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17 May 2010 By
Kourosh Ziabari
A Harvard University
graduate, a current Alexander F. Hehmeyer Professor of
Political Science and Public Policy at Duke
University, and the director of Triangle Institute for
Security Studies (TISS), Peter D. Feaver is perhaps
best known for his mission under President Bush as the
special advisor for strategic planning and
institutional reform on the National Security Council
from 2005 to 2007.
The author of “Guarding
the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in
the United States” (Cornell University Press), he is
an international relations expert and has long
commented on issues pertaining to the Middle East and
Iran.
In his recent commentary
for Foreign Policy on recent post-election
unrest in Iran and the inevitable intertwinement of
Iran’s turmoil with the disputed proposal of direct
negotiations between Tehran and Washington, Feaver
writes: “We want to create and deepen fissures within
the Tehran regime — check that, we need those fissures
— because that is the only plausible way that a
diplomatic deal on the nuclear file could be struck.”
Feaver is one of those
American pundits who explicitly favor the imposition
of hard-hitting sanctions against Iran so as to
persuade Tehran to halt its “nuclear ambitions”. He
adds in his Foreign Policy article: “Financial
sanctions that activates business pressure on the
regime and thereby deepens fissures within the
political elite seemed to be our best shot at
fissure-exacerbation.”
In Prof. Feaver’s view,
the best diplomatic solution on Iran’s nuclear
standoff is to endow Tehran with “fig-leafs”; giving
Iran some rhetorical concessions by admitting its
“right” to develop nuclear energy emblematically and
pressuring it to suspend its nuclear program for “some
long period of time” concurrently.
In an interview with
Foreign Policy Journal, Peter D. Feaver discusses
these and other issues.
Kourosh Ziabari:
Over the past thirty years, Iran and the U.S. have
been embroiled in an unending conflict. Both sides
accuse each other of plotting against their interests
and threatening their security. Do you believe that
the U.S. government has deliberately imposed pressures
on Iran to dismantle the Islamic government and bring
to power the governmental system it prefers?
Peter Feaver: For
over thirty years, the United States has had several
intractable disputes with the Iranian regime. The
dispute concerns the regime’s behavior, specifically
its support for international terrorism, its pursuit
of WMD, and its hostility towards Israel. The United
States does not have a dispute with the Iranian people
per se and the dispute with the Iranian regime is
primarily about behavior. So if the regime were to
change its behavior, successive U.S. governments from
both the Republican and Democratic sides of the aisle
have indicated that the United States would develop
more fruitful and cordial relations with that regime.
Ziabari: So is it
realistic to believe that Iran’s nuclear program is
ideologically a new battleground for the Iran-U.S.
confrontation to persist and continue? Why, if the
U.S. is concerned about the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, doesn’t it take any actions to disarm its
Middle Eastern allies and empty their arsenals? Isn’t
it then right for Iran and the other non-aligned
states around the world to cite this as the exercise
of double standards by the U.S. government?
Feaver: The United
States views the Iranian pursuit of a nuclear weapon
to be substantially more destabilizing than the
Israeli nuclear posture. President Obama has
indicated that he would like to reinvigorate U.S.
efforts at moving towards what is called the “global
zero” option on nuclear weapons. However, until we
reach that point, he has also indicated that the
United States needs to preserve its nuclear option. I
interpret that as meaning to say that if we ever do
reach global zero, the United States would have to be
the very last country to give up nuclear weapons. I
suspect that the Obama team also thinks that Israel
would likely have to be the second to last country to
give up nuclear weapons.
Ziabari: Is there
some special ideology behind that which the public
isn’t aware of? Why is there such a belief that Israel
should be the second from last? Isn’t it because of
Israel’s wide influence on the policy-making process
in the U.S. corporate system?
Feaver: Most
Americans, including, I believe, most of the key
figures in the Obama Administration, understand that
Israel faces acute security challenges. It confronts a
persistent terrorist threat from well-armed groups
that have powerful and rich state sponsors. It is
surrounded by states that, with few exceptions, have
refused repeated peace overtures and refused to
establish normal relations. And some of the regimes of
powerful states in the region have pledged themselves
to the elimination of Israel. Consider, for example,
Ahmadinejad’s pledge to wipe Israel from the face of
the map. Given such a security environment crowded
with existential threats, and given the terrible
history of the Holocaust, it is not reasonable to
expect Israel to give up something that it sees as a
vital deterrent before it has seen dramatic changes in
the behavior and attitude of its neighborhood.
Ziabari: So,
because of the bilateral disputes, do you think that
the U.S. government should continue funding opposition
groups in Iran whose main objective is to change the
current regime? Won’t it probably hinder the
continuation of talks between Iran, EU and U.S.?
Feaver: The United
States supports reformers throughout the world,
including those who are working on behalf of the
Iranian people to reform the Iranian political system.
There can be a debate about tactics including the
nature of that support, but there is no doubt that
Americans support the Iranian people and understand
their dissatisfaction with the current regime. The
failure of the diplomatic track thus far is not due to
U.S. support for reformers. It is due to the Iranian
regime’s refusal to negotiate in good faith. As
relations with the Soviet Union during the Cold War
demonstrated, the United States has often conducted
negotiations even with hostile regimes while
continuing its support for reformers.
