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21 November 2010 By Ellen Brown
The deficit hawks are circling, hovering over QE2,
calling it just another inflationary bank bailout.
But unlike QE1, QE2 is not about saving the banks.
It's about funding the federal deficit without
increasing the interest tab, something that may be
necessary in this gridlocked political climate just to
keep the government functioning.
On November 15, the Wall Street Journal published an
open letter to Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke from 23 noted
economists, professors and fund managers, urging him
to abandon his new "quantitative easing" policy called
QE2. The letter said:
We believe the Federal Reserve's large-scale asset
purchase plan (so-called "quantitative easing") should
be reconsidered and discontinued. . . . The planned
asset purchases risk currency debasement and
inflation, and we do not think they will achieve the
Fed's objective of promoting employment.
The Pragmatic Capitalist (Cullen Roche) remarked:
Many of the people on this list have been warning
about bond vigilantes while also comparing the USA to
Greece for several years now. Of course, they've been
terribly wrong and it is entirely due to the fact that
they do not understand how the US monetary system
works. . . . What's unfortunate is that these are many
of our best minds. These are the people driving the
economic bus.
The deficit hawks say QE is massively inflationary;
that it is responsible for soaring commodity prices
here and abroad; that QE2 won't work any better than
an earlier scheme called QE1, which was less about
stimulating the economy than about saving the banks;
and that QE has caused the devaluation of the dollar,
which is hurting foreign currencies and driving up
prices abroad.
The Looming Threat of a Crippling Debt
Service
The federal debt has increased by more than 50% since
2006, due to a collapsed economy and the highly
controversial decision to bail out the banks. By the
end of 2009, the debt was up to $12.3 trillion; but
the interest paid on it ($383 billion) was actually
less than in 2006 ($406 billion), because interest
rates had been pushed to extremely low levels.
Interest now eats up nearly half the government's
income tax receipts, which are estimated at $899
billion for FY 2010. Of this, $414 billion will go to
interest on the federal debt. If interest rates were
to rise just a couple of percentage points, servicing
the federal debt would consume over 100% of current
income tax receipts, and taxes might have to be
doubled.
A Reluctant Fed Steps Up to the Plate The Fed was strong-armed
into rebating its profits to the government in the
1960s, when Wright Patman, Chairman of the House
Banking and Currency Committee, pushed to have the Fed
nationalized. According to Congressman Jerry Voorhis
in The Strange Case of Richard Milhous Nixon (1973):
As a direct result of
logical and relentless agitation by members of
Congress, led by Congressman Wright Patman as well as
by other competent monetary experts, the
Federal Reserve began to pay to the U.S. Treasury a
considerable part of its earnings from interest on
government securities. This
was done without public notice and few people, even
today, know that it is being done. It was done, quite
obviously, as acknowledgment that the
Federal Reserve Banks were acting on the one hand as a
national bank of issue, creating the nation's money,
but on the other hand charging the nation interest on
its own credit –
which no true national bank of issue could
conceivably, or with any show of justice, dare to do. Voorhis went on, "But
this is only part of the story. And the less
discouraging part, at that. For where the commercial
banks are concerned, there is no such repayment of the
people's money." Commercial banks do not rebate the
interest, said Voorhis, although they also "‘buy' the
bonds with newly created demand deposit entries on
their books – nothing more." After the 1960s, the
policy was to fund government bonds through commercial
banks (which could collect interest) rather than
through the central bank (which could not). This was
true not just in the U.S. but in other countries,
after a quadrupling of oil prices combined with
abandonment of the gold standard produced
"stagflation" that was erroneously blamed on
governments "printing money." Consistent with that
longstanding policy, Chairman Bernanke initially
resisted funding the federal deficit. In January
2010, he admonished Congress:
"We're not going to
monetize the debt. It is very, very important for
Congress and administration to come to some kind of
program, some kind of plan that will credibly show how
the United States government is going to bring itself
back to a sustainable position."
His concern, according to The Washington Times, was
that "the impasse in Congress over tough spending cuts
and tax increases needed to bring down deficits will
eventually force the Fed to accommodate deficits by
printing money and buying Treasury bonds."
