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02 November 2012 By Osman Mirghani Lebanon is a victim of itself
and others. This small country seems constantly doomed
to pay extortionate bills with its security and
stability, and the blood of its sons. At best, it is
obliged to live in a fragile and tense truce, deprived
of true stability and lasting peace. The players
differ, and the offenders vary, but the results are
always the same. The country constantly teeters on the
edge of the abyss, being pushed around by foreign
interests and endless domestic conflicts. Internal
coexistence remains fragile, and all parties operate
under the principle of "no winners and no losers",
except Lebanon itself of course, which is helpless. Lebanon is considered fair game because national
unity exists there in name only. Sectarian tensions
open Lebanon's pores to anyone seeking to erode the
nation, or to settle scores with others on its
territory. Slogans are traded internally as national
sovereignty is sold to third parties, and the fate of
the country is placed in the hands of others. Lebanon
has become a commodity in the auction of politics, and
an open arena for the wars and conflicts of others.
How many wars have taken place on Lebanese territory
by remote control, how many assassinations have
occurred through decisions from abroad, and how many
murder files remain open, with the killers still
unknown? Few are those who have sought to help Lebanon
out of its ordeal, and many are those who want to keep
it subject to their calculations, and a hotbed for
their wars. The assassination of Brigadier General Wissam al-Hassan,
head of the intelligence branch of the Lebanese
Internal Security Forces, does not differ in its
motives and objectives from many of the assassinations
that have rocked Lebanon in the past. The intention
was to instigate a shock, thus increasing tensions and
further pushing the country towards a vacuum and
sectarian strife, with the aim of creating a war or at
least putting the country on the brink of it. There is
something of a consensus that the timing of the crime
and the choice of assassination target were intended
to aggravate the internal situation as much as
possible, which has remained tense ever since the
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri,
with tensions further increasing as a result of the
Syrian crisis. Many see a link between the
assassination of Brigadier General al-Hassan and the
arrest of former Lebanese minister Michel Samaha, who
was detained before carrying out his task and who
confessed to receiving orders from Damascus. In both
cases, the intention was to aggravate the internal
situation and transfer the Syrian war onto Lebanese
territory. Lebanon remains the weakest link among
Syria's neighbors, and hence the easiest to exploit.
There are Lebanese allies, agents and clients ready to
line up behind Damascus and expand the arena of
conflict, in order to relieve the pressure on the
Syrian regime and complicate regional and
international calculations, especially since the fall
of the al-Assad regime would be a blow to Tehran and
would weaken Hezbollah. In this regard we have seen a
growing escalation on the Turkish-Syrian border,
attempts to move the tension to Jordan and Iraq, and
we can also include the timing of the drone launched
over Israel, which Hezbollah claimed responsibility
for. The wise in Lebanon were quick to contain the anger
that erupted after the assassination of al-Hassan, so
that the crime would not achieve its planned
objectives and Lebanon would not descend into war. But
the problem remains how to respond, and should the
government resign or be dismissed? If the government
stepped down what would be the alternative, and would
this alternative be able to operate in light of the
political polarization and sectarian tensions? Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati has said he
will not hold onto his position because he believes
his sect is being targeted, he senses its anger, and
he cannot bear the responsibility for al-Hassan's
blood. But even this resignation, which would seem
natural in any other country going through what
Lebanon is going through, does not seem easy to agree
upon, even among allies. While many believe that the
resignation is the least the Prime Minister can do,
there are also those who believe that this will not
solve the problem and will only add more confusion and
complexity, and may lead the country towards a vacuum,
particularly as the formation of an alternative
government will face obstacles from forces allied with
Damascus. In turn, this vacuum could increase
sectarian tensions and end up igniting the situation,
which would mean that Wissam al-Hassan's assassins
would have finally achieved their goal. In light of
this complex picture, a government of national unity
remains a distant dream, because such a government,
even if it was formed by some miracle, will never
succeed if Lebanon itself is not united. It will never
succeed if there is no consensus on Lebanese
sovereignty, and if Lebanese politicians are not
united in their rejection of foreign interference, and
distanced from such influences. The sad answer is that there is no real solution in sight as long as Lebanon remains internally divided, and as long as sectarian tension prevails. Many Lebanese citizens value loyalty to their sect over loyalty to their homeland, and they seek to make alliances abroad instead of fortifying the domestic situation and strengthening the unity of their country and the independence of its decisions. People today are calling, just as they called after other assassinations or crises, for a salvation government, or for another round of national dialogue, but this will only help to treat the wounds; it will not cure the underlying disease. The Lebanese must be honest with themselves and recognize that the current constitutional formula needs to be reviewed, because it does not solve the problem of sectarianism, rather it legitimizes it, and it does not strengthen national unity, rather it weakens it. In a country with 18 officially recognized sects, there is a need to do everything possible to enhance assimilation between groups and strengthen national unity. There is a need for a frank discussion about whether sectarian quotas in their current form have actually succeeded in protecting the country and safeguarding its unity, or if they have actually consecrated sectarianism there, and made the country vulnerable to foreign interference and an arena for the wars of others. The problem of Lebanon will only be resolved when the Lebanese behave like Lebanese, regardless of whether they are Muslim or Christian, Sunni or Shiite, Maronite or Orthodox, Druze or Alawite, Armenian or Assyrian. In the absence of this, the country will never know genuine stability or lasting peace, and it will continue to be sacrificed at the hands of its sons and the hands of others. |