Enemy of my enemy: Re-evaluating the Islamic State's Relationship with the Ba'athist JRTN
22 June 2015By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Introduction
Since the full-blown revival of Iraq's Sunni insurgency at the beginning of
2014, there has been much misunderstanding of the relationship between the
Islamic State and insurgents of Baathist orientation, principally represented by
the Jaish Rijaal al-Tariqa al-Naqshabandiyya (JRTN). Much of the discourse on
this subject attempts to tie the JRTN to the Islamic State, arguing that a
so-called 'alliance of convenience' between the two groups has been key to the
Islamic State's maintenance of power in areas outside of government control.
Linked to this theme is the portrayal of the Islamic State as somehow Baathism
reincarnated, most commonly noting the former careers that many leading figures
in the group had in the security apparatus of former Iraqi president Saddam
Hussein's government. As such, it is worthwhile to trace the relationship
between the JRTN and the Islamic State from the initial emergence of the former
until the present day, primarily focusing on the aftermath of the United States'
military withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011, in order to highlight that the
common notion of the 'alliance of convenience' is mistaken and that there is a
clear dividing line between the two groups. Whatever co-ordination that took
place in mid-2014, in particular, soon dissipated as the Islamic State
consolidated power and local territorial control at the JRTN's expense, so that
the JRTN has largely descended into irrelevance. Consequently, whatever the
veracity of claims by Shia militias that the JRTN leader and former aide to
Hussein, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, was killed in mid-April 2015, the JRTN's impact
on Iraq's security situation in the face of the wider Islamic State threat is
minimal.
Ideology and beginnings
The JRTN was founded at the end of 2006 following Hussein's execution in
December, officially as part of a Douri-led coalition called Al-Qiyadat al-Ula
lil-Jihad wal-Tahrir, or the Supreme Command for Jihad and Liberation (SCJL).
Although the coalition nominally included other groups, at least in the
beginning, in practice the JRTN has become interchangeable with the SCJL. The
goal of the JRTN can be summed up as aiming to resurrect Iraq's Baathist state
that existed before the US-led invasion in 2003. The Sufi religious aegis of the
Naqshbandi order, deriving from the cultivation of the sect during the Hussein
era, should be viewed as secondary, though it does help to separate the JRTN
from the Salafist-jihadist ideology of the Islamic State, as will be discussed
subsequently. The primacy of Baathist ideology is illustrated by the JRTN's
pan-Arab logo portraying a unified Arab world, as envisaged by Baathism, as well
as the first point of the JRTN's creed as stated on its official website, "Our
army believes that Iraq is an Arab, Muslim state that cannot be separated from
the Arab Islamic Ummah."
The term "Arab Islamic Ummah" is a key part of Iraqi Baathist discourse,
reflecting not only the classical pan-Arabism but also the Islamic face that
Hussein tried to give his regime following the 1990-91 Gulf War. Also in keeping
with official Baathist ideology is a superficial anti-sectarian stance,
reflected in point 16 of the JRTN creed, which states, "Our army believes in the
outlawing of the establishment of sectarian, racist, and regionalist blocs and
parties and their possession of weapons." Indeed, the JRTN even claims non-Sunni
members, describing itself in a July 2014 statement as an "extension of the
prior national Iraqi army", with members from all sects and ethnicities,
including Arabs, Kurds, Shia, Sunnis, Turkmen, and even Christians, Mandaeans,
and Yezidis.
Linked to this point is a rejection of any notion of dividing Iraq, which
implicitly entails the repudiation of concepts of federalism by sect that has
gained increasing popularity among Iraq's Sunni population, especially the more
'moderate' sections of the pro-insurgency movement, such as the Islamic Army in
Iraq (IAI). The IAI set up an activist wing after the US withdrawal - named Al-Hirak
al-Shaabi al-Sunni - to work for the goal of a Sunni federal region. In
contrast, therefore, the JRTN stands out as an inherently rejectionist and
revolutionary actor in Iraq's Sunni insurgency. The fact that the IAI showed
itself to be more amenable to compromise within the system was also demonstrated
by the large number of its fighters and commanders who ended up joining the
Sunni Awakening (Sahwa) movement from the beginning of 2007 onwards, which
proved key in driving back the Islamic State's predecessor, the Islamic State in
Iraq (ISI).