Ziabari: Do you
believe in the effectiveness of reconciliation between
Iran and U.S.? How should a new set of negotiations
between the two countries take place? President Obama
has put aside the preconditions that the Bush
administration had proclaimed as essential for the
commencement of dialogue with Iran; conversely, Iran
has put forth a set of agendas for the talks, such as
the cessation of sanctions and support for Israel by
the White House. The second agenda sounds idealistic
and impractical; what about the sanctions? Will U.S.
ease the tough sanctions against Iran in near future?
Feaver: The U.S.
is interested in negotiations as a means toward the
end of peacefully dismantling the Iranian nuclear
program. The current Iranian regime has repeatedly
signaled that it is unwilling to negotiate about the
nuclear program. The United States believes it needs
tough sanctions as leverage on the Iranian regime;
without such leverage, why would Iran negotiate in
good faith. Iran believes that it should negotiate
only when there are no such sanctions or leverage in
place.
Given all that, it is
hard to have much optimism that negotiations will be
fruitful. To the extent that there is any reason for
optimism, there is this: the Iranian people have
suffered for a long time at the hands of the Iranian
regime and, of late, have expressed their
dissatisfaction with the regime’s behavior. Moreover,
a civilization as old and great as Iran’s does not
need nuclear weapons or international terrorism to
enjoy global respect and stature; if Iran gave up the
ambition of a nuclear weapons program and abandoned
its support of international terrorists, the benefits
they would receive from the international community
would be extensive and would reap untold benefits for
the Iranian people. Thus, there is reason to hope that
wise Iranian leaders would emerge who see these points
and are willing to move Iran on to a better global
trajectory.
Ziabari: The
domestic proponents of President Ahmadinejad say that
the same policy of tension easing and cooperation
which you allude to was pursued during former
President Khatami’s administration, and that Iran
halted uranium suspension for two years voluntarily,
but no major changes took place, the sanctions
remained in effect, and President Bush eventually
labeled Iran as a part of the “Axis of Evil”. What’s
your take on that?
Feaver: If the
Iranian regime gave up its nuclear program, submitted
to the full IAEA safeguards regime, came clean on its
past behavior, and withdrew its support for
international terrorism, I am confident that those
steps would result in dramatic and long-lasting
benefits. I am also confident that the Iranian regime
has not taken those steps yet.
Ziabari: But Iran
and the U.S. have long disputed a number of issues and
the nuclear program is simply the newest of them.
Iranians still feel uneasy about the U.S. involvement
in the 1953 coup which toppled the democratic
government of Dr. Mossadegh. Which steps should both
sides take to compensate for the past acrimonies?
Feaver: It would
be a mistake to begin with these historical
grievances. The wiser course is to begin with the
current and most urgent concerns, the regime’s pursuit
of nuclear weapons and the regime’s support for
international terrorism. Once those are addressed
adequately, the historical grievances, and we must
realize that both sides have historical grievances,
can be more fruitfully engaged.
Ziabari: However,
the Iranian President has made clear that he would not
change his foreign policy over the next four years.
What’s the White House’ agenda for this short-term
future? Is Washington planning to continue pressuring
Tehran through funding the opposition groups and
pursuing the clandestine plan of toppling the Islamic
system? What’s your prediction about the future of
Iran-U.S. relations under Ahmadinejad’s government?
Feaver: As long as
Ahmadinejad remains committed to walking further along
the destructive path he has already walked, it is hard
to see how Iran-U.S. relations can improve much.
However, his path has so alienated Iran from the
world, and the regime from the Iranian people. Iran’s
leaders need to see this and adjust their trajectory
accordingly.
Ziabari: The U.S.
has reportedly threatened Iran with a military strike
and the idea that “all options are on the table”;
meanwhile, the Iranian people whom you believe the
U.S. government is trying to support and encourage for
their peaceful movements are strongly opposed to
another war as they have the bitter experience of the
8-year Iran-Iraq war waged by Saddam. Has the U.S.
government come to the conclusion that such an option
is contrary to the interests of Iranian people?
Feaver: I know of
no influential American voice inside or outside of
government who believes the military option is a good
one. Everyone would prefer to resolve the nuclear
issue and the support for terrorism issue peacefully
through diplomacy. However, the military option
probably needs to be on the table for diplomacy to
have any chance of succeeding. Exercising the military
option would be a tragedy for all concerned, including
the Iranian people. But if this regime succeeds in its
effort to build a nuclear arsenal, that would be a
greater tragedy.
Ziabari: Finally,
do you see possible common ground for cooperation
where Iran and the U.S. can jointly sit at a table to
discuss? Now that President Obama has broadcast
signals that he recognizes the current political
system of Iran, especially in his Nowrouz greeting
message, is it possible that the serious direct
negotiations take place in the near future?
There are many potential
areas of common ground. For one thing, the Iranian
regime publicly claims that it is not seeking nuclear
weapons and merely wants access to peaceful nuclear
energy. There is common ground between those public
statements and the position of the rest of the world,
if the regime would simply accept the numerous
proposals put forward by the P5+1 and others. Both
sides also have an interest in seeing Iran fully
integrated in the international economic and political
system. That full participation is the big reward Iran
would earn if it finally and verifiably abandoned its
pursuit of nuclear weapons and its support for
international terrorism |