Islamist Division In Sudan: Reality Or Ploy? Staying In Power, Even If They End Up Losing The Rest Of The Country
11 February 2013
By Osman Mirghani
There has been a lot of talk recently about deep
divisions and rifts in the ranks plaguing the ruling
Islamic Movement in Sudan, as a result of accumulating
governance errors, corruption, and the inner circle's
monopolization of decision making. This is in addition
to the struggle over who will succeed President Al-Bashir,
which has intensified after reports of his illness
that required him to travel abroad twice for
treatment. Some aspirants from among the ruling party
and Islamist Movement have rushed to take up advanced
positions now, rather than waiting until the
president's term ends next year. Several issues came
to a head after the regime announced it had thwarted a
coup attempt late last year and arrested a number of
military and civilian personnel responsible. It soon
became clear to the people from their names that the
perpetrators belonged to the Islamist movement and the
ruling party. Indeed, some of them were among the most
prominent fighters in the ranks of the regime who
protected it on both the military and security levels.
Then the pillars of the regime did their utmost to
launch an attack on what they described as a coup and
sabotage attempt, forgetting or overlooking the fact
that they originally came to power via a military coup
that overthrew a democratically elected government.
This confirmed that political Islamist movements are
sick with the desire for power, to the extent that
they do not accept the practice of true democracy and
do not believe in the concept of the peaceful transfer
of power through the ballot box.
From here, the Sudanese people are divided. On the one
hand there are those who believe the talk of an
explosion of inherent differences, reaching the stage
whereby they threaten the survival of the regime
itself, after it became bloated and ravaged by the
disease of power and domination. On the other hand
there are those who dismiss this as the Islamists'
game of tricks to distract the people and absorb the
rising popular anger in light of the severe economic
crisis, the high cost of living, and the outrage
towards corruption. These factors led to the streets
of Khartoum, and a number of other Sudanese cities,
witnessing a series of demonstrations and angry
protests which the regime quelled with severe
repression to prevent their spread. The Sudanese
street remains motivated after the Arab Spring
uprisings, which revived memories of their first
popular revolution in October 1964 and then their
second uprising in April 1985, both times overthrowing
military regimes.
The coup attempt was revealed a few days after the
Islamic Movement's general conference, which was held
this time amid unprecedented media clamor, after
previous conferences had been held in secrecy and away
from the media limelight. Much talk was leaked about
sharp differences, calls for reform, disengagement
between the party and the state, and even talk of
reconsidering the overlapping relationship between the
Islamic Movement and the ruling National Congress
Party. This talk was seen as the culmination of a
wider debate about the so-called ?thousand brothers?
memorandum, allegedly put forward by groups of youths
within the movement and some of its ?reformist?
elders, to President Bashir, vice president Ali Osman
Mohammed Taha, who is referred to as the ?emir of the
Islamic Movement?, along with other leading figures in
the party, demanding a package of reforms. This
memorandum was the talk of Sudanese councils for a few
months and raised many questions and speculation that
the regime failed to resolve with a clear statement,
but rather it heightened this atmosphere with
ambiguous, conflicting statements from a number of
officials or those affiliated with the regime.
Yet the timing of the publishing of the memorandum
contributed to an increase in uncertainty about
whether the whole process is another maneuver or trick
from the National Islamic Front, which has recently
changed its name, not for the first time, to the
Islamic Movement. The memorandum, as is rumored, was
put forward in December 2011 after months of
demonstrations that erupted in Sudan. These
demonstrations had raised fears among some of those in
power that the infection of the Arab Spring would be
transferred to Khartoum, especially in the aftermath
of the secession of the south, which the Bashir regime
considered responsible for the protests and their
consequences. From this standpoint, the memorandum, at
least for those skeptical of the regime, seemed like
an attempt to contain the popular anger or save the
regime from itself by calling for internal reform
rather than regime change. However, on the other hand
there were those who believed that the regime had
already begun eroding as a result of its bloated and
corrupt nature, and the sense of marginalization among
many of the movement's youth. There were also strong
feelings of anger among a number of military leaders
who had borne the brunt of the fighting and had
defended the regime for many years, only to see their
sacrifices wasted because of in-fighting and squabbles
over the spoils of war. In this context there appears
to be a link between the ?thousand brothers'
memorandum and another one allegedly signed by 700
officers in the armed forces, where the vast of
majority of recruits are from the Islamic Movement or
at least sympathize with it. The latter memorandum was
submitted to President Bashir in October 2010 to
demand that the path be rectified and to bring his
errors to his attention. Some of these signatories
were also among those arrested in the coup attempt in
Khartoum at the end of November last year, with the
most prominent signatory, Brigadier General Mohammed
Ibrahim, being detained and considered the leader of
the alleged coup.
There are strong indications that the differences
within the corridors of power are not entirely
artificial. It is true that some may have been
manufactured by the security services or from inside
the Islamic Movement, but this does not deny the fact
that some stem from varying views, or from the
struggle for influence and positions. The problem is
that those at odds with the regime want to salvage it
rather than overthrow it, and even if they resort to a
military coup they just want to reproduce the regime
in a new guise that guarantees their stay in power for
God knows how long. Even for those who disagree among
themselves, the survival of power within their hands
remains the goal. How else can we explain the remarks
of the Islamic Movement's new secretary general, AL-Zubair
Ahmed Hassan, who said that he would work to reunite
the Islamists in the National Congress Party and the
People's Congress Party, the latter led by Turabi. He
added that if he failed in doing so, then it could in
fact be in the interests of Islam in Sudan for the two
parties or congresses to remain independent, because
it may allow them to succeed one another.
Such talk clearly demonstrates the intention of the
Islamists in Sudan to cling onto power, even if they
disagree about the exact style or direction, because
in the end they are merely different schools of
thought within a single movement. Sudan's experience
and evidence shows that the Islamists only care about
staying in power, even if they end up losing the rest
of the country.
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