Egypt Can Rise To The Historical
Occasion But It Must Choose Wisely
17 March 2012
By Alon Ben-Meir
A few days after the Egyptian uprising, I argued
that the Arab Spring could well turn into a long and
cruel winter due to a host of prominent factors
including: the lack of traditional liberalism, the
elites' control of business, a military that clings to
power, and the religious divide and Islamic extremism.
These factors are making the transformation into a
more reformist governance (slow, filled with hurdles
and punctuated with intense violence) much to the
chagrin of Utopian-minded Western governments who
thought that the transition to democracy would be
attainable within months. If and when the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB) and the ruling Military Council reach
a power-sharing agreement, the situation will continue
to unravel and be punctuated by chaos and accompanied
by violence.
A testimony to this chaos is the recent crisis over
the democracy-promoting U.S. NGOs working in Egypt. In
a classic case of diversionary policies, the
military-led government attempted to divert the
attention of the public away from the worsening
economic and security conditions by putting 19 U.S.
citizens on trial for illegally working in Egypt for
NGOs that receive unregistered foreign funding. U.S.
threats to cut off the $1.3 billion in aid to the
military resulted in the release of its citizens a few
days ago. Left confused as to what this fuss was all
about, the Egyptian public reacted sharply against the
military, accusing it of being too incompetent to run
the country's affairs. While this does not suggest
that the Egyptian revolution or the Arab Spring is
doomed, it does offer a reminder to those young men
and women who seek a promising future that they must
remain armed with determination, prudence and the
courage to act when a change of course is needed yet
again.
To set the path for future democratic stability in
Egypt, a resuming of the country's leadership role in
the Arab world and carefully considered regional
responsibilities, any new Egyptian government needs to
follow a number of steps:
First, the electorally-triumphant Islamic parties
should not be tempted to exercise hegemony, but should
rather push for pluralism ensuring that any government
is representative, in word and deed, of Egypt's wide
political spectrum. Demonstrating prudence, the MB has
decided to distance itself from a coalition with the
ultra-conservative Salafi party and has instead sought
out an agreement with the liberal parties. But there
is a growing concern amongst Egypt's democrats that
the MB will use their sugar-coated coalition with the
liberals to hide their real intentions: to gradually
"Islamize" the country's institutions and society
instead of working on the desperately-needed
socioeconomic reforms. The policies that the new
government will pursue and to what extent it will
embrace pluralism will signal not only to the Egyptian
people how it is responding to their needs, but will
also send a clear message to the Arab world as to
where Egypt is actually heading. The Arab youth do not
want their or any other Arab government, to be
fashioned after the Iranian regime and will rise again
if they feel betrayed.
Second, the new government should embark on extensive
sustainable development projects to revive the
economy. To some, the economic gloom might seem to be
lifting in Egypt, but they must remember that this
"brighter" prospect is mainly due to the $3.2 billion
loan the government expects to sign shortly with the
International Monetary Fund in the hopes that this
will clear the way for other foreign aid. However,
foreign aid can only solve immediate and not long-term
economic problems and no foreign-aid-dependent country
is likely to become prosperous. Egypt's current dismal
economic reality can only be solved through
sustainable development strategies, which depend on
decentralized decision-making on the economic projects
and the transfer of managerial authority, skills, and
capacities to sub-national levels, all of which are
key to advancing democracy and development from the
bottom-up.
Decided on by the local communities, and funded by
micro-finance loans, these development projects will
help alleviate the country's endemic poverty, create
jobs and empower the masses, particularly women.
Islamic parties can be a natural ally to this form of
economic development, not only because the majority of
their activities have historically been providing
social services at the grassroots level, but also
because this model identifies with the Islamic
concepts of Shura (consultation) and Ijma
(consensus-building). Instead of responding to a
recent call from the prominent Salafi preacher Mohamed
Hassan for citizens to raise money to do away with US
aid, wealthy Egyptians should donate towards this type
of development. Knowing the experience of Bangladesh
and Morocco, the wealthy donations will get a
significant return and help advance the country's
economic and democratic prospects.
Third, the new government (that would have a
significant MB component) should maintain the peace
with Israel as a pillar of Egypt's national security.
In a panel discussion I participated in on al-Hurra
channel last month which included the chairman of the
MB Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), Dr. Mohamed Morsy,
it was stated by Dr. Morsy that the FJP would honor
the peace but is not really interested in talking with
the Israelis. Also, in the midst of the American NGO
crisis in Egypt, the FJP countered the U.S. threat to
cut aid to the country by threatening to review the
peace treaty with Israel. These are worrying signs as
they ignore the major outcry of the Egyptian and other
Arab revolutionaries who were spurred by domestic
failures and deprivations and not by hatred and
disdain toward Israel. The revolutionaries did not
burn Israeli flags and call for "death to Israel" but
instead demanded freedom, opportunity and dignity. The
MB seems to treat the peaceful relations with Israel
as if they are doing Israel a favor, when in fact the
peace is in Egypt's own national interest. The
preservation of the peace will prevent another
deliberate or accidental armed confrontation, which
would heavily tax the Egyptian economy. Egypt would
have to allocate tens of billions of dollars towards a
war with Israel, which it does not have, while losing
U.S. financial assistance without any prospect of
challenging Israel militarily. And to what end? Israel
is an unmitigated reality and the Egyptian people can
benefit greatly from normal relations from a
technologically and economically-advanced neighboring
country.
Finally, any new government should aggressively pursue
a restoration of Egypt's regional role. Though poor in
resources, Egypt has always been the epicenter of the
Arab world, and the model that emerges in Egypt will
certainly have an impact on the entire Middle East.
But for the Egyptians to set an example for the rest
of the Arab world, they will have to take the lead in
the Arab Spring revolutions. Thus far, unfortunately,
the military-led government has chosen to remain an
observer in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. It has even
allowed Iranian ships to cross the Suez Canal en route
to Syria carrying arms to the Assad regime to suppress
and kill his people who, like their Egyptian
counterparts, simply seek to be free. For political,
security and geo-strategic reasons, the new government
in Egypt cannot afford to lose Egypt's traditional
leadership role in the Arab world by allowing a small
Arab country like Qatar to take the lead or permitting
Iran to rise to the position, a country that is laying
in wait to usurp the political and regional agenda.
Neither the Egyptian people nor the international
community should expect a velvet transition from
dictatorship to democracy. But the new government in
Cairo should work, in cooperation with its regional
and international partners, to smooth the transitional
process and shorten the period of chaos and
instability, which will lead to sustained democratic
reforms (albeit with Islamic values). Egypt can rise
to the historic occasion but it must now choose
wisely.