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23 February 2010 By Sami Moubayed After the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came
to power in Ankara, many in the West referred to a new
Turkish foreign policy called "neo-Ottomanism",
suggesting a revival of the intellectual, political
and social influence of the Ottoman Empire, which
departed the scene 92 years ago. That policy was
attributed to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and
his advisor, now foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu.
Quickly, however, the term "Ottomanism" began to fade,
given that it was difficult to market in countries
formerly controlled by the Ottoman Empire, due to
continued indoctrination against Ottomanism by the
Arabs over nince decades. Some, however,
continued to stand by the term, including Cuneyt Zapsu,
an advisor to the Turkish prime minister, who said: "A
new, positive role for Turkey in the world requires a
reconciliation with its own past, the overcoming of
societal taboos, and a positive new concept of Turkish
identity. We are the Ottomans' successors and should
not be ashamed of this." Decision-makers in
Turkey had once tried to hide their Ottoman past,
ashamed of it during the heyday of Kemal Ataturk,
because it looked backward and was too Islamic for the
secular state that was being carefully erected in
Turkey. That is now a thing of the past thanks to the
steady policy of the AKP, which has been opening up to
countries such as Syria and, more recently, Lebanon.
Many wrongly interpreted Erdogan's policy towards
the Arab world, now entering its seventh year, as
purely a Syrian-Turkish alliance. By nature of his new
orientation, Erdogan is striving to restore Turkey to
its rightful place amongst Arab and Muslim nations,
and that by no means stops at the gates of Damascus.
It is a policy that embraces Egypt, Jordan, Palestine,
Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. During the past few
years, Turkey has sponsored indirect talks between
Syria and Israel, tried to hammer out solutions
between Fatah and Hamas in Palestine, and worked on
mending broken fences between Damascus and Baghdad
after relations soured last August. Turkey has permanently
stood as a mediator between Iran and the Arab world
and has worked hard to help embrace non-state players
like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas, whose leadership
it received in Ankara in 2004, despite public outcry
from the United States. Additionally, it has
tried to flex its muscle within the complex world of
Iraqi politics, calling on Sunni leaders to take part
in the political process that was started after the
2003 downfall of Saddam Hussein. Big brother Turkey,
after all, had mediated in similar waters at the turn
of the 20th century, and apparently still knows the
region, its people and their plight only too well, and
still feels best suited to solve existing conflict
within it. Last month, Erdogan
received Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri in a
groundbreaking visit to Turkey, adding yet another
link to the long chain of alliances that Erdogan is
carefully creating for the Turkish republic.
Among other things,
the two countries agreed to increase technical and
scientific cooperation in military affairs and lift
visa requirements between Lebanon and Turkey. At first
glance, this will boost tourism and people-to-people
contact between Beirut and Ankara. According to official
numbers, 50,794 Lebanese tourists went to Turkey in
2008 - an increase of 18,000 from 2007 and large when
compared with the number, not more than a few hundred,
of Turkish tourists who streamed into Beirut.
It will certainly
affect bilateral trade, which stood at U.S.$225
million in 2002 and now stands at $900 million. It
also means that Turkey has now lifted visa
requirements with six Arab countries, the others being
Libya, Morocco, Tunis, Jordan and Syria. Erdogan best explained
it by saying that a "regional Schengen" system,
similar to the agreement signed between European
countries in Luxemburg in 1985, has now gone into
effect in the region, removing systematic border
control between these countries - making them closer
to how they had been under the Ottoman Empire. When
Iraq normalizes, he added, it, too, could join the
regional "Schengen" system. Clearly from all the
optimism shown by Erdogan for the Hariri visit,
cooperation between Turkey and Lebanon will not end
there. The Turkish premier, after all, has visited
Beirut twice, in 2007 and in 2008, and was the most
senior foreign guest attending the inauguration of
Lebanese President Michel Suleiman. During the Israeli war
of 2006, he firmly stood by the Lebanese, and in its
immediate aftermath, sent 600 Turkish troops to take
part in peacekeeping on the Lebanese-Israeli border by
the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Erdogan
saw to it that $50 million worth of aid was given to
reconstruct southern Lebanon, along with building 41
schools, five parks and a rehabilitation center worth
$20 million. Politically, Lebanon
and Turkey are now colleagues in rotating positions at
the UN Security Council, and this is where real
political cooperation will materialize in the months
to come. Turkey's heavyweight influence will come in
handy as Lebanon tries to waiver Security Council
resolution 1559, which called on the Syrians to
withdraw from Lebanon and stipulates the disarmament
of non-state players, including Hezbollah. In as much as the
Hariri team once called for implementing 1559 in
2005-2009, they would now prefer that it disappears,
given that, far from being an adversary, Hezbollah is
now a Hariri ally, strongly represented in both
parliament and the Hariri cabinet. The Lebanese
government recently claimed that the resolution should
be canceled, saying that all of its clauses had been
fulfilled, noting that Hezbollah was a part of the
Lebanese state and defense system and not merely a
non-state player or a militia, as many in the West
claim it to be. That argument, which
saves both Hezbollah and Hariri the burden of having
to deal with 1559, was put forth last December by
Hariri's new Foreign Minister Ali al-Shami, an
appointee of the Hezbollah-led team in the Hariri
cabinet. When speaking at a
press conference with Erdogan, Hariri noted that not a
single day passed where the Israeli Defense Forces did
not infringe on Lebanese waters or airspace, claiming
that this was a legal breach of UN resolution 1701,
which was passed after the war of 2006. Erdogan nodded, saying
that Israel had breached "no less than 100"
resolutions in recent years, adding: "This requires
serious reforms at the United Nations. We do not
support Israel's position and will not remain silent."
