Putin's Choice: Not Much In The Way Of
Russian Policy Substance Has Changed
01 June 2012
By Alon
Ben-Meir
Since the end of the
Cold War, the relationship between Russia and the West
has revolved around a perpetual "reset" that never
seems to arrive and attempts to do so are typically
based on mutual suspicion and of course, a perceived
self-interest. For the past decade, Russia has seen
considerable growth under President-Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin, who has presented himself as a stable
figure that provides ordinary Russians with a greater
standard of living. Russia continues to be inflicted,
however, by internal and external problems including:
persistent and endemic corruption, a myopic political
establishment, crumbling infrastructure, limited trade
outside oil and gas, an often erratic foreign policy,
and denied civil and political rights to particular
segments of the Russian population. How Putin will
tread the treacherous road ahead will determine
Russia's role and influence in the international arena
for years to come.
In response to the late 2011 legislative elections,
which were marred by irregularities, a series of
unprecedented demonstrations threatened the legitimacy
of Mr. Putin's rule as well as the oligarchic state
that has endured under his watch. The official
reaction to the protests was unsurprisingly harsh as
the assumed longevity of Mr. Putin was placed under
intense scrutiny by domestic and foreign observers.
Putin has become increasingly more assertive in his
efforts to consolidate his power after the flawed
elections. Little hope for reform was held when Putin
replaced the majority of his cabinet, which is now
staffed by loyalists, thus ensuring the continuity of
his near dictatorial style as he begins his third
term.
Instead of a blanket crackdown, the Russian state
allowed some protests to continue relatively
unobstructed, but now there are signs of potential
censure and governmental hostility toward freedom of
expression and individual civil and political rights.
The parliament is currently considering a bill that
will dramatically increase fines for those involved in
unauthorized protests, in an attempt to halt the
recent spate of non-traditional (and nonviolent)
demonstrations that seek to preserve the momentum of
last year's groundswell. What is clear from the
protests, and Putin's response, is that Russia needs
to "reset" its relationship with its own people by
respecting their right to freedom of speech and
assembly, and work toward shaping a political system
that is more inclusive and transparent.
In addition to the political malaise, Russian society
is plagued by rampant corruption. Freedom House labels
Russia as being "not free," and Russia ranks pitifully
low on Transparency International's Corruption
Perception Index. The public has little choice but to
succumb with deep resentment and fervent frustration
towards the corrupt system, which governs many aspects
of their lives. Seventy percent of small business
owners have reported paying a bribe, and only 17
percent believe the court system treats everyone in an
equal manner. Despite the massive wealth that has been
created, the state of Russian infrastructure is a
shameful reminder of how corruption robs the Russian
people of their rights and well-being. Unless the
pervasive corruption is dealt with concretely, Russia
will languish behind other global powers while
resorting more often to flexing its muscles
domestically instead of engaging in real reforms and
creating a more democratic and just society.
Economically, Russia has had remarkable success in the
past decade; GDP has skyrocketed and the state was
able to make effective use of its bulging oil export
revenues. In stark contrast to the instability of the
Yeltsin years, Putin was able to ride a wave of strong
economic development and cultivate an image of a
strong leader that was respected or, at the very
least, tolerated by the general public. Under the
surface, however, Russia's supposed economic success
failed to reach ordinary people. In an ironic twist,
Russia's poor had more purchasing power in the 1990s
and as their real income declined, the top few percent
of Russian society doubled their wealth. Furthermore,
Russia's overreliance on a small range of exports,
which mainly include oil, natural gas, chemicals and
military hardware, is unsustainable given the
volatility of the oil and gas markets in particular.
For a country that enjoys a growing economy, the
prospect of future growth in Russia will not be
realized unless the Russian economy diversifies and
begins a systematic clean up of its corrupt economic
practices to give small businesses a fair stake in an
environment of economic growth. Indeed, there is no
reason why Russia cannot become an industrial
powerhouse; it is entirely conceivable that items
labeled "made in Russia," which are a rarity nowadays,
could one day be rolling out of Russian factories for
Western consumption.
As I have noted before, Russian foreign policy has
been largely self-defeating and reminiscent of an
antiquated Cold War style of state relations. Russia's
muscular approach to foreign policy originates from
its massive nuclear stockpile, which outnumbers that
of the United States albeit considerably less
modernized, and its riches in oil and gas, the price
of which is subject to supply and demand. Other than
that, Russia enjoys a unique position in international
affairs: as a member of the Quartet that deals with
the Israel-Palestine conflict, a member of the P5+1
negotiating team with Iran concerning its nuclear
program, a permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council with veto power and a member of the
G-8.
These characteristics enable Russia to exercise a
significant diplomatic influence over the course of
many international issues. That said, Russia's
abominable position on Syria paints Moscow in a
terrible light in the eyes of the Arab world and puts
it at odds with the wider international community.
Although it is understandable that Russia wants to
preserve its regional influence and augment that by
maintaining its naval base in Syria--its last bastion
in the Middle East from the Soviet era- there is no
excuse for its blind support of President Assad, which
makes the Kremlin an accomplice to the ongoing
massacre of the Syrian people. In fact, Russia's stern
opposition to force President Assad out of power may
well precipitate an all out civil war that the Kremlin
is, presumably, trying to avoid. Russia could still
maintain its influence in the region by working with
the Syrian opposition. There should be no doubt,
however, that Russia's contemporary foreign relations
are based on an unsustainable path that is destined
for failure, to which the Syrian tragic development
attests.
The announcement made at the recent NATO summit that
the European missile shield program was "up and
running" was interpreted by Russia as a clear and
unambiguous provocation and a sign that NATO was
seeking to blunt Russian ambition. Putin responded in
kind by successfully testing a new intercontinental
ballistic missile, which followed a previous statement
from a top Russian general which suggested that a
pre-emptive strike against NATO launch sites was
possible if an agreement on missile defense could not
be reached. This brinkmanship has significant
political and geostrategic overtones and it may
backfire. Moscow knows that an expanding NATO places
further limitations on its ability to carve out
spheres of influence, in which it hopes to create a
"Eurasian union" that ensures Russian regional
dominance.
The Cold War may have ended twenty years ago, but not
much in the way of Russian policy substance has
changed since then. Given all of Russia's wealth, its
immense resources, the endurance of its people, and
its unique diplomatic role, Putin can further enhance
Russia's international standing by changing course now
instead of continuing to slide backwards. Unless
Russia resets itself, it will miss a rare opportunity
to become a responsible and respected global leader.