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24 May 2010
By Ramzy Baroud Clad in his
usual attire of a colorful, striped robe, Afghan
President Hamid Karazai appeared more like an emperor
as he began his fourth day in Washington. Accompanying
him on a somber visit to the Arlington National
Cemetery were US Defense Secretary Robert Gates,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen
and top US (and NATO) commander in Afghanistan Stanley
A. McChrystal - the very men responsible for the war
and occupation of his own country. The
well-choreographed and clearly-rehearsed visit seemed
set on giving the impression that the relationship
between Karzai and these men was that of an
independent, confident leader seeking the support of a
benevolent superpower. But what were
Karazai’s real reasons for visiting Washington?
Typical media
analyses have for months misrepresented the apparent
chasm between Afghanistan and the US under Obama’s
administration. Even if this administration was
genuinely discontented with Karazai’s policies, at
least until very recently, the resentment had little
to do with the reasons offered by media ‘experts’. It
was not because Karazai was failing to deliver on
governance, end corruption and so on. Let’s face it,
the US war in Afghanistan was never morally grounded,
and it never could be either. Not unless the militant
mindset that governs US foreign policy somehow
acquires a complete overhaul. For now,
let’s face up to reality. Bad days are awaiting
Afghanistan. True, it is hard to imagine how
Afghanistan’s misfortunes could possibly get any
worse. But they will, particularly for those living in
Kandahar in the south. Seated next to Karazi during
his Washington visit, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton promised that her country will “not destroy
Kandahar in order to save Kandahar.” The statement
may sound assuring, but it is in fact ominous and very
troubling. Clinton was referring to the Bush
administration’s policy in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
In fact, she candidly admitted this by saying, “This
is not Fallujah,” referring to the Iraqi city which
was almost completely destroyed in 2004 by a massive
US Marine assault intended to ‘save’ the city.
“Lessons have been learned since Iraq,” stated
Clinton. But if
lessons were truly learned, then why the fictitious
language, the silly assertion that the real intention
is to in fact ‘save’ Kandahar? And what other strategy
does the US have in store for Afghanistan, aside from
the irritating debate on whether to use unmanned
drones or do the killing face to face? Was Karazai
in Washington to provide a cover for what is yet to
come in the Taliban’s southern stronghold? It’s not
unlikely. Considering past and repeated claims of a
growing divide between Kabul and Washington, a bloody
attack on Kandahar could in fact be seen as the US
acting unilaterally in Afghanistan. Add to this
scenario the constant and continued calls made by
Karazai himself to engage Taliban. A US escalation
without public consent from Karazai himself couldn’t
possibly be seen as a part of a joint strategy.
At a
presentation at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP),
Karazi spoke of an extended US commitment to
Afghanistan that would last “beyond the military
activity right now ... into the future, long after we
have retired, and perhaps into our grandsons' and
great-grandsons' -- and great-granddaughters' --
generations.” “This is
something the Afghan people have been seeking for a
long, long time,” he said. Clinton too
was concerned about the plight of the ‘people’. She
promised to “help the people of Kandahar to recover
the entire city to be able to put it to the use and
the benefit of the people of Kandahar…We're not
fighting the Afghan people…We're fighting a small
minority of very dedicated, ruthless extremists who
unfortunately are able to enlist young men... for a
variety of reasons and send them out onto the
battlefield.” Although
Clinton wanted us to believe that the Bush era is
over, with a new dawn in US foreign policy upon us,
she used almost the exact same language, phrased in
almost the exact same context that the Bush
administration used prior to its major military
assaults aimed at ‘saving the people’ from some
‘ruthless extremists’, whether in Iraq or Afghanistan.
And a major
assault there will be, for the Taliban’s counter-surge
is threatening the US’s counterinsurgency operations. A quick scan
of an article by Marie Colvin in Marjah, Afghanistan,
where the Taliban is once more making its presence
very clear, highlights the challenges facing the US
military throughout the country. Entitled ‘Swift and
bloody: the Taliban’s revenge,’ the May 9 article
starts with the claim that “rebels have returned.”
Throughout, the report was dotted with similar
assertions. “Marjah was supposed to be safe…All that
progress is threatened by the Taliban ‘surge’…There
were always fears that they would re-emerge .. The
strength of the Taliban’s presence is gradually
becoming clearer…The Taliban are growing bolder…”
The term
‘surge’ was once associated with General David
Petraeus’s strategy predicated on the deployment of
30,000 new troops in Afghanistan. That it is now being
attributed to the Taliban’s own strategy is ironic, to
say the least. Once meant to be a ‘success story, now
convincing the world that things are working out in
Afghanistan might not be so easy after all. “Worries
are growing in the Pentagon that if thousands of
marines and Afghan security forces cannot entirely
defeat the Taliban in Marjah, a town of only 50,000,
securing the far larger prize of Kandahar may be an
even greater struggle than has been foreseen,” wrote
Colvin. The challenge
ahead, although bolstered with all the right (albeit
predictable) language is likely to be bloody, just
like the rest of this sad Afghanistan episode, which
actually began much earlier than 2001. The US and
Karazi (as a supposed representative of the ‘Afghani
people’) must come across as united in the face of the
extremist minority. Karazi’s visit to the US was the
political padding prior to the likely military storm.
It was meant to assure the public that the chaos which
will follow is in fact part of a counterinsurgency
effort; well-planned, calculated, executed and, as
always, passionately articulated. -
Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net)
is an internationally-syndicated columnist and the
editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is
"My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza's Untold Story"
(Pluto Press, London), now available on Amazon.com. |