The Islamic State (IS) and Pledges of Allegiance: The Case of Jamaat Ansar al-Islam
02 December 2014
With the rise of IS, it is of interest
to examine how IS has secured pledges of allegiance (bay'ah)
from other groups both on the domestic front (i.e.
within Iraq and Syria) and abroad (e.g. in Gaza-Sinai
and Libya). I would argue that the case of Jamaat
Ansar al-Islam ('The Group of the Supporters/Partisans
of Islam') offers instructive insight not only into
the factors that lead to pledges of allegiance but
also the means of interpreting the available evidence.
To recall, Jamaat Ansar al-Islam is the latest
incarnation of the al-Qa'ida-linked Ansar al-Islam of
Iraqi Kurdistan that was destroyed in the aftermath of
the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Remnants then
formed Ansar al-Sunna, which split two ways in 2007:
Jamaat Ansar al-Islam and Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna, the
latter of which has recently claimed some very limited
operational activity in the south of Baghdad and
issued a lengthy tract from its leader calling for
unity among the 'mujahideen of the Ummah.' The main
areas of Jamaat Ansar al-Islam's presence in Iraq have
been Mosul, Kirkuk province, and over the course of
this year the Tikrit area and a more limited emergence
in Anbar province. In 2011, one of the leaders of
Jamaat Ansar al-Islam- Abu Muhammad al-Muhajir-
expanded the group's presence into Syria, setting up a
camp in al-Hewel in Hasakah province on the border
with Iraq. Calling itself 'Ansar al-Sham,' Jamaat
Ansar al-Islam then spread its presence across
northern Syria.
Though aspiring for the goal of a global Caliphate,
Jamaat Ansar al-Islam has traditionally been a rival
of IS and its prior incarnations- the Islamic State in
Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) and the Islamic State of
Iraq- because it has not accepted the claim that IS or
its predecessors constitute an actual state, let alone
a Caliphate. This sparked multiple clashes in Mosul
and Kirkuk province, with the targeting of Jamaat
Ansar al-Islam-linked professionals and religious
figures in the former in particular. In early 2013,
Jamaat Ansar al-Islam had appealed to al-Qa'ida leader
Aymenn al-Zawahiri to restrain what was then the
Islamic State of Iraq, but to no avail.
The renewal of the wider Sunni Arab insurgency in 2014
brought problems between Jamaat Ansar al-Islam and IS
to the forefront: the two appear to have worked
together to bring about the fall of Mosul and Tikrit.
However, IS very quickly began to crack down on the
presence of Jamaat Ansar al-Islam in both cities. Over
the course of the summer, both before and after the
Caliphate declaration on 29 June, IS advertised via
its 'Wilayat Ninawa' provincial news feed two apparent
waves of defections from Jamaat Ansar al-Islam to IS.
The latter instance is of particular interest because
around the same time there emerged a statement put out
in Jamaat Ansar al-Islam's name claiming
thedissolution of the organization in Iraq and its
allegiance with IS:
"Indeed we give good news to the Islamic Ummah in the
east and west of the land of the announcement of the
dissolution of the group [jamaat] 'Ansar al-Islam in
Iraq' to the Commander of the Believers: Caliph
Ibrahim (may God protect him)…This pledge of
allegiance has come after sessions and meetings with
the sheikhs of the Islamic State who showed to us the
legitimacy of the Islamic State's project via proof in
tradition and thought. The last of these meetings was
on 29 Shuwwal, in which we announced the bay'ah by
group and individual membership, and before that,
proof had been shown to us regarding the truth of the
existence of the Islamic State on the ground as a
state with establishments having weight in this
environment of states.
It is also the one [state] that has defeated the
Crusaders, broken the thorn of the Safavids,
annihilated the apostate Sahwa forces, bloodied the
nose of the secularist Kurds, opened up the abode of
the Muslims, got rid of the artificially imposed
borders among the land of the Muslims. It is also the
one that has broken the bonds and freed the lions, and
it is the one that has made God's law the ruling
authority, has implemented the hudud [Shari'a
punishments], established offices and has been just
towards the oppressed. Moreover, it has established
security, cultivated order and protection, and
provided support for the orphans and wayfarers. All
that and more we have seen with our eyes and felt with
our hands, so may God reward them best in the stead of
the Muslims.
Let it be known that this statement of allegiance is
the last one coming from Jamaat Ansar al-Islam in
Iraq, and any other statement following it, we disavow
that statement…further, this blessed allegiance to the
Dawla took place with the attendance of dozens of
commanders and amirs of the Ansar…This has also led us
to direct a forthright call to all factions and groups
in the fields of jihad in the totality and the
brothers of creed and ideological program [aqida wa
manhaj] from the members of Jamaat Ansar al-Islam
outside of Iraq [i.e. in Syria]…to pledge allegiance
[…]
Majlis Shura Jamaat Ansar al-Islam in Iraq
29 Shuwwal 1435 AH
25 August 2014"
This statement's veracity was immediately denied in a
statement put out on what was then Jamaat Ansar
al-Islam's official Twitter feed, which I have
translated here. At first sight, one might be inclined
to go with my initial assessment, based on the issuing
of the denial on the official Twitter feed, that
Jamaat Ansar al-Islam in Iraq had not been really been
dissolved after all, even if it had been significantly
weakened by the allegiance pledges to IS (without
quantifying exactly how far it had been weakened).
