Why Attacking Iran Is Becoming More
Likely: Coming Close To Reaching The "Zone Of
Immunity"
15 June 2012
By Alon Ben-Meir
The negotiations over Iran's nuclear program during
the past few months have produced nothing more than a
diplomatic dance in the face of persistent Iranian
ploys for time coupled with intransigence on key
issues. In failing to reach a negotiated settlement,
the conflict with Tehran is inching closer toward a
point of no return, where Israel might decide that the
circumstances warrant a unilateral attack against
Iran's nuclear facilities. Although there are other
scenarios under which Israel may decide to attack
Iran, chief among them is Israel's fear that Iran is
close to reaching what Israel's Defense Minister Ehud
Barak terms, "a zone of immunity." Under such
circumstances and given more time, Iran would be in a
position to store much of its previous enriched
uranium, as well as its high quality centrifuges, deep
inside the mountain base of Fordow, thus becoming
completely immune from aerial bombardment.
This objective, which Tehran is hard at work in
seeking to achieve, limits how much time Israel would
have before it acts. This Israeli concern makes the
continuing diplomatic efforts coupled with sanctions
advocated by the Obama administration unviable options
and might in fact be extremely risky to pursue. The
Netanyahu government is absolutely convinced that Iran
will continue to play for time as it has over the past
several years, during which time Tehran has
considerably advanced its nuclear program in defiance
of the IAEA and in spite of severe sanctions.
Netanyahu and his Defense Minister Barak, in
particular, are not persuaded that any future talks
will persuade Iran to give up its uranium enrichment
program. Time has therefore become Israel's worst
enemy as Iran races to shield its main nuclear
facilities to make them impregnable to air attacks.
Unlike securing a "zone of immunity", which the
Israelis believe Tehran could achieve within a few
months, other possible scenarios include: Iran
mustering the technology to produce nuclear weapons,
cyber-attacks being inadequate to slow the nuclear
program, and requiring more time to work, thus denying
Israel the luxury of time to assume the "wait and see"
attitude.
Although a consensus exists among the Israeli defense
and security establishment that an attack would at
best delay Iran's nuclear program by two to three
years and might even push Iran to pursue nuclear
weapons capabilities more vigorously than at the
present, it is not a given that Iran would simply
resume its nuclear activity following such an attack.
Some Israeli officials argue that the changing
regional and domestic political dynamics may force
Tehran to rethink its nuclear weapons program.
Moreover, as Barak speculated a couple of months ago,
Iran's potential retaliatory attacks against Israel or
its allies, specifically the US, would have limited
impact and the catastrophic regional repercussions
many Western observers suggest would not necessarily
come to pass. Although President Putin, for domestic
political motivation, is eager for a foreign policy
achievement and would be inclined to put more pressure
on Iran, no one who understands the internal dynamics
in Iran expects any breakthrough in the next meeting
scheduled for June 18-19 in Moscow between the P5+I
and Iran. As a result, feverish diplomatic
maneuverings will follow along with a stiffening of
the American and European sanctions that are in place
already. Additionally, the current quiet military
preparation for striking Iran by both the US and
Israel may well enter a new phase of readiness, albeit
with differences in timing and the decision regarding
if or when to strike, which remains a contentious
issue between the two allies.
Undoubtedly, there is extensive cooperation between
the United States and Israel regarding Iran's nuclear
program, including intelligence sharing and the
coordination of cyber-attacks, all the while keeping
Israel informed about the progress (or the lack
thereof) in the negotiations with Iran. In recent
weeks, a number of former and current American
officials have visited Israel including: Michele A.
Flournloy, former Undersecretary of Defense, David S.
Cohen, Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence in the Treasury Department, and Wendy R.
Sherman, Undersecretary of State for Political
Affairs. These and others are trying to assure Israel
that the US's commitment to preventing Iran
from acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities is solid
and that the US is prepared to use military force
should it become necessary.
The Obama administration insists that Iran is at least
two years away from reaching the so-called "point of
no return", providing the administration with more
time for diplomacy and allowing the crippling
sanctions to succeed. Moreover, having just concluded
the war in Iraq and with the fighting in Afghanistan
still continuing, there is little appetite to start
new military operations, which could ignite regional
conflagration. In addition, being that this is an
election year, the President does not want to risk a
military operation especially when there is more time
to find new alternatives. Finally, neither the US nor
any of its close allies, especially Israel, faces
direct, imminent or immediate danger from Iran, which
US collective intelligence agencies assure is not the
case at this juncture.
The Netanyahu government sees the Iranian threat from
a different perspective. Israel maintains, with some
justifications, that the Iranian leadership has
repeatedly threatened Israel existentially and even if
Iran does not use a nuclear weapon against Israel, it
poses a grave regional danger far greater than the
potential consequences of an Israeli attack. A nuclear
Iran would increase nuclear proliferation (the Saudi
government has already threatened to develop its own
nuclear weapons), heighten the risk of extremist
groups of obtaining nuclear materials, and embolden
Iran to throw its weight around in the region, pitting
the Shiite bloc against Israel. That said, former
Israeli officials from the intelligence and military
communities argue that Iran knows only too well that
Israel maintains second strike capabilities that could
cause catastrophic damage to Iran and the Iranian
leadership is not so irrational as to commit suicide.
Nevertheless, Netanyahu insists that Israel's national
security concerns cannot be taken lightly and however
remote the Iranian threat may be, Israel cannot afford
to take the risk.
The Israeli position is further strengthened by the
argument that the on and off negotiations between the
P5+1 and Iran and through Turkish and Brazilian
mediation nearly two years ago, have produced nothing
of substance. This problem was compounded by the
recent presumed agreement between the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran to allow
inspectors to access the controversial Parchin
military base, which has failed to materialize.
Moreover, recent evidence revealed that a cleanup
operation has taken place at the military site, which
has heightened the suspicions of IAEA, the US and
Israel. Finally, Iran continues to refuse unfettered
IAEA access at its suspected nuclear sites, with the
intent of obfuscating its true nuclear goals. Israel
views this as a pattern that Tehran has been pursuing
almost with impunity while defying not only the IAEA
but also four UNSC resolutions demanding a complete
suspension of its enrichment program.
Although for Israel time is of the essence, should
Iran come close to reaching the "zone of immunity"
which would make attacking Iran more likely, clear and
unequivocal evidence of Israeli intelligence findings
must be produced for the whole world to see before
Israel contemplates such an attack. There is no room
for emotions, miscalculations or misperceptions. A
premature Israeli attack could not only have
catastrophic regional consequences but could also
subject Israel to world–wide condemnation, potentially
crippling sanctions, and retaliatory attacks by Iran
and its surrogates.
The United States is not oblivious to Iran's
intentions or to Israel's legitimate concerns.
Regardless of the differing assessments between Israel
and the US, Israel would be well advised to fully
collaborate with the American administration and act
in concert to avoid any miscalculations that could
potentially cost Israel dearly, severely undermine the
US influence and spin the Middle East out of control.