Since the start of the uprising in Syria in 2011,
President Bashar al-Assad has responded to the
challenge with three major speeches.
Each time, the venue chosen had a perhaps unintended
symbolic significance.
The first venue was the ornate hall used for meetings
of the Council of Ministers.
The choice indicted that the president regarded the
burgeoning uprising which begun in Deraa as a largely
administrative problem to be handled by the government
through bureaucratic means.
Al-Assad's tone was paternalistic, not to say
patronising. He saw the uprising as a minor and
localised affair prompted by some people's
misunderstanding of his government's beneficial
policies.
Trying to triangulate, al-Assad cast himself as an
arbiter between the protestors and the government. In
that mode he dictated a series of meaningless
measures, with ministers dutifully noting every word.
Al-Assad's failure to see the political nature of the
uprising was astonishing, to say the least.
In the next speech al-Assad enlisted members of the
Syrian parliament as audience. The choice of the
parliament as venue indicated the beginning of an
understanding that something more than administrative
blips was involved. Despite thousands killed and many
more driven out of their homes or imprisoned, the
problem al-Assad faced was unlikely to end with
bureaucratic measures and hollow promises.
Nevertheless, al-Assad still insisted that the revolt
concerned a tiny minority. Though months of efforts to
crush the uprising by mass killing and indiscriminate
destruction had failed, al-Assad clung to the failed
recipe.
Commentators had wondered where the third speech might
be held. The hall of the Council of Governments no
longer fit the purpose if only because Syria has
ceased to have a government in the normal sense. Two
changes of prime minister, the defection of a prime
minister and reshuffles caused by defections and/or
assassination have transformed the Council of
Ministers into an empty shell. Today, to the extent
that Syria could be said to have a government it
consists of Bashar al-Assad and his kitchen cabinet
including his wife, brother, and mother.
The parliament was also out as venue for a
presidential speech.
Many members have simply vanished, some joining the
opposition or seeking shelter in exile. It is not even
clear if the discredited organ could conjure a quorum
for a plenary session.
So, where could al-Assad make another speech? The
question had prompted speculation for weeks. Since no
one had seen the president in public since June, there
were rumours that he had fled to his Alawite
stronghold or was hiding in the mountains.
However, when revealed, the venue chosen for the
latest presidential speech fit the bill perfectly.
The third speech was made in the Damascus Opera House,
closed since last May when Russian musician Viktor
Babenkov was billed for a recital.
Was al-Assad following Babenkov with a partition
composed in Moscow?
The question is not fanciful.
Al-Assad's analysis of the dire situation in Syria
included echoes of Russian propaganda. The uprising
was the work of "terrorists financed, armed and
manipulated by the West", al-Assad claimed. There was
no point in talking to the rebels; he would rather
talk to their "masters" in the West.
Some Western analysts believe that al-Assad's
rejection of peaceful transition is prompted by Russia
and that the key to any solution lies in Moscow. I
don't believe that is the case. Russia no longer has
the influence it once had as the Soviet Union.
Today, Russia is operating as an opportunist power,
seeking a say in Syria's future without making a big
political investment. Even if Russia abandoned al-Assad,
he would not throw in the towel unless he is convinced
that the game is up for him.
Al-Assad's analysis is the mirror image of the mistake
made by Western analysts. He is proposing negotiations
with the West, actually meaning the United States,
because he wrongly believes Washington writes the
score for the Syrian uprising.
However, even if Washington asked the Syrian
opposition to accept al-Assad in some capacity, it is
doubtful that key segments of the uprising would
agree. In the same way, even if Moscow asked al-Assad
to leave, it is not certain he would do so.
The crisis in Syria has fond a momentum of its own
that no outside power, or combination of powers, can
modulate let alone stop.
The fate of Syria is in the hands of Syrians.
Outsiders could help shorten the deadly crisis by
supporting the uprising in a massive way, enough to
counter al-Assad's military machine.
Paradoxically, by rejecting feelers put out to him for
a negotiated transition, al-Assad may have forced the
Western powers into that direction.
Assad's libretto at the Opera House the other night
may have had a farcical tone. But it may well lead to
a tragic denouement for him.
Amir Taheri was born in Ahvaz, southwest Iran, and
educated in Tehran, London and Paris. He was Executive
Editor-in-Chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran (1972-79).
In 1980-84, he was Middle East Editor for the Sunday
Times. In 1984-92, he served as member of the
Executive Board of the International Press Institute (IPI).