QE2 Is Not QE1
In QE1, the Fed bought $1.2
trillion in toxic mortgage-backed securities off the
books of the banks. QE1 mirrored TARP, the
government's Troubled Asset Relief Program, except
that TARP was funded by the government with $700
billion in taxpayer money. QE1 was funded by the
Federal Reserve with computer keystrokes, simply by
crediting the banks' reserve accounts at the Fed.
Pundits were predicting that QE2 would be more of the
same, but it turned out to be something quite
different. Immediately after the election, Bernanke
announced that the Fed would be using its power to
purchase assets to buy federal securities on the
secondary market -- from banks, bond investors and
hedge funds. (In the EU, the European Central Bank
began a similar policy when it bought Greek bonds on
the secondary market.) The bond dealers would then be
likely to use the money to buy more Treasuries,
increasing overall Treasury sales.
The bankers who applauded QE1 were generally critical
of QE2, probably because they would get nothing out of
it. They would have to give up their interest-bearing
bonds for additional cash reserves, something they
already have more of than they can use. Unlike QE1,
QE2 was designed, not to help the banks, but to
relieve the pressure on the federal budget.
Bernanke said the Fed would buy $600 billion in
long-term government bonds at the rate of $75 billion
per month, filling the hole left by China. An
estimated $275 billion would also be rolled over into
Treasuries from the mortgage-backed securities the Fed
bought during QE1, which are now reaching maturity.
More QE was possible, he said, if unemployment stayed
high and inflation stayed low (measured by the core
Consumer Price Index).
Addison Wiggin noted in his November 4 Five Minute
Forecast that this essentially meant the Fed planned
to monetize the whole deficit for the next eight
months. He quoted Agora Financial's Bill Bonner:
"If this were Greece or Ireland, the government would
be forced to cut back. With quantitative easing ready,
there is no need to face the music."
That was meant as a
criticism, but you could also see it as a very good
deal. Why pay interest to foreign central banks when
you can get the money nearly interest-free from your
own central bank? In eight months, the Fed will own
more Treasuries than China and Japan combined, making
it the largest holder of government securities outside
the government itself.
The
Overrated Hazard of Inflation
The objection of the
deficit hawks, of course, is that this will be
massively inflationary, diluting the value of the
dollar; but a close look at the data indicates that
these fears are unfounded.
What
About the Inflation in Commodities? Despite surging commodity prices, the overall
inflation rate remains very low, because housing has
to be factored in. The housing market is recovering
in some areas, but housing prices overall have dropped
28% from their peak. Main Street hasn't been flooded
with money; the money has just shifted around.
Businesses are still having trouble getting reasonable
loans, and so are prospective homeowners. As for the obvious price inflation in commodities
-- notably gold, silver, oil and food -- what is
driving these prices up cannot be an inflated U.S.
money supply, since the money supply is actually
shrinking. Rather, it is a combination of factors
including (a) heavy competition for these scarce goods
from developing countries, whose economies are growing
much faster than ours; (b) the flight of "hot money"
from the real estate market, which has nowhere else to
go; (c) in the case of soaring food prices, disastrous
weather patterns; and (d) speculation, which is
fanning the flames. Feeding it all are the extremely low interest rates
maintained by the Fed, allowing banks and their
investor clients to borrow very cheaply and invest
where they can get a much better return than on risky
domestic loans. This carry trade will continue until
something is done about the interest tab on the
federal debt. The ideal alternative
would be for a transparent and accountable government
to issue the money it needs outright, a function the
Constitution reserves to Congress; but an
interest-free loan from the Federal Reserve rolled
over indefinitely is the next best thing.
A Bold
Precedent QE2 is not a "helicopter drop" of money on the
banks or on Main Street. It is the Fed funding the
government virtually interest-free, allowing the
government to do what it needs to do without driving
up the interest bill on the federal debt – an interest
bill that need not have existed in the first place.
As Thomas Edison said, "If
our nation can issue a dollar bond, it can issue a
dollar bill. The element that makes the bond good,
makes the bill good, also." The Fed failed to revive the economy with QE1, but
it could redeem itself with QE2, a bold precedent that
might inspire other countries to break the chains of
debt peonage in the same way. QE2 is the functional
equivalent of what many countries did very
successfully before the 1970s, when they funded their
governments with interest-free loans from their own
central banks. Countries everywhere are now suffering from debt
deflation. They could all use a good dose of their
own interest-free national credit, beginning with
Ireland and Greece. |