29 March 2010 By Rick Rozoff U.S. and NATO
military expansion along Russia’s western and southern
flanks diminishes the need for Cold War era nuclear
arsenals and long-range delivery systems appreciably.
Washington can well afford to reduce the number of its
nuclear weapons and still maintain decisive worldwide
strategic superiority, especially with the deployment
of an international interceptor missile system and the
unilateral militarization of space. And the use of
super stealth strategic bombers and the Pentagon’s
Prompt Global Strike project for conventional
warhead-equipped first strike systems with the
velocity and range of intercontinental ballistic
missiles to destroy other nations’ nuclear forces with
non-nuclear weapons. On March 26th U.S. President Barack Obama and his
Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev reached an
agreement on a successor to the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START 1) of 1991. The new accord, if it is ratified by the U.S.
Senate, will reportedly reduce U.S. and Russian active
nuclear weapons by 30 per cent and effect a comparable
reduction (to 800 on each side) in the two nations’
delivery systems: Intercontinental ballistic missiles,
strategic long-range bombers and ballistic missile
submarines. After a phone conversation between the two heads of
state to “seal the deal,” Obama touted it as “the most
comprehensive arms control agreement in nearly two
decades.” [1] The START 1 agreement expired almost four months
earlier, on December 5 of last year, and its
replacement has been held up by, among other matters,
Russian concerns over increasingly ambitious American
interceptor missile system plans for Eastern Europe,
on and near its borders. Judging by the lengthy ordeal that has been the
Obama administration’s health care initiative – so far
the bill has only been passed in the House (by a
219-212 vote) where his party has a 257-178 majority –
and the opposition it confronts in the Senate, a new
nuclear arms accord with Russia will be a captive to
domestic American political wrangling at least as much
as less important and potentially controversial issues
traditionally are. Though even if approved by both houses of Congress
there will be nothing to celebrate in Moscow. (Or in
Iran, which will be the main target of Washington’s
next “disarmament” drive after the momentum gained
from Friday’s announcement.) The new treaty would reduce both nations’ deployed
nuclear warheads to 1,550, but the U.S. only
acknowledges currently possessing 2,200 in storage
while in fact having 3,500. On the day of the telephone conversation between
Obama and Medvedev, U.S. Under Secretary of State for
Arms Control and International Security Affairs Ellen
Tauscher stated there would be “no constraints” on the
expansion of American and allied nations’ interceptor
missile deployments, a new treaty notwithstanding. Three days earlier Russian Chief of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces Nikolai Makarov was
interviewed by one of his country’s major newspapers
and warned: “If the Americans continue to expand their
missile defenses, they will certainly target our
nuclear capability and in this case the balance of
forces will shift in favor of the United States.” [2] On March 27 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
stated, “Nothing in this treaty contains clauses which
would make it easier for the U.S. to develop a missile
shield which would pose a risk to Russia,” [3] but
neglected to add that nothing would prohibit it
either. Perhaps Lavrov needs to listen more closely to
Ellen Tauscher. It is a matter of speculation why Russia’s
political leadership consistently defers to the U.S.
on issues ranging from the war in Afghanistan to
so-called missile shield deployments near its
northwest frontier, and from the Pentagon acquiring
new military bases in the Black Sea nations of
Bulgaria and Romania to NATO establishing a cyber
warfare facility (politely named Cooperative Cyber
Defence Center of Excellence) in neighboring Estonia. Whatever combination of perceived comparative
military weakness, over-willingness to oblige,
national inferiority complex, eagerness to be seen as
the junior partner of the world’s only superpower and
fear of the results of confrontation actuates Russia’s
government, the policy of accommodation has only left
its nation more isolated, encroached upon by U.S. and
NATO military presence, and regarded as a less than
dependable ally by other nations prepared to challenge
bids by the U.S. to achieve global dominance. In
short, it doesn’t work. Not for Russia and not for the
world at any rate. It is splendidly effective for the
U.S. and NATO, however. On the very day that an Obama administration beset
by a series of foreign policy frustrations, setbacks
and debacles scored a public relations victory at
Russia’s expense, the Pentagon announced that it was
allotting funds from a $350 million war chest “set
aside for countries that need help developing their
counterterrorism activities, conducting stability
operations, or assisting U.S. forces” to Georgia,
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Croatia, and Hungary,
ostensibly “to help build those countries’ military
capabilities for the U.S.-led campaign in
Afghanistan.” [4] The first four nations border Russia and the other
two are not too far from its western border. A report from a pro-government Georgian news source
dispensed with public relations pabulum and described
the development in less evasive terms: “The Pentagon said on Friday it would build the
military capabilities of Georgia and the Baltic states
bordering Russia to ready them for operations in
Afghanistan. “The Pentagon announcement came on the same day
U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev sealed an agreement on a landmark
nuclear arms reduction treaty that they are to sign on
April 8 in Prague. “In notifications sent to Congress, the Pentagon
said military assistance programs for Georgia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Estonia, Croatia and Hungary were designed
to build their capacities `to conduct stability
operations alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan,`
Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said. “Russia defeated Georgia`s military bid to retake a
pro-Moscow region from rebels in a five-day war that
rekindled tension between the Kremlin and the West.
