30 December 2010 By Stephen
Lendman On April 20, an initial
explosion, then a larger one ignited BP's Deepwater
Horizon platform. For over a day it burned before
sinking, killing 11 crew members, releasing thousands
of barrels of oil daily, and causing the greatest ever
environmental disaster - criminal malfeasance by any
standard. Years from now, its full impact
will be known, but already hundreds of thousands of
people are harmed, local economies gravely impacted,
and large parts of the Gulf contaminated by toxic
hydrocarbons and dispersants, making seafood
absolutely unsafe to eat. Obama, administration officials,
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
and BP executives lied, claiming most oil disappeared,
96% of Gulf waters were safe and reopened, and seafood
was safe to eat. False, according to mounting evidence
confirming: -- layers of oil residue
contaminating several thousand square miles of
seafloor; -- elevated hydrocarbon levels in
Gulf residents' blood, suggesting an epidemic of
future illnesses, including cancer and others as
lethal; -- massive dispersants use
prevented clean-up by skimming; -- no practical way now to clean
up spilled oil; and -- dispersants bioaccumulate,
making oil toxins more bioavailable to sealife, easier
to absorb, and more harmful if ingested. The effects will linger for
decades, maybe generations, making critics wonder if
willful intent was involved, given evidence,
including: -- Washington and BP complicity
in misreporting, coverup and denying the disaster's
severity from start to capping to the most recent
disturbing findings; -- virtual confirmation of the
greatest ever environmental crime, contaminating large
portions of the Gulf; destroying basic food chain
elements that are building blocks for fisheries,
birds, sea turtles and mammal populations; polluting
coastal shorelines; and causing a massive public
health problem with no federal aid to inform and
mitigate; -- irreparable harm to the lives
and livelihoods of potentially millions of Gulf
residents; and -- BP's history of violations,
exposing the industry's worst safety, maintenance, and
environmental record, yet nearly always able to escape
with small fines, penalties and settlements; no
prosecutions; no pressure to operate responsibly; and
no curtailment of government-let contracts, so no
reason not to continue business as usual. Yet after BP declared the Macondo
well dead last September, the event died with it,
disappearing from major media reports that were
complicit with BP and Obama officials by misreporting
it from the start. No wonder critics ask: was
Macondo's blowout accidental or willful? Was
deliberate sabotage involved? Were the Obama
administration and BP complicit in the greatest ever
environmental crime with enormous global consequences?
If so, why? A November report showed BP
ignored warning signs and used inadequate procedures
to secure Macondo's integrity. Jointly prepared by the
National Academy of Engineering (NAE) and National
Research Council (NRC), it said: "failures and missed indications
of hazards were not isolated events during the
preparation of the Macondo well for temporary
abandonment. Numerous (faulty) decisions (preceded)
abandonment despite indications of hazards, such as
the results of repeated negative-pressure tests,
suggest an insufficient consideration of risk and a
lack of operating discipline." As a result, safety was virtually
ignored, including employee warnings that Macondo was
a disaster waiting to happen. Moreover, the report
found BP used only six centralizers (well casing
centering devices in the wellbore) even though
"modeling results suggested that many more (were)
needed." BP also didn't incorporate a
"float shoe" at the well casing bottom - a devise
containing a check valve to automatically activate in
case of emergency. It's a vital extra precaution not
used. In addition, BP chose not to remove drilling mud
without first installing a "lockdown sleeve" on the
production casing's wellhead seals. It would have
protected against shifting position built up
pressure. The Interior Department's
Minerals Management Service, its regulatory arm, was
also cited for "not hav(ing) formal training and
certification....for its inspectors." It means
incompetents, not professionals, were in charge,
leaving BP unregulated despite its poor safety,
maintenance and environmental record - a red flag
begging for close monitoring. Most important is that
longstanding safe operating practices would have
prevented disaster, yet BP ignored them. Minimally,
willful negligence should be charged. However,
deliberate malfeasance is more accurate, revealing a
manufactured crime for corporate gain despite
short-term costs. Obvious red flags included: -- suspicious BP stock
transactions; -- CEO Tony Hayward sold about
one-third of his holdings weeks before the explosion;
-- Goldman Sachs sold BP stock
worth over $250 million in Q I 2010, 44% of its
investment: what did they, not the public, know? -
and -- Enormous Big Oil/Wall Street
pressure was exerted to enact Obama-supported cap and
trade legislation; after House passage, it stalled in
the Senate. The bill would have let corporate
polluters reap huge windfall profits by charging
consumers more for energy, and also create a new
bubble through carbon trading derivatives speculation.