However, there is much less evidence of extensive JRTN participation in the
Sahwa. Consequently, by the time of the US withdrawal, one could affirm with
reasonable confidence that the two main Sunni insurgent actors in Iraq were the
ISI and the JRTN. Partly on the basis of the consistent shared rejection of the
post-2003 Shia-dominated political order in Iraq, allegations emerged from
security officials even in this period of collaboration between the JRTN and the
ISI, with the JRTN reportedly assisting the ISI in carrying out vehicleborne
improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks in various parts of Iraq, including
Kirkuk, Ramadi, and Tikrit. Although unverified, the reports are somewhat
credible as during 2010-11 the ISI was a weakening organisation under heavy
security force pressure and was unable to impose its will over other groups in
the same way the Islamic State is currently able. By comparison, the type of JRTN operations officially advertised by the group's own media always tended to
be much less sophisticated than those of the ISI, with no suicide attacks,
co-ordinated VBIED attacks, or sustained territorial assaults.
Rather, JRTN operations entailed more basic hitand-run guerrilla operations,
particularly the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), rockets, and
mortars. One operational video, for example, dated 25 November 2011, features an
IED attack purportedly targeting a vehicle of "the American enemy" in northern
Baghdad. In this video, the JRTN claims the IED was manufactured locally "and
with [the] co-operation of members of the government army", referring to the new
Iraqi army of the Baghdad government. The fact that the group might have had
local sympathisers in the security forces at this stage is not surprising.
Despite the US withdrawal, most officially advertised JRTN video operations
post-2011 continued to portray attacks as targeting "the American enemy", as
though the perceived occupier was somehow still present. This was probably
related to the fact that in the immediate aftermath of the US withdrawal, the
Sunni narrative of Iranian influence over a supposed "Safavid" - a pejorative
term used in Sunni discourse to mean an Iranian client - government in Baghdad
did not yet have sufficient currency to give credibility to attacks on Iraqi
government forces that might end up harming civilians through collateral damage.
The available videos on JRTN operations indicate a reach across predominantly
Sunni areas of Iraq, ranging from Diyala province in the east to Anbar province
in the west, and from the Baghdad area and surrounding belt all the way to
Ninawa province in the north.
However, to understand further where JRTN influence was particularly strong, it
is best to examine the JRTN's activist front organisation, known as Intifada
Ahrar al-Iraq (IAAI), or the Uprising of the Free People of Iraq.
IAAI and protests in Iraq
The link between the IAAI and the JRTN is demonstrated by numerous lines of
evidence, despite the fact it was initially denied by IAAI spokesperson Dr Ghazi
Faisal. First, the IAAI regularly shares official JRTN statements on its
official and linked social media pages, while declining to do so with other
insurgent groups. Second, IAAI discourse exactly mirrors that of the JRTN, using
the same revolutionary rhetoric, the same forms of address in its statements,
and the same superficial anti-sectarian messaging. Third, it is notable that the
same areas where the JRTN was seen as traditionally strong became strongholds
for protests organised by the IAAI in 2013.
