned veteran Fatah leader Marwan Al-Barghouti.
The latter stands out today as the most popular
Palestinian leader. Many Palestinians hope that the
release of Al-Barghouti by Israel, probably in the
context of a prisoner swap deal with Hamas, would
seriously strengthen the "nationalist camp" within
Fatah against the "pragmatic camp" led by Abbas.
This
may explain the fact that the Palestinian Authority
leadership did not make any effort to pressure former
Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert to free Al-Barghouti.
Indeed, it was reported that Abbas himself demanded
that Al-Barghouti's name be taken off any list of
Palestinians to be released.
Given the sensitivity of the issue, the Palestinian
Authority denies "all innuendoes and insinuations" in
this regard. (end) |