Surprises From Khartoum: Or, Perhaps, Nothing More Than Maneuvers To Remain In Power
20 May 2013
By Osman Mirghani
The Sudanese regime has taken a number of different
turns over its 24 years in power, gone back on many of
its political slogans, and frequently changed its
attitudes in an attempt to cling to power. After
coining the slogan, "We eat what we plant and wear
what we manufacture," the regime ruined the country's
agricultural projects and sold off large swathes of
state-owned lands in controversial deals, raising
concerns among the Sudanese that one day their country
would become a wasteland. In an attempt to ridicule
this slogan, the Sudanese people added: "We laugh at
what we hear," particularly following an unprecedented
rise in living expenses, forcing the majority of the
population to cut down on the number of their daily
meals.
After the "Salvation" regime adopted the slogans of
jihad to "crush the insurgency" in the South, pledging
not to abandon a single inch of national territory,
Sudan became fragmented, with wars raging in the North
and extending from the borders of Darfur to South
Kordofan and the Blue Nile. Despite its vows not to
negotiate or compromise the unity of Sudan, the regime
eventually signed the secession agreement, with the
president joining the ceremonies at the announcement
of the independence of South Sudan in Juba. Moreover,
regime officials claimed that "lifting the burden of
the South," would promote the welfare of the North.
In light of this record of failures and setbacks, many
attitudes and slogans have changed and many confusing
and contradictory statements have been issued, with
the government pursuing no certain policy except that
of clinging to power. The latest of these confusing
statements was President Omar Al-Bashir's announcement
last week that he is confident that the day will come
when the two parts of Sudan reunite or form a sort of
union. What makes this statement confusing is the fact
that it comes from the president who not only oversaw
the secession process, but who also played a major
role in creating the climate for this to take place.
Had the regime been concerned about the unity of
Sudan, why did it not make use of the six years
following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that
led to the South's self-determination referendum in
2011? During these six years, many political programs
could have been implemented to attract people towards
unity instead of the quarrels and the aggressive
statements that led to the Southerners vote "yes" on
secession.
In reality, the regime wasted these years, arousing
animosity towards the South to the extent that some
officials and ideologues failed to conceal their
desire to see the it secede. They thought that
secession would help them implement their "Islamic
movement" project and establishing a so-called second
republic. The Islamic movement, which was responsible
for the "Salvation" coup, sought to impose its
ideology on the country, turning Sudan into the first
Muslim Brotherhood republic in the Arab world.
With the belief that the South was an obstacle in the
way of the establishment of an Islamic republic, the
regime sought to lift this burden from its shoulders
even if this meant "losing" a fifth of the country, a
quarter of its population, and over three quarters of
its oil revenues. The regime believed that even after
the secession of the South, it would succeed in
obtaining a considerable amount of the Southern oil by
imposing heavy transit fees. As the emerging country
in the South is landlocked, it can only export its oil
via the Northern pipelines. Besides this, trade in
South Sudan is also dependent on the North.
Therefore, the regime's ideologues were convinced that
they would be able to use their economic sway in
settling some of the pending issues, from border
demarcation and the fate of Abyei to the division of
water revenues and the issues of South Kordofan and
the Blue Nile. However, things did not go as Khartoum
expected, and the relations between the South and the
North deteriorated, leading to actual military
confrontation. This, in turn, led to the suspension of
oil exports, leaving the economies of both countries
on the verge of collapse.
Given the awkward position it finds itself in at home,
particularly after the Arab Spring, the "Salvation"
regime has returned to the strategy of contradicting
itself. For example, the regime has decided to hold
negotiations with South Sudan once more, accepting
less oil transit fees than it had previously demanded.
In addition, it has offered compromises over the
security arrangements, replacing its former discourse
of using strength "to discipline the south" to dealing
with Juba based on a new reconciliatory tone. We have
seen Bashir, on returning from visiting the South,
claim that his regime is seeking to restore national
solidarity with South Sudan and that he is confident
that one day the two parts of Sudan will reunite.
These are surprises from the Khartoum leadership—or,
perhaps, they are nothing more than maneuvers to
remain in power.
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