Russia has since accused Washington of re-arming the
Georgian ‘war machine.’” [5] The operative phrases are “build the military
capabilities of Georgia and the Baltic states
bordering Russia,” “conduct stability operations
alongside U.S. forces,” and “re-arming the Georgian
war machine.” The day before the Obama-Medvedev conversation
Russian Information Agency Novosti reported on a poll
conducted by the Levada Center independent polling and
sociological research organization on the attitude of
Russians toward the U.S. The results showed that only
9 per cent of those contacted viewed the U.S. as
promoting “peace, democracy and order” in the world,
while 73 per cent viewed Washington as “an aggressor
seeking to establish control over all countries.” [6] A poll Medvedev, Lavrov and others in the Kremlin
may want to pay some attention to if for no other
reason that to pretend to represent the interests and
the opinions of their people. The survey also showed that a majority of Russian
citizens saw no value in improving relations with the
U.S. After all, why cultivate friendlier contacts with
a nation, whose head of state last December boasted of
it being “the world’s sole military superpower” and
which will have a record $708 billion military budget
next year, when it is an aggressive power bent on
dominating your own country and every other one on the
planet? It would be ludicrous to attribute the
above-documented sentiments, almost a full generation
after the breakup of the Soviet Union and 25 years
after Mikhail Gorbachev became its last leader, to the
residual effects of “anti-American propaganda.”
(Though in the unlikely event Western news media
notice the poll that is how they can be depended upon
to construe its results and meaning.) In fact any informed and impartial populace
attending to world developments in the post-Cold War
period would reach a similar conclusion, and no doubt
outside of the “Euro-Atlantic family,” as NATO
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen while in a
maudlin mood recently deemed it, comparable
percentages could be expected worldwide if people
truly spoke their minds. Well-founded Russian suspicions of U.S. global
geopolitical objectives can only be reinforced by
several recent developments. The Pentagon is dispatching a first contingent of
100 troops to run a Patriot Advanced Capability-3
missile battery in Poland next month, 35 miles from
Russian territory. On March 26 it was reported that the defense
ministers of the pro-American governments of Latvia
and Poland – both neighboring Russia – “called on NATO
to locate more of the alliance’s facilities in central
and eastern Europe,” with Polish defense chief Bogdan
Klich adding, “We are aware that NATO institutions are
unequally distributed between Western and Central
Europe.” [7] Central Europe is the current designation
for what was formerly called Eastern Europe. A nation
makes that geographical leap when it joins NATO. While delivering a presentation on his bloc’s new
Strategic Concept in the Polish capital on March 12,
NATO chief Rasmussen twice employed the Western mantra
of “Europe whole, free and peace.” Ten days later Polish Chief of General Staff
General Franciszek Gagor presided over a ceremony for
the deployment of his nation’s seventh contingent of
troops to NATO’s Afghan war front – Poland will soon
have 2,600 soldiers there, its largest-ever overseas
military deployment – and said “the experience gained
in the mission has tangibly accelerated the
modernization of the Polish armed forces.” [8] Last autumn Defense Minister Klich divulged plans
to spend $16.2 billion (12.4 billion euros) “to
modernize Poland’s armed forces,” with fourteen new
programs including “air defense systems, combat and
cargo helicopters, naval modernization, espionage and
unmanned aircraft, training simulators and equipment
for soldiers….” [9] Seven years ago the Polish government signed a
contract to purchase 48 U.S. F-16 fighter jets,
reported to be the most expensive arms deal in the
