A Different Agenda Is Needed For Geneva II: Russia And Iran - Only Ready To Give Assad Money And Arms To Kill More Syrians
29 December 2013
By Amir Taheri
Since the Syrian crisis started
three years ago, the powers interested in its outcome
have always fallen one step behind events. As it
prepares for yet another conference on Syria next
month in Geneva, the international community may again
be out of step with the realities of a tragic
situation.
If information leaked from several capitals is right,
the Geneva gathering would discuss the creation of a
"transition authority." That scheme might have made
sense three years ago when Syria faced a popular
uprising against the regime. At that point, the
outline of a possible compromise was beginning to take
shape. The scheme failed because the major powers,
notably the United States and Russia, refused to back
it. The US thought that the Syrian despot would go the
same way as those of Tunisia and Egypt, and thus there
was no need to for a major American commitment. Acting
as an opportunist power, Russia hedged its bets and
hoped to land on the winning side with a minimum
investment.
But while the powers dithered, the Syrian crisis
mutated into a nationwide insurrection, then a civil
war, a sectarian struggle and, finally, a humanitarian
tragedy.
That the problem we now face is no longer the same as
it was three years ago is clear from the latest
assessments of the situation by the United Nations and
ancillary organizations. Today, some 60 percent of the
Syrian population of around 20 million consists of
refugees in neighboring countries, displaced persons
inside the Syria, and "captive communities" living in
permanent states of siege.
For all intents and purposes, Syria has experienced
what political scientists call a systemic collapse.
The machinery of government has been shattered, with
most ministries and state-controlled services
operating at less than a third of their normal
capacity. The nation's educational network has morphed
into an archipelago of isolated schools and
universities catering for a fraction of those who need
it. Inadequate at the best of times, the nation's
health service has suffered even more. According to
the World Health Organization, fewer than 30 hospitals
are still operating under more or less acceptable
conditions while a range of epidemics, long extinct in
the country, are making a comeback.
A study prepared for the Geneva conference also shows
that the army and the police, long the backbone of the
regime, have ceased to exist as institutions dealing
with national security.
Tens of thousands of officers, non-commissioned
officers and privates have defected to various armed
opposition groups. Many more have simply deserted to
their villages or have become refugees abroad. What is
left of the army and police consists of a hodgepodge
of death squads often armed and, at times, even
controlled by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps and Lebanese Hezbollah.
Worse still, the opposition has morphed into a nebula
of groups with rival ideologies and little or no clear
vision of what they want. (They all know what they
don't want: the continuation of the Assad regime!)
In such a context, talking of "transition" may be a
puerile exercise. A transition would make sense only
if there was an established authority from which one
could transit to an alternative moral and political
authority.
Today, the question is no longer that Syria has a bad
government; it is that Syria has no government in the
normal sense of the term. Bashar Al-Assad still makes
occasional television appearances on foreign channels,
posturing as the head of a non-existent government. He
is, at best, the leader of one faction among many.
Assad's presidential term is due to end next spring.
He is, of course, bluffing that he would seek another
seven-year term, knowing full well that even holding
one of the fake elections that Syria has always had is
no longer physically possible.
The real problem, therefore, is to see Syria
transformed into an ungoverned space and a
battleground for several parallel wars that could
continue for as long as outsiders are prepared to arm
rival groups.
Such an outcome would not serve the interests of any
of the powers involved in this tragedy on opposite
sides. Cynics might say let Russia and Iran keep their
chips on Assad and pay the price. Facing a looming
cash-flow problem, the mullahs of Tehran might not
find it easy to maintain the Assad regime as a
spendthrift mistress that grows uglier by the day. As
for Russia, it faces the risk of being sucked into an
endless conflict with no credible prospects for
reaping any benefits and the possibility of losing
big.
For the first time in three years, participants in the
Geneva II may have a few common interests, chief among
them preventing Syria from becoming a bleeding wound
on the Mediterranean.
Geneva II might be useful if it focuses on the
realities of the situation. The most urgent task is to
mobilize the resources needed to face the humanitarian
disaster. An unknown number of Syrians have already
died in this conflict, and many more face death by
hunger, disease and exposure to the elements.
Will Russia and Iran be prepared to put their hands in
their pockets and contribute to the UN appeal for
resources? Or are they only ready to give Assad money
and arms to kill more Syrians?
The next task would be to set up UN-protected safe
haven where Syrians could receive a minimum of aid
inside the country. Would Russia and Iran support such
a scheme, or would they help Assad bomb camps for
displaced people and besieged communities?
With an agenda that might have been relevant three
years ago, Geneva II will get nowhere and Syrian
democrats have no reason to attend it.
Amir Taheri was born in Ahvaz, southwest Iran, and
educated in Tehran, London and Paris. He was Executive
Editor-in-Chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran (1972-79).
In 1980-84, he was Middle East Editor for the Sunday
Times. In 1984-92, he served as member of the
Executive Board of the International Press Institute (IPI).
Between 1980 and 2004, he was a contributor to the
International Herald Tribune. He has written for the
Wall Street Journal, the New York Post, the New York
Times, the London Times, the French magazine Politique
Internationale, and the German weekly Focus. Between
1989 and 2005, he was editorial writer for the German
daily Die Welt. Taheri has published 11 books, some of
which have been translated into 20 languages. He has
been a columnist for Asharq Alawsat since 1987.
Taheri's latest book "The Persian Night" is published
by Encounter Books in London and New York.
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