17 March 2012 By Osman Mirghani As it approaches the one year landmark, the Syrian
crisis has entered the stage of a race against time.
On the one hand, the regime continues to commit
excessive violence and killings, benefiting from the
slack international community as well as regional and
international complexities. On the other hand, the
rebels have so far been able to withstand all, as
opposition groups seek to increase pressure on the
regime and convince hesitant international parties of
their ability to organize themselves and present a
ready alternative capable of reassuring – and gaining
the support of – different components of society. The
already complicated scene has been further compounded
by the Russian-Chinese veto in the Security Council,
and later by the "Friends of Syria" conference, which
frustrated all those who pinned hope upon it and built
up high expectations. The conference merely produced a
general statement lacking in clear, practical steps
that could change the reality on the ground. It only
served to expose the gap between the different parties
concerned, after the Westerners once again upheld
their old stance rejecting military intervention, and
their reservations even towards calls to arm the
Syrian opposition. The Syrian crisis will continue, until further
notice, to remain captive of regional and
international calculations and complexities. The
ongoing bickering between a number of Western
capitals, most prominently Washington on the one hand,
and Russia and China on the other, reflects such
complexities. Russia, despite its recent move to
justify using its veto, still upholds its pro-Damascus
stance and claims to be seeking a peaceful solution to
ward off the evils of a civil war in Syria. At the
same time, Moscow rejects using the United Nations as
a tool for regime change. In order to understand the Russian stance, we
require an explanation that goes beyond the argument
that Moscow felt deceived previously by the Security
Council's resolution on Libya, and therefore it is now
objecting to any resolution that leaves the door open
for possible military intervention in Syria. Moscow is
not only suspicious of Western stances towards Syria,
but is also skeptical of Western movements near its
vicinity. Russia still feels deeply humiliated as a
result of the decline in its international influence,
with the Western tern encroaching upon the former
Soviet republics adjacent to its border. In her memoirs published late last year, former
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice gave a detailed
account of her meeting with Vladimir Putin, in the
wake of the "color revolutions" that broke out across
a number of former Soviet republics. Rice says: "Putin
told me he was opposed to any revolution from the
street." Although he did not say explicitly during the
meeting that his country considered these revolutions
to be a Western plot, Rice interpreted Putin's words
as an insinuation that such revolutions were a Western
tool to divert Russia from its path. Such rhetoric may
reflect Putin's skeptical vision towards the current
Arab revolutions, and the harmony he maintains with
the position of the Syrian President, who also
describes the uprising against his regime as a plot.
The irony of this situation is that the Western
states that launched a fierce campaign against the
Russian stance towards Syria now seem to have come to
an agreement with Moscow, with regards to the need to
find a political solution to end the crisis. Indeed,
it has transpired that some Western states have
advised the Arabs and the Syrian opposition not to
close the door on Russia's calls for dialogue between
the regime and the revolutionaries. How can this be
explained? The West's strategy fluctuates between its
desire to undermine the Syrian-Iranian axis and take
Israel's fears into account. Hence, the stance
objecting to the armament of the Syrian opposition is
understandable; for this could lead to a large-scale
war provoking unrest along the Israeli border. The
excuse of a "divided Syrian opposition" in order to
justify not arming the rebels does not seem convincing
when the same Western capitals previously backed the
Libyan rebels with air-raids and intelligence
information, and remained silent about their armament,
although the Libyan opposition were far more dispersed
than their Syrian counterparts. Likewise, we can also refute the claim that arming
the Syrian opposition would not necessarily ensure the
overthrow of the al-Assad regime, as the balance of
power would remain considerably in favor of the
regime, and the increase of weapons in the battlefield
would only mean more civilian victims. However, we
could say that this situation also applied to the
Libyan case; the Gaddafi regime was in possession of
huge arsenal in the face of the rebels, and
nevertheless, the West had no objections to arming the
rebels; rather it encouraged such an endeavor. The sole reason why the West is currently warning
against arming the Syrian opposition is that the West
is concerned about Israel. Washington, alongside a
number of Western capitals, fears that an internal
full-scale war may erupt, and uncontrolled security
chaos may prevail. As a result, weapons may
proliferate among parties stationed along the Israeli
border, with the possible involvement of Jihadist
groups. The fears regarding Israel also include the
possibility that the fall of the al-Assad regime may
result in the Muslim Brotherhood rising to power,
along the lines of Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco. The
last thing Israel would want is to find itself
besieged by Muslim Brotherhood regimes along its
border from Egypt to Syria, and pro-Iran movements
from Hezbollah in Lebanon to Hamas in Gaza. Such factors may help to explain the convergence
between the West and Russia, and the preference for a
political solution along the lines of Yemen. This
would mean the handover of power whereby President al-Assad
would leave, but part of his regime would remain in
power alongside the opposition in order to maintain
stability, and prepare for a gradual internal change.
If this solution proves impossible and the crisis is
further prolonged, then Israel would also derive
benefits, provided that confrontations with heavily
armed fighters do not extend towards its border.
Prolonging the crisis may grant Washington and Israel
more time to make a decision with regards to launching
a military strike against Iran, as Syria would then be
preoccupied with its internal situation, and Hezbollah
would be lacking its main supply route. The only factor that can disrupt these complicated
elements lies in the Syrian people's ability to
escalate their uprising in a manner that undermines
the regime and intensifies the pressure on the
international community, prompting it to reconsider
its calculations. Comments 💬 التعليقات |