It was about profits, not
environmental protection, especially a potential $10
trillion market for derivatives speculation, a plum
needing an environment crisis to enact, like last
summer's salmonella scare. It provided impetus for
lame duck session passage of the Food Safety
Modernization Act - a food tyranny measure,
benefitting agribusiness at the expense of small
farmers and consumers. Cap and trade is a stealth scheme
to license pollution, raise energy prices, and provide
a huge bonanza through carbon trading derivatives
speculation. Corporate interests badly want it. It
remains if the 112th Congress will oblige. On December 25, writers David Barstow, David Rohde and Stephanie Saul headlined, "Deepwater Horizon's Final Hours," saying: Months after the disaster, "Investigators have dissected BP's well design and Halliburton's cementing work, uncovering problem after problem." Besides attention on the failed blowout protector (BOP), the explosion "escaped intense scrutiny, as if" one problem caused the other. False. Deepwater Horizon "had formidable and redundant defenses against even the worst blowout. It was equipped to divert surging oil and gas safely away from the rig. It had devices to quickly seal off a well blowout or to break free from it. It had systems to prevent gas from exploding and sophisticated alarms that would quickly warn the crew at the slightest trace of gas." The crew practiced responding to alarms, fires and blowouts, and "it was blessed with experienced leaders who clearly cared about safety." In fact, Deepwater Horizon's disaster shouldn't have happened, yet it did. Why suggests willful malfeasance, given the huge profit potential involved, as explained above. Eleven lost lives, many injuries, billions in cost affecting one quarter only, a contaminated Gulf, and potentially millions of harmed coastal residents are inconsequential by comparison. Based on interviews with 21 crew members, documents The Times obtained, sworn testimonies, and written statements from nearly all rig survivors, a disturbing picture emerges, especially a singular fact: Crew members "died and suffered terrible injuries because every one of the Horizon's defenses failed on April 20," a near-impossibility, but it happened. "Some were deployed but did not work. Some were activated too late, after they had almost certainly been damaged by fire or explosions. Some were never deployed at all." Everything that could go wrong did. Decisive steps weren't taken. Communications "fell apart." Warning signs were missed or weren't heeded, and "crew members in critical areas failed to coordinate a response." Paralysis, breakdown, and disaster resulted. "For many, the first hint of crisis came in the form of a blast wave." Yet crew members weren't trained or prepared to handle worst type crises. Why not is key for Mocondo, what workers called a "well from hell," plagued by problems. "Heavy drilling fluid, called mud, kept disappearing into formation cracks. Less mud meant less weight bearing down on the oil and gas that were surging up. This set off violent 'kicks' of gas and oil that sent the (rig's team) scrambling to control the well." In March, trouble halted operations for nine days. It was a hint of worse to come, and just a matter of time before occurring. Management should have taken extra precautions. Failure begs the question. Why not? Instead of instituting fail safe measures, they were systematically avoided. "In effect, they were daring the well to blow out." On April 20, it obliged. What shouldn't and under safe operating conditions couldn't happen, in fact, did. Once the BOP failed, nothing stopped oil and gas from "racing up the Horizon's riser pipe. Nine minutes later came the first explosion." The crew trained for blowouts. Procedure called for "quickly installing a special valve on the drill pipe....Only minutes before the blowout, the drill shack" got "puzzling pressure readings" and sensed trouble. "The industry (long believed) BOPs were 'the ultimate fail-safe' " device. Transocean said Horizon's BOP couldn't prevent blowouts this extreme. However, evidence shows poor maintenance crippled it. Its problems included dead batteries, bad solenoid valves, and leaking hydraulic lines. None should have happened, and all could have easily been fixed. Yet they were "overlooked and ignored." Willful negligence or criminal malfeasance? Either way is damning, especially for an industry major with decades of expertise. Failure was inexcusable, suggesting willful intent. "Transocean (also) never performed an expensive 90-day maintenance inspection that the manufacturer said should be done every three to five years." So do industry and federal regulations. Despite two explosions, Horizon still shouldn't have sunk. Disconnecting the rig from the BOP would have cut off the fire's main fuel source, giving rig and crew a fighting chance. Witnesses differ on details, but agree on one basic point: "even with Horizon burning, powerless and gutted by explosions, there was still resistance to the strongest possible measure that might save the rig." However, Horizon's "death knell....was the emergency disconnect system itself. Like so many of the rig's defenses, it failed" for unexplained reasons. "Horizon was still handcuffed to the well from hell." Evacuating fast was essential. Major unaddressed problems, initial explosions, subsequent small ones, intense heat, and poor evacuation drills left 11 crew members dead. Their epitaph should indict BP officials and complicit Obama officials for homicide. Justice demands holding them accountable.
Stephen Lendman lives in Chicago and can be reached at lendmanstephen@sbcglobal.net. Also visit his blog site at sjlendman.blogspot.com and listen to cutting-edge discussions with distinguished guests on the Progressive Radio News Hour on the Progressive Radio Network Thursdays at 10AM US Central time and Saturdays and Sundays at noon. All programs are archived for easy listening. http://www.progressiveradionetwork.com/the-progressive-news-hour/ Comments 💬 التعليقات |