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28 May 2010
By Jonathan Cook
Israel faces unprecedented
pressure to abandon its official policy of “ambiguity”
on its possession of nuclear weapons as the
international community meets at the United Nations in
New York this week to consider banning such arsenals
from the Middle East.
Israel’s equivocal stance
on its atomic status was shattered by reports on
Monday that it offered to sell nuclear-armed Jericho
missiles to South Africa’s apartheid regime back in
1975.
The revelations are deeply
embarrassing to Israel given its long-standing
opposition to signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, arguing instead that it is a “responsible
power” that would never misuse nuclear weapons
technologies if it acquired them.
Reports of Israel’s nuclear
dealings with apartheid South Africa will also
energise a draft proposal from Egypt to the UN
non-proliferation review conference that Israel -- as
the only nuclear power in the region -- be required to
sign the treaty.
Israeli officials are
already said to be discomfited by Washington’s
decision earlier this month to agree a statement with
other UN Security Council members calling for the
establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear
arms.
The policy is chiefly aimed
at Iran, which is believed by the US and Israel to be
secretly developing a nuclear bomb, but would also
risk ensnaring Israel. The US has supported Israel’s
ambiguity policy since the late 1960s.
Oversight of Israel’s
programme is also due to be debated at a meeting of
the UN’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic
Energy Agency, in Vienna next month.
The administration of US
President Barack Obama is reported to have held
high-level discussions with Israel at the weekend to
persuade it to consent to proposals for a 2012
conference to outlaw weapons of mass destruction in
the Middle East.
As pressure mounts on
Israel, local analysts have been debating the benefits
of maintaining the ambiguity policy, with most warning
that an erosion of the principle would lead inexorably
to Israel being forced to dismantle its arsenal.
Echoing the Israeli
security consensus, Yossi Melman, a military
intelligence correspondent for the Haaretz newspaper,
also cautioned that declaring Israel’s nuclear status
“would play into Iran's hands” by focusing attention
on Tel Aviv rather than Tehran.
Israel refused to sign the
1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, having
developed its first warhead a few years earlier with
help from Britain and France.
Tom Segev, an Israeli
historian, reported that Israel briefly considered
showing its nuclear hand in 1967 when Shimon Peres,
Israel’s current president, proposed publicly
conducting a nuclear test to prevent the impending
Six-Day War. However, the test was overruled by Levi
Eshkol, the prime minister of the time.
Mr Peres, who master-minded
the nuclear programme, later formulated the policy of
ambiguity, in which Israel asserts only that it will
“not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the
Middle East”.
That stance -- and a
promise not to conduct nuclear tests -- was accepted
by the US administration of Richard Nixon in 1969.
According to analysts, the
agreement between Israel and the US was driven in part
by concerns that Washington would not be able to give
Israel foreign aid -- today worth billions of dollars
-- if Israel declared itself a nuclear state but
refused international supervision.
Nonetheless, revelations
over the years have made it increasingly difficult for
the international community to turn a blind eye to
Israel’s arsenal.
Mordechai Vanunu, a
technician at the Dimona nuclear energy plant in the
Negev, provided photographic evidence and detailed
descriptions of the country’s weapons programme in
1986. Today the Israeli arsenal is estimated at more
than 200 warheads.
In 2006 Ehud Olmert, then
the prime minister, let slip Israel’s nuclear status
during an interview with German TV when he listed
“America, France, Israel and Russia” as countries with
nuclear arms.
Even more damaging
confirmation was provided this week by Britain’s
Guardian newspaper, which published documents
unearthed for a new book -- The Unspoken Alliance by
Sasha Polakow-Suransky, an American historian -- on
relations between Israel and South Africa’s apartheid
regime.
The top-secret papers
reveal that in 1975 Mr Peres, then Israel’s defence
minister, met with his South African counterpart, P W
Botha, to discuss selling the regime nuclear-armed
missiles. The deal fell through partly because South
Africa could not afford the weapons. Pretoria later
developed its own bomb, almost certainly with Israel’s
help.
Israel, Mr Polakow-Suransky
said, had fought to prevent declassification of the
documents.
Despite publication by the
Guardian of a photographed agreement bearing the date
and the signatures of both Mr Peres and Mr Botha, Mr
Peres’ office issued a statement on Monday denying the
report.
Israel’s increasingly
transparent nuclear status is seen as an obstacle to
US efforts both to impose sanctions on Iran and to
damp down a wider potential nuclear arms race in the
Middle East.
This month the US surprised
officials in Tel Aviv by failing to keep Israel’s
nuclear programme off the agenda of the IAEA’s next
meeting, on June 7. The issue has only ever been
discussed twice before, in 1988 and 1991.
Aware of the growing
pressure of Israel to come clean, Benjamin Netanyahu,
the Israeli prime minister, declined an invitation to
attend a nuclear security conference in Washington
last month at which participants had threatened to
question Israel about its arms.
At the meeting, US
President Barack Obama called on all countries,
including Israel, to sign the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
A draft declaration being
considered at the UN review conference later this week
again demands that Israel -- and two other states
known to have nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan --
sign the treaty.
Egypt has proposed that the
189 states that have signed the treaty, including the
US, pledge not to transfer nuclear equipment,
information, material or professional help to Israel
until it does so.
Reuven Pedatzur, an Israeli
defence analyst, warned recently in Haaretz that there
was a danger the Egyptian proposal might be adopted by
the US, or that it might be used as a stick to
browbeat a recalcitrant Israel into accepting greater
limitations on its arsenal. He suggested ending what
he called the “ridiculous fiction” of the ambiguity
policy.
Emily Landau, an arms
control expert at Tel Aviv University, however, said
that those who believed Israel should be more
transparent were “misguided”. Ending ambiguity, she
said, would eventually lead to calls for Israel’s
“total and complete disarmament”.
The last Non-Proliferation
Treaty review conference, five years ago, failed when
the US repudiated pledges to disarm and refused to
pressure Israel over its nuclear programme.
Jonathan Cook is a
writer and journalist based in Nazareth, Israel. His
latest books are “Israel and the Clash of
Civilisations: Iraq, Iran and the Plan to Remake the
Middle East” (Pluto Press) and “Disappearing
Palestine: Israel's Experiments in Human Despair” (Zed
Books). His website is
www.jkcook.net. |