nation’s history. Why Poland requires a modernized army nineteen
years after the end of the Warsaw Pact and moreover in
a Europe “whole, free and at peace” was not addressed. What in fact is the case is that the war in
Afghanistan is a mechanism employed by the U.S. and
NATO to provide wartime combat training to the armed
forces of several nations bordering Russia – Poland,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Norway and Mongolia – for
contingency plans far closer to home. Last August
Georgian Defense Minister Davit (Vasil) Sikharulidze
“told The Associated Press in an interview
that…training by the U.S. Marine Corps will not only
give his troops the skills necessary to fight
alongside NATO allies in Afghanistan, but also could
come into play if another war broke out between
Georgia and Russia.” [10] Recently Lithuania’s Foreign Minister Audronius
Azubalis visited NATO headquarters in Brussels where
he was summoned over the bloc’s 21st century global
military doctrine to be formally adopted in Lisbon,
Portugal this December. Azubalis “stressed that the Article Five of the
North Atlantic Treaty, which sets out the principle of
collective defence, had to remain the key element of
the new Strategic Concept,” and said “it is necessary
for NATO to be more visible in member states, when
organizing exercises and trainings, and when
developing infrastructure.” He also “highlighted the
importance of U.S. nuclear presence in Europe and
stated that an appropriate NATO’s policy had to be
implemented with regard to new threats.” [11] So-called collective defense under the rubric of
NATO’s mutual military assistance clause, moving NATO
bases and military equipment to Russia’s borders, and
maintaining American nuclear weapons in Europe have
nothing to do with the war in Afghanistan or defense
against such new NATO casus belli as global warming,
rising sea levels, water shortages, piracy, a drop in
food production and others identified by the bloc’s
secretary general last autumn in London. Also last week the armed forces of Estonia and
Lithuania participated in the opening exercises of the
Baltic Battalion Project (BALTBAT) Intelligent Eagle
10 operation in preparation for the two nations’
forces serving with the NATO Response Force, “a
high-readiness and technologically advanced allied
force made of land, air and maritime components
capable of quick deployment at any time in any place
for a full spectrum of operations.” The maneuvers were “conducted in several phases:
surveillance of a fictitious operation area and the
elaboration on an operation plan and preparation for
combat action training….” [12] At the same time a NATO “group of experts”
delegation arrived in the Estonian capital of Tallinn
to deliver a presentation on the Alliance’s Strategic
Concept. Next month, April 22-23, NATO is to hold a
meeting in Tallinn with the foreign ministers of 56
nations, 28 full members and an equal amount of
military partners from around the world. The gathering
“will mark the first time that the new Strategic
Concept is discussed at the ministerial level.” [13] The U.S. Navy announced on March 23 that it was
sending personnel from its military station in Rota,
Spain to Latvia to lay the groundwork for the Baltic
Operations (BALTOPS) 2010 exercises later this year.
“BALTOPS is an operation sponsored by Commander,
United States European Command, and is an exercise
aimed to promote a mutual understanding of maritime
interoperability between U.S. Navy, NATO, and non-NATO
participants.” [14] Two years ago NATO opened a so-called cyber defense
installation in Estonia, as the bloc itself described
it at the time “after a major cyber attack on Estonian
public and private institutions prompted NATO to
conduct a thorough assessment of its approach to cyber
defence.” The alleged perpetrators were Russian of
course. “At their meeting in October 2007 Allied Defence
Ministers called for the development of a NATO cyber
defence policy which was adopted [in] early 2008.”
