Israel's Posturing: Behind Netanyahu
And Barak's Threats To Attack Iran
06 September 2012
By Alon Ben-Meir
Successive Israeli governments have consistently
inhibited in the past any public discussion about
Iran's nuclear program and what Israel might do to
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. In recent
weeks however, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense
Minister Barak have been openly discussing the issue
while intimating their readiness to take whatever
actions necessary to eliminate the Iranian threat. The
question is why Netanyahu and Barak have chosen to
"advertise" their deep concerns now and why they have
such an urgency to act at this particular juncture,
both of which have prompted newspapers reporters and
pundits to speculate about what the real intentions
are behind this public exposure and what is to be
expected. Meanwhile, former and current officials,
including President Peres, have expressed pointed
objections to taking any unilateral military strikes
against Iran, insisting that if such action became
necessary, it must certainly be led by the US to
shield Israel from being singled out and blamed for
the potentially disastrous regional consequences.
Having concluded that sanctions and diplomacy have
failed as Iran is either technologically nearing the
point of no return or achieving a zone of immunity
that will make their most advanced nuclear plants at
Fordo (near Qom) impregnable to air attack, the
Netanyahu government has decided on a new strategy
designed to achieve multiple purposes. While Israel's
determination to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear
weapons has not changed, the new strategy is meant to
strongly convey that Israel is not bluffing.
Israel's groundwork for the new strategy is as
follows: Israel will alert its
closest ally, the US, alarm its
European friends, credibly threaten
Iran and gather more information, warn
other enemies such as Hezbollah and Hamas,
test the private sentiments and public
reactions of the Sunni Arab states, and will finally
prepare the Israeli public while
laying in wait for the right moment to strike, should
everything else fail.
The Netanyahu government has already expressed its
displeasure with the strategy the Obama administration
has adopted to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear
weapons. Whereas many Israelis believe that President
Obama's credibility is on the line and he will act
militarily should it become necessary, others,
including Netanyahu and Barak, are not so sure. They
are concerned that Obama may eventually have to choose
between preventing or containing Iran and will settle
on the latter by providing Israel and other Arab
allies in the region with some kind of security
umbrella.
Netanyahu and Barak are troubled by the fact that
Obama has relied excessively on a diplomatic solution
knowing full well that the Iranians are masters of
playing for time. Moreover, he chose to impose gradual
sanctions to which the Iranian government was able to
adjust instead of inflicting real, crippling
sanctions, especially after the failure of the first
few sets of negotiations, which could have forced
Tehran to change course. This approach, from the
Israeli perspective, played into Iran's hand while
engaging the P5+1 (the US, the United Kingdom, France,
Russia and China plus Germany) in futile negotiations
that have never stood a chance of success.
By asking the P5+1 to declare that the talks with
Iran have failed, Netanyahu is alerting the US that
time is of the essence and challenging Obama to take
more decisive actions against Iran. Netanyahu's
rationale is that since Obama seeks to prevent an
Israeli attack in an election year, he will be under
immense pressure from his presidential rival, Mitt
Romney, not only to adopt a final set of truly
crippling sanctions but to be clear about his
willingness to use force against Iran before it
reaches the point of no return or enters the zone of
immunity.
Netanyahu's message of alarm is directed against
the EU, Turkey and China, which will be the most
affected by the potential disruption of oil supplies
should the Strait of Hormuz become imperiled.
Netanyahu and Barak are convinced that the EU in
particular is engaged in wishful thinking, believing
that continuing diplomatic efforts coupled with
stiffer sanctions will force the Mullahs to come to
their senses. The EU clearly view Netanyahu as
overzealous about Israel's national security, are
extremely worried about an Israeli attack and are
convinced that the repercussions will be catastrophic.
Thus, for them no attack should be contemplated as
long as Iran is willing to continue to talk.
Using the repeated Iranian existential threat
against Israel, and while observing the Western
powers' ineptitude in the past in dealing with the
genocide in Bosnia, Sudan and now the wholesale
slaughter in Syria, Netanyahu has little faith in what
the EU can, or will, do to bring Iran to a halt. The
EU, from Netanyahu's perspective, could have done a
great deal more to cripple Iran economically but it
still has yet to do so. At the same time, the EU
refuses to declare Hezbollah, Iran's prime surrogate
but Israel's staunchest enemy, as a terrorist
organization while it continues to allow Hezbollah to
freely raise tens of millions of dollars in Europe,
when much of it is used for buying armaments to target
Israel.
