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12 May 2010 By Abdul Rahman Al-Rashid
Despite the ongoing uncertainty surrounding Tehran and
its political isolation, freedom of movement between
Iran and the six Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC]
countries has not stopped. Visits take place on a
daily basis, the majority of which are Gulf Arab
businessmen and students traveling to Iran, however
Iranians also travel westwards across the Gulf, and
this includes those who are using the Gulf to travel
to other parts of the world, such as merchants who
transferring boats full of carpets, fish, and caviar.
Despite the quiet hostility and the cold war that is
taking place between the extremist Iranian regime and
the Gulf regimes, a thin line continues to tie the two
Gulf shores together allowing the people of the Gulf
the ability to travel and serve their own interests.
However the discovery of an Iranian spy cell in Kuwait
confirms suspicions that Tehran has not creased
sending its spies to slip in undetected amongst the
[Iranian] businessmen, students, and travelers, and
that they recruit local citizens who fall into the
clutches of this extremist religious military regime.
The
discovery of this Iranian spy cell in Kuwait has
brought the debate about relations with Tehran to the
forefront once again, and the question is should we
sever ties with Tehran so that the Iranian authorities
realize that they will be the biggest loser if their
major gateway to the world becomes closed to them?
Iran is able to operate through other crossings
points, such as Turkey, Syria, and Pakistan, however
this cannot provide Iran with the same [transport]
capabilities as provided via Dubai, Kuwait, and
Bahrain, which represents their major corridor to the
world.
Regardless of the level of anger that we demonstrate
towards what happened in Kuwait, the Iranian regime
will not stop using its airlines companies, banks, and
commercial cooperation in espionage activities,
because this is the nature of the Iranian regime which
highly values its intelligence operations, and which
looks at the spy cells that it has spread throughout
the region as being a political arm and an advanced
military bastion. In Tehran's hostile statements
towards the US, it has not hidden its intention to
target the Gulf States should clashes break out
between the two countries. Iran is aware that the Gulf
has strong international interests and considers the
region to be a soft target and is therefore seeking to
use this in order to exploit its opponents,
threatening that in the event of a US attack on Iran,
they will retaliate by attacking the Gulf States.
Iran
has previously attempted to attack Saudi Arabia in
1987, losing two fighter jets at sea, although they
only officially acknowledged losing one. Iran also
launched a violent war to attack any oil tankers
trading with Gulf States, particularly Kuwait, forcing
these tankers to raise the US flag and travel under
the protection of US Naval Forces. In addition to
this, Iran has been implicated in a number of
terrorist operations, and today continues to play host
to elements of Al Qaeda following the US war in
Afghanistan. Iran's
history of provocation has resulted in Gulf States
being unable to trust the possibility of peaceful
relations with Tehran, as they cannot help but suspect
the presence of Iranian spy cells on their soil. The
two sides are in a state of cold war that has been
ongoing since the Iranian Revolution took place in
1979. As for the Iranians, they believe that this is a
one-sided war, as the Gulf regimes do not have a
counter political agenda, nor do they spend spy cells
or sleeper cells onto Iranian soil. Does
Iran's reliance upon a policy that paves the way for
war with the Gulf States benefit Tehran? The truth is
that the Iranian regime's expenditure and effort to
recruit and fund its agents in the region in order to
oppose the Gulf regimes is very similar to what Saddam
Hussein was doing before he discovered that everything
that he built did not help him at the critical moment
whether this was in 1990 or 2003. Iran's strategy is
based solely upon the concept of war, and this informs
all of its [external] relations, making relations with
Iran difficult. |