[15] Last week Jamie Shea, NATO’s Director of Policy
Planning, identified what he called cyber attack
capabilities as “the fifth dimension of warfare after
space, sea, land and air….” [16] Prominent Western, especially U.S., officials have
been demanding a NATO Article 5 response to cyber
attacks for the past three years. Late this month a U.S. warship, the guided missile
cruiser USS Vicksberg, joined a Norwegian counterpart
for anti-submarine exercises, after which the two
ships “proceeded above the Arctic Circle.” The
exercises included “a series of complex Air Defense
Exercises (ADEX) supported by Norwegian F-16 squadrons
out of [the] Bodo Main Air Station.” [17] In the Black Sea region, American ambassador to
Georgia John Bass recently assured the government of
former State Department fellowship recipient and New
York resident Mikheil Saakashvili of continued
Pentagon support in two spheres: Ongoing training of
the Georgian armed forces by U.S. Marine Corps
personnel stationed in the country (by all indications
permanently) and “improvement of defense systems and
support structures.” [18] Shortly afterward Saakashvili appeared at a joint
press conference at NATO headquarters with Anders Fogh
Rasmussen. The Georgian leader’s comments included: “We are the biggest per capita contributor to the
Afghan…to the ISAF [International Security Assistance
Force]….But we also are willing to engage in training
their troops in Georgia and on site in Afghanistan.” The NATO chief said: “I have reiterated to the president that NATO’s
policy towards Georgia has not changed. We will
continue to support Georgia in its Euro-Atlantic
aspirations. NATO is fully committed to Georgia’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Our Allies
stick to their policy of non-recognition of the
Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia….I can
assure you that there will be no change of the wording
of what the NATO summit decided at the Bucharest
Summit in 2008. And you will recall that we decided
that Georgia as well as Ukraine will become members of
NATO….And we have no intention whatsoever to change
this wording. So the NATO position is unchanged.” [19] On the same day it was reported that Georgia’s
State Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration, Giorgi
Baramidze, said his government “is pushing for rapid
entry into NATO with plans to meet membership
requirements within the next three years….” [20] In February the governments of fellow Black Sea
nations Romania and Bulgaria confirmed their
willingness to accede to U.S. requests to base
intermediate-range interceptor missiles on their
territories. Shortly after the countries’ NATO
accession six years ago the Pentagon secured the
permanent use of four new military bases in Romania
and three in Bulgaria. Last week the Romanian government disclosed it was
purchasing 24 second-hand F-16 multirole jet fighters
from the U.S. “to modernise its air force.” [21] Concurrently, the nation’s foreign minister, Teodor
Baconschi, met with NATO Secretary General Rasmussen,
reiterating “the NATO open door policy” toward
Georgia, Ukraine and the Balkans and a commitment “to
the diversification of partnership relations with NATO
countries in the Western Balkans and in the Black Sea
region.” The two also insisted that “bilateral cooperation
with the U.S. in the field of anti-missile defence
represents one of Romania’s contributions to the
development of a NATO anti-missile defence system, to
be based on the principles of indivisibility of
security of the Alliance and allied solidarity, as
stated at the Summit in Bucharest and reaffirmed at
the Summit in Strasbourg-Kehl.” [22] Also last week, Romania’s President Traian Basescu
called on members of parliament to pass a new national
security law in view of three recent developments: The
nation’s absorption into NATO, the deployment of U.S.
military personnel to bases in the country, and
“developments related to the anti-missile shield.”
[23] On the same day it was reported that the Bulgarian
Defense Ministry had “approved a memorandum to
exchange military personal staff with the U.S. navy. “The memorandum sets up a bilateral program in the
framework of which the navies of Bulgaria and the U.S.
will have the opportunity to exchange experience and
experts.” [24] U.S. and NATO military expansion along Russia’s
western and southern flanks diminishes the need for
Cold War era nuclear arsenals and long-range delivery
systems appreciably. Washington can well afford to
reduce the number of its nuclear weapons and still
maintain decisive worldwide strategic superiority,
especially with the deployment of an international
interceptor missile system and the unilateral
militarization of space. And the use of super stealth
strategic bombers and the Pentagon’s Prompt Global
Strike project for conventional warhead-equipped first
strike systems with the velocity and range of
intercontinental ballistic missiles to destroy other
nations’ nuclear forces with non-nuclear weapons. Russia has only its nuclear capability to resort to
in the event of a major attack on its territory, as it
has no bases beyond its borders except for minor ones
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Armenia and
Transdniester. Surely none in nations facing the
United States. 1) Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2010 Comments 💬 التعليقات |