Between 1980 and 2004, he was a contributor to the
International Herald Tribune. He has written for the
Wall Street Journal, the New York Post, the New York
Times, the London Times, the French magazine Politique
Internationale, and the German weekly Focus. Between
1989 and 2005, he was editorial writer for the German
daily Die Welt. Taheri has published 11 books, some of
which have been translated into 20 languages. He has
been a columnist for Asharq Alawsat since 1987.
Taheri's latest book "The Persian Night" is published
by Encounter Books in London and New York.From Consul To Terrorist: The Only Faction Active oOn The Scene Because Everybody Else Has Left The Arena :: EsinIslam The Muslim World Portal For Islamic News And Opinions
From Consul To Terrorist: The Only Faction Active oOn The Scene Because Everybody Else Has Left The Arena
14 January 2013
By Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed
As soon as I heard the name Iyad Ag Ghaly in relation
to the events in Mali I began to wonder if this could
be the same man from the same country? Could it really
be him? Iyad Ag Ghaly heads up the military operations
of armed terrorist groups in northern Mali; whilst
there was a man with the same name who served as
Mali's consul in Jeddah. I called some friends and
confirmed that Iyad Ag Ghaly is indeed the same man
that I met at Jeddah's Hilton hotel less than three
years ago.
We are facing a truly strange world where those who
are legitimate today could be fugitives tomorrow.
At the time, I knew-from those who had dealt with
Ghaly as a Tuareg tribal chief and diplomatic
consul-that he was the best source to find
intermediaries to negotiate the release of hostages
taken in the Azawad region. Now, he is said to be
commander of the Ansar Dine movement fighting the
Malian army, as well as international French and
African forces.
When I read a profile about him in yesterday's Asharq
al-Awsat newspaper, I was even more confused, for this
stated that he was close to Libyan dictator Muammar
Qadhafi who reportedly sent him to fight in Lebanon.
Yet, Ghaly only recently displayed extremist
tendencies.
This kind of confusion and uncertainty has become
quite common as shown by the emergence of extremists
like Tarek al-Zomor and Mohamed al-Zawahiri on Egypt's
political scene. So how did a man like Iyad Ag Ghaly
turn from being a moderate Sunni Muslim to an
extremist armed fighter? Is it rational to suppose
that a man in his fifties, like Ghaly, should suddenly
become radicalized? This is truly hard to believe. I
sense that this may be some kind of political maneuver
where politicians have pretended to adopt extremist
ideologies in order to recruit impulsive youths. These
politicians provide these youth with funding under the
pretext of ?religious duty?, convincing them to
sacrifice their lives for a false cause in return for
a place in heaven! Since there is a general
international lack of will to fight anywhere in the
world, the French-alongside a few African states-will
fight this war on their own before realizing that
desert wars never end and withdraw. What makes matters
more complicated is that conflicts that involve
religious slogans and tribal powers can last for
decades without any side being defeated.
Our problem with those who are keen on fighting these
extremists, like the French today and the Americans
yesterday in Afghanistan and perhaps tomorrow in
Syria, is their inability to understand the
fundamental nature of the problem. These extremist
groups represent the smallest part of the equation;
rather the greatest and most important challenge is to
confront extremist ideologies. Had the West, as well
as the Arab countries involved and other relevant
parties invested their money and effort in fighting
extremist ideologies, this crisis might have come to
an end. Instead they spent billions of dollars on tens
of thousands of soldiers, advanced weaponry, and
combat drones managing to eliminate a number of Al
Qaeda's leaders; however Al Qaeda's ideology remains
the same and in fact continues to spread like a
disease. Most people find it easier to jump to easy
conclusions by laying the blame on one group or
another like Sunnis, Shi'ites, clerics, or even
religion as a whole; however all these groups were
present prior to this and were never a source of
trouble.
We are living in a different world in which political
powers are establishing and nourishing extremist
ideologies and generations. These politicians have the
project, the expertise, and the will to propagate such
extremist ideology and they are practically immune to
punishment because the wrong parties are always held
accountable. Who could have imagined that Mali would
become an international battlefield after Afghanistan?
The West is repeating the same mistake in Syria by
allowing it to fall prey to extremists who are
emotionally manipulate the general public under the
pretext that they are their only source of salvation
from the tyranny of the Assad regime. In reality, they
are the only faction active on the scene because
everybody else has left the arena.
Al
Rashed is the general manager of Al -Arabiya
television. He is also the former editor-in-chief of
Asharq Al- Awsat, and the leading Arabic weekly
magazine, Al Majalla. He is also a senior Columnist in
the daily newspapers of Al Madina and Al Bilad. He is
a US post-graduate degree in mass communications. He
has been a guest on many TV current affairs programs.
He is currently based in Dubai.
Add Comments