However, it is now apparent that the statement above
put out in the name of Jamaat Ansar al-Islam's Majlis
Shura, far from being a mere forgery, represented the
overwhelming majority of the organization, and that
whoever controlled the group's official Twitter feed
at the time only constituted a small remnant that had
not pledged allegiance to IS and has subsequently
ceased to exist for all intents and purposes as a
distinct Jamaat Ansar al-Islam in Iraq on the ground.
Multiple lines of evidence corroborate this
assessment. First, since the issuing of the denial of
dissolution, the group's Twitter account has
disappeared and has not re-emerged. It is normal for
jihadi groups to set up mirror accounts, unless
Twitter is taking steps to ensure that all subsequent
accounts are deleted promptly, which is what forced IS
off Twitter in an official capacity. Second, there
have been no new media releases of any sort: no new
photos, videos or statements. For example, Jamaat
Ansar al-Islam in Iraq is supposed to release
something every year in relation to Eid al-Adha (e.g.
here in 2013,here in 2012, here in 2011, and here in
2010), but nothing this time around, even as Jamaat
Ansar al-Islam in Bilad al-Sham [Syria] put out photos
in relation to the occasion.
Finally, we come to testimony I myself have gathered,
this coming from one 'Abu Bakr al-Iraqi', one of those
from Jamaat Ansar al-Islam in Iraq who has not pledged
allegiance to IS. When I asked him about the lack of
any new media releases from Jamaat Ansar al-Islam, he
explained that "the group came to an end 3 months ago
as around 3000 of them pledged allegiance to the Dawla,
which constitutes a ratio of 90%." Despite his own
lack of pledge of allegiance, Abu Bakr al-Iraqi is
sympathetic to/understanding of those from Jamaat
Ansar al-Islam who defected to IS, tweeting recently:
"Whoever attacks our brothers the soldiers of Ansar
al-Islam who pledged allegiance to the Dawla, I say to
them: 'Be aware of God, for they have not abandoned
their arms. Whereas we have remained seated, they are
in their place. This is better than [what] we [are
doing.]'" It will also be recalled that Abu Bakr
al-Iraqi, despite his misgivings about IS' conduct in
brutally crushing the Shaitat tribal rebellion in Deir
az-Zor province, had nonetheless expressed approval of
the beheading of James Foley, and characterized the
coalition against IS as part of a war on Islam (a
discourse that goes beyond Iraq's jihadi groups: cf.
the Islamist nationalist 1920s Revolution Brigades in
a recent statement).
In sum, what we have here is a case of pledges of
allegiance arising not only on account of IS'
assertions of wealth and power but also strongly
facilitated by ideological overlap. After all, if one
is aspiring for a Caliphate, then there is certainly
some allure in pledging allegiance to a group that
already claims to be a Caliphate and has the real
trappings of a state entity, unlike IS' predecessor
the Islamic State of Iraq. In this process of rapid
pledges of allegiance, IS has effectively destroyed
Jamaat Ansar al-Islam's project to spread through
Syria and Iraq as one battlefield, as the group's
Syrian branch is now isolated in Aleppo and Idlib,
having been cut off from Iraq on account of IS'
control of Raqqa province as well as most of Deir
az-Zor province and all parts of Hasakah province not
controlled by Kurds or the regime.
I also mentioned in the beginning of this article that
the case of Jamaat Ansar al-Islam offers insight into
how we interpret available evidence. Just because a
statement put out in a group's name is not issued via
that group's official media channel, it should not
automatically follow that this statement is a mere
pro-IS forgery of no meaning or value. On the
contrary, as my friend and colleague Daveed
Gartenstein-Ross has commented in relation to IS and
securing pledges of allegiance outside of Syria and
Iraq, one aspect of IS' strategy appears to be to have
those ready to declare their allegiance within a
particular group to issue a statement in that group's
name regardless of any disapproval at the official
level. What then follows of course depends on
circumstances by case. To illustrate this point, one
can look at Egypt's Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (JABM)
for comparison. As happened with Jamaat Ansar al-Islam
in Iraq, a statement was put out in JABM's name
claiming a bay'ah to IS, which was then circulated in
the Egyptian press and in a Reuters story. The
statement was then denied on JABM's Twitter feed the
next day, but then days later an audio was released on
that same Twitter feed affirming bay'ah to IS.
Though not exactly analogous, it would seem that in
both cases the initial event of a statement in the
group's name claiming allegiance was probably the
result of IS encouraging those willing to pledge
allegiance- at that point the majorities in their
groups- to put out a statement, which would force
loyalists unwilling to lose their groups' distinct
identities to respond in some way. With JABM, the
difference (as opposed to Jamaat Ansar al-Islam's
traditional rivalry with IS) would appear to be that
most of the reluctant remnant controlling the official
media channel was trying to have it both ways in being
sympathetic to IS without actually pledging
allegiance, which might explain the rather odd tweet
denying the initial pledge of allegiance while
referring to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the
'Caliph of the Muslims.' Thus, this remnant was
compelled to issue a pledge of allegiance days later
to preserve credibility, while any others still
unwilling to pledge (as allegedly existed in the Nile
Valley area) would disband and perhaps join other
groups (e.g. Ajnad Misr?).
Admittedly, the above as regards JABM is somewhat
speculative, but that such experiments in thought seem
necessary should point us to the most salient lesson
that jihadi groups are never monolithic in alignments
and approach, whatever apparent uniformity might be
conveyed by official statements.
©
EsinIslam.Com
Add Comments