The direct threat against Iran is based on
Netanyahu and Barak's calculation that although public
discussion about the potential attack on Iran provides
Tehran more time to prepare for the worst, it will
provide Israel with certain advantages. Fear of an
imminent Israeli attack will force the Iranian
authorities to take additional security measures to
protect their nuclear facilities, which will reveal
Iran's preparedness and capabilities, and expose its
weaknesses and how much of its boastings of a damaging
counter-attack against Israel are in fact accurate.
Importantly, Israel will also be in a position to
better assess the Iranian public's reaction and
whether the rumors of an imminent attack will
precipitate panic, which may reveal how the Iranian
authorities react and pacify the public. More than
anything, Israel wants Iran to take its threats
seriously, which explains why Netanyahu and Barak
openly stated that when it comes to Israel's national
security Israel must, in the final analysis, rely only
on itself.
Netanyahu's and Barak's exposé is also intended to
warn all those who might think of coming to Iran's aid
by engaging Israel on another front (in particular
with groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas) that they
should think twice before they dare to provoke Israel.
By openly discussing their intentions, Netanyahu and
Barak want these groups or states to assume that
Israel would not have discussed such a sensitive
national security matter had it not taken into full
consideration their potential involvements. The
message to Hezbollah is clear: there will not be a
repeat of the 2006 war, Israel will break its
back and that this time around no one will come to its
aid considering Syria is in shambles and Iran is under
intense economic pressure and too busy to deal with
the potentially catastrophic effects of an Israeli
attack.
The other target of Israel's open discourse on
attacking Iran is intended to test the Sunni Arabs,
especially the Gulf States led by Saudi Arabia. There
have been ongoing tacit discussions between Israel and
the Gulf States about the potential Israeli strike and
how that might affect both their public reactions and
their private interests and concerns. There is no
doubt that all Sunni Arab states would prefer to
prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons
peacefully. But after failing to do so by
diplomatic means, they would support an attack on
Iran's nuclear facilities, whether the attack is
carried out by Israel, the US or through a joint
effort. Saudi Arabia in particular sees the conflict
between Shiites verses Sunnis in terms of regional
domination with a focus on the Gulf and views Iran
with nuclear weapons as a nightmarish scenario that
must be prevented at all costs.
Finally, Netanyahu's and Barak's message was
intended for the Israeli public not only to prepare
them for a potential Iranian counter-attack but to
begin psychological and logistical preparations (
including the distributions of gas masks, stocking
underground shelters with food and water) to avoid
public panic and rally the nation around the
government's prospective actions. Although the
Netanyahu government is not dismissive of the voices
of the Israelis who consider a unilateral attack as
ill-conceived and extremely risky, Netanyahu and Barak
want to demonstrate unshakable resolve in the face of
an existential threat and that the public can
ultimately trust their judgment. Moreover, such an
exercise, even if a strike is avoided either because
of the United States or because of Netanyahu's/Barak's
readiness to act, will be good for Israel and good for
the entire region as long as Iran never acquires
nuclear weapons.
Israel has time and again stated in the past that
it will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons or
the technology to quickly assemble such arsenals. The
Israelis insist that whatever repercussions arise from
attacking Iran's nuclear facilities will be far less
ominous than allowing Iran to obtain nuclear
capabilities, which will have far more reaching
geopolitical and security implications that will
adversely affect every state in the region.
In the final analysis, an Israeli strike on Iran's
nuclear facilities may not come as soon as many
predict. The strike can and may well happen but it is
very unlikely that such an incredibly ominous
undertaking will occur without a minimum of US
acquiescence, if not outright support and direct
involvement. Regardless of how much Netanyahu and
Barak may be sure of themselves and Israel's military
capabilities, they cannot afford to make any mistakes
or miscalculations because Israel's future is on the
line.
Yet, exactly because of that, no one should think
for a moment that Israel is bluffing. Netanyahu and
Barak have concluded that diplomacy has run its course
and only extraordinary, crippling and immediate
sanctions may still have a slim chance of success.
Once Israel determines that Iran has either achieved
the point of no return or is about to reach the zone
of immunity and the US is not prepared to take
military action, Israel will attack Iran
singlehandedly and no consequences of such an attack,
from the Israeli perspective, will fare against such
an existential threat.