Syrian Kurds: Time To Assert Their
Rights - A Historic Opportunity For The Minority
Groups
04 April 2012
By Alon Ben-Meir
Regardless of what may come out of Kofi Annan's
peace plan to end the internal conflict in Syria, and
whatever may emerge from the Arab League meeting this
week in Baghdad, the prospect of Assad's fall offers
the Kurdish minority in Syria a historic opportunity
to gain equal political and civil rights. Given the
totalitarian nature of Baathist rule under Assad, the
regime's fall in Syria will take the entire system of
government down with it, much like Saddam's Iraq in
2003. But unlike Iraq's Kurds who have enjoyed virtual
autonomy since 1991 when the United States enforced a
no-fly zone over northern Iraq, Syria's Kurds are less
organized and more divided. Syrian Kurds need to close
ranks, fully join the Syrian people in pursuit of
freedom, and not allow this historic window of
opportunity to slip away.
Unless it wishes to preside over a divided Syria where
the Kurds could contribute to prolonged instability,
any elected government emerging in the post-Assad
Syria must commit itself to the equality of all Syrian
citizens, regardless of their ethnic background. The
Kurdish nation constitutes a population of more than
40 million people, the majority of whom live on a
contiguous landmass that includes Iraq, Iran, Turkey,
and Syria. The Kurds are the world's largest minority
group that remains stateless. The nearly century-old
denial of equal political and civil rights for Kurds
in these four countries has been a contentious issue
with all Kurdish minorities ever since the Kurdish
territory was divided after World War I between Iraq,
Iran, Turkey and Syria, with the sole exception of the
short-lived Kingdom of Kurdistan from September 1922
to July 1924 when the Kurds enjoyed political
independence. Although in all host countries the Kurds
are discriminated against in varying degrees, their
living conditions in Syria are even worse as many are
denied citizenship, land ownership, and even the
freedom of movement within the country.
To fully gain from the popular revolt and achieve
equal rights with the rest of the Syrian people,
Syria's Kurds need to take five central steps and
remain consistent and unwavering, regardless of how
treacherous the road to freedom may be.
First, they must organize themselves and develop a
coherent agenda, which they can use to advance from
the early stages of the revolution, until President
Assad is deposed and the country moves toward a clear
reform. The Syrian Kurds need to assert themselves as
an integral part of the Syrian population and identify
with the Syrian people's just and non-violent struggle
to remove the regime and elect a government committed
to the universal values of freedom, human rights, and
democracy. The Syrian Kurds should not, at this
juncture, seek either the establishment of a federal
system or strive for an autonomous region. Instead,
they should commit themselves to Syria's unity and its
constitutional laws, which will be
collectively-enacted by a new parliament.
Second, rival Kurdish groups must end their deep
divisions and present a unified approach if they want
to be recognized and dealt with seriously. The
Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria (KDPS) supports
the removal of the Assad regime while the Democratic
Union Party (PYD), which has close ties to Turkey's
PKK, is concerned that Assad's removal will lead to
the dominance of the Turkish-supported Muslim
Brotherhood which would maintain the same anti-Kurd
policy. The Assad regime is currently exploiting the
Kurdish division by allowing the PYD leadership to
return from exile while permitting it to open Kurdish
language schools, cultural centers, and party offices
in Syrian cities. The success of the Syrian Kurds in
achieving true equality will ultimately depend on
their ability to unite, and remain united, throughout
the revolutionary process. PYD leadership must be
reminded that its pro-Assad approach is a losing
strategy in either case: if the regime survives,
albeit unlikely, it will not hesitate to revoke all of
the concessions it has made in time of crisis, and if
the regime falls, which is more likely, the new
government will probably settle the account (for
supporting Assad) with the PYD and the Kurds.
Third, the leadership of the Kurds must demand and
insist on proportional representation within the
Syrian National Council (SNC). Currently there is only
one delegate, which is hardly representative of the
size of the Kurdish community in Syria, a community
that constitutes 10-12% of Syria's total population
(or almost two million people). While KDPS, the SNC's
main Kurdish component, should work harder to convince
other reluctant parties, particularly the PYD to join
forces, the SNC should be aware that it could also
significantly benefit from a broader Kurdish
representation if it wants to be seriously
representative of the Syrian people and its political,
ethnic, and religious mosaic. Shortchanging the Kurds
will undoubtedly raise serious concerns among other
minorities within the country such as the Armenians,
the Druze, and other groups, that will fear similar
marginalization within the new Syria.
Fourth, the Kurdish leadership should approach their
relationship with Turkey with caution. Since the SNC
is headquartered in Istanbul, it is certainly
influenced by the Erdogan government, which does not
want, for obvious reasons, to encourage federal or
autonomous solutions for the Kurds. Syria's Kurds have
every reason to question Turkey's intentions because
Ankara clearly wants to see the Muslim Brotherhood,
with which it has a close affinity, in power in
Damascus. Moreover, the Kurds do not rule out a
possible Turkish military intervention in Syria to
ensure stability. Such an intervention will still be
used to solidify the dominance of the MB.
Nevertheless, the Syrian Kurdish leadership should
cooperate and enhance its relations with Turkey not
only because it is premature for Syria's divided Kurds
to challenge Turkey's plan but also because the Kurds'
sole other option is anathema: an Assad regime that is
closer than ever to Iran.
Finally, the Syrian Kurds should learn from, and ask
for the support of, their brethren, the Iraqi Kurds,
who benefited greatly from the fall of Saddam Hussein
and are currently running the Kurdistan region as a
prosperous island of stability within a conflict-torn
Iraq. Since affinity between the Kurds (regardless of
their country of residence) is stronger than the
affinity to their separate host states, Iraq's
Kurdistan Region is a natural ally and is freer to
help the Kurds' cause in Syria in contrast to the
Iraqi government, which tacitly supports Assad.
Syria's Kurds can benefit from their Iraqi brethren in
experience, ranging from the reconciliation between
the rivaling Talabani-faction Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan party and Barzani-faction Kurdistan
Democratic Party, to the gradual, peaceful approach to
achieving autonomy within a nation state should the
effort to attain full integration fail.
In conclusion, it is time for Syria's Kurds to close
ranks and join the Syrian people's march for freedom
and demand their own basic rights from a future Syrian
government, which they themselves must help shape. The
Arab revolutions are as historically exceptional and
unparalleled as the victory of the Kurd-turned-Arab
Saladin over the European Crusaders in the twelfth
century, and this time, too, Arabs and the Kurds can
join forces to defeat injustice that has plagued them
from within.