Having Turkey on
Lebanon's side will be a great boost for Hezbollah,
which is preparing for a possible new round of
confrontation with Israel in summer this year. From
Ankara, Hariri came to Hezbollah's defense, telling
reporters, "Terrorism is not when one defends one's
land - the opposite is correct," thus supporting
Hezbollah's war against Israel until the Sheba Farms
are liberated from Israeli occupation. This fits in nicely
with the barrage of criticism that Erdogan has been
firing against Israel for the past year, started in
January 2009 when, speaking at Davos right after the
Gaza war, he told Israeli President Shimon Peres:
"President Peres, you are old, and your voice is loud
out of a guilty conscience. When it comes to killing,
you know very well how to kill. I know well how you
hit and kill children on beaches." Best mirroring
Erdogan's new policy is that, despite the new and firm
relationship with the Arabs, he has not wasted his
country's historical relationship with Israel.
Although critical, his embassy remains open in Tel
Aviv, and he is preparing to receive Israeli Defense
Minister Ehud Barak in Ankara in late January.
Only by being able to talk to all parties will the
Turks achieve the security and normalcy they aspire to
in the Middle East. While Israel is not pleased with
Erdogan's new policy, claiming that he has clearly
taken sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arabs
are thrilled that the Turkish giant has emerged and,
unlike the case since 1918, is now clearly on their
side in the battlefront. He has reminded the
Arabs that despite a very rough period in bilateral
relations during World War I, the Ottoman legacy in
the Arab world was not all bad, and not all
autocratic. Why? Because by defending Syria, Lebanon
and Palestine, Erdogan feels that he is also defending
Turkey, seeing all four countries as one, given their
geographic, historical, social, religious and cultural
proximity. Many of the finest
buildings in Damascus and Beirut, after all, were
constructed during the Ottoman era. So were many of
the codes, laws of commerce and aspects of civil
administration, which lasted well into the 20th
century. The Ottoman influence on Arab language,
heritage, music, heritage and cuisine, cannot be
ignored, despite years of trying to write off anything
Ottoman as being destructive to Arab culture.
Although the Ottomans
struck with an iron fist at the Arabs working with
Great Britain against them during the Great War, they
also - very symbolically - refused to sell land in
Ottoman Palestine to the Zionists during the reign of
Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II. He even refused to meet
the Jewish banker Mizray Qrasow when, in 1901, he
offered to pay off the empire's debts and build it a
navy in exchange for the right to build colonies and
buy Arab land in Palestine. Abdul Hamid told one of
his aides, "Tell those impolite Jews that I am not
going to carry the historical shame for selling holy
land to the Jews and betraying the responsibility and
trust of my people." It is that part of
Ottoman history that Erdogan wants the Arabs to
remember, not the hangman's noose that was erected by
the Ottoman governor of Syria, Jamal Pasha, in the
central squares in Beirut and Damascus in 1915-1916.
When the republics
were young in Lebanon, Turkey and Syria, Turkish and
Arab nationalism stood in the way of a clear
appreciation of history, leading to nothing but bad
blood between Arabs and Turks. That era is now
hopefully gone - never to return - thanks to the
efforts of Erdogan, referred to, very symbolically, by
Hariri as "Big Brother" during his Ankara visit.
--
Sami
Moubayed
is editor-in-chief of Forward Magazine in Syria. He is
the author of the forthcoming book "The Damascus Tea
Party: Syrian-US Relations 1919-1959." |