Protests that broke out in 2011 were nationwide on the model of the Arab Spring
demonstrations and tended to focus on popular grievances such as the provision
of public services, government corruption, and calls to end the US occupation
and perceived foreign interference. In this context, the IAAI announced itself
on 24 February 2011, urging a "violent/tremendous revolution against the
occupation, oppression, and tyranny", and calling on "Iraqis from Arabs, Kurds,
Turkmen, Sunnis, Shia, Muslims, Christians, and the rest of the other religions,
sects, and ethnicities" to rise up. Playing on the notion of nationwide
grievances and resentment at the US occupation, the first IAAI statement made
the US presence in Iraq the focus of its anger, rather than sectarian-tinged
talk of the "Safavid" government. The IAAI also launched a video channel at this
point, filming and uploading footage of some of the protests. Among some of the
demonstrations captured on camera by the IAAI and shared on its channel was a
local protest held in Rawa, in western Anbar (currently controlled by the
Islamic State), in May 2011 featuring a banner reading, "The tribe of the people
of Rawa rejects foreign intervention and demands the departure of the occupier",
and chants of "Iran, out, out. Iraq will remain free. With blood, with soul, we
sacrifice for you oh Iraq." The IAAI undoubtedly hoped to capitalise on the wave
of popular protests, but little ultimately came out of the 2011 demonstrations.
The IAAI would have to wait until the beginning of 2013 for its status to become
prominent. Unlike the 2011 protests, these demonstrations had a distinct Sunni
sectarian element, focusing on grievances such as de-Baathification legislation
introduced in May 2003 - seeking, at a minimum, its total repeal - and the
detention of friends and relatives by the security forces. However, the IAAI
used the protests to push its revolutionary agenda, for example releasing a song
in March 2013 entitled "Our people want the downfall of the government". Other
familiar JRTN themes came out in other songs released by the IAAI in this
period, such as the song "The People have Revolted", featuring lyrics including,
"We won't stop until Baghdad, bringing down the ruling system and the
constitution" and "we reject all rule of division". At IAAI protests, there was
a familiar JRTN slogan - "Qadimun ya Baghdad", or "Coming, oh Baghdad" - in
reference to the notion of retaking the capital and overthrowing the government.
The most prominent IAAI protest sites were at Hawija in Kirkuk province, and the
cities of Mosul and Tikrit, with notable influence also in Diyala and Fallujah -
which gained notoriety for the presence of some protesters waving ISI flags.
It was clear that the IAAI was not going to be reconciled to the system,
whatever concessions the government might make. Rather, its aim was to revive a
full-blown insurgency through confrontation, and the government played right
into the IAAI's hands with the Hawija massacre in April 2013, which resulted in
the killing of dozens of apparently unarmed protesters by security forces.
Following the incident, the JRTN's military spokesperson released a statement
invoking the traditional Quranic justification for defensive jihad, while
emphasising that the "patience of this oppressed people will not last and the
peacefulness of their demonstrations and sit-ins will not continue". The
immediate aftermath of the massacre led to an apparent upsurge in JRTN activity,
with reported attacks at Mosul airport, and in Abu Ghraib, east Mosul, Fallujah,
the Hamrin Mountains, the Tariq camp near Fallujah, Tikrit, and Tuz Khurmato.
The JRTN also briefly seized control of the town of Sulaiman Bek.
Subsequent violence in Iraq has never dipped below pre-Hawija massacre levels,
so the incident, the wider Sunni demonstrations, and the JRTN's involvement in
the post-incident escalation can be interpreted as a key turning point in the
revitalisation of Iraq's Sunni insurgency. At this stage too, focus on the "Safavid"
angle becomes more apparent in the JRTN's propaganda, with an official JRTN
video on the "operations of liberating Sulaiman Bek" featuring an "assault on
the Safavid militias and destruction of a tank". Similarly, a JRTN video from
the Fallujah area on 25 April 2013 is entitled "Bombing of a base of the Safavid
militias in Fallujah." However, evidence is lacking of co-ordination in this
upsurge between the JRTN and the ISI - which had become the Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in April 2013 following the decision by emir Ibrahim
al-Badri (alias Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) to expand into Syria and attempt to
subsume Jabhat al-Nusra. Furthermore, in the protests themselves, the issue of
people showing up with ISI/ISIL banners was a localised problem in Fallujah and
Ramadi, and not one affecting IAAI protest sites in particular.
What can be said with certainty though is that ISIL, having already intensified
operations in 2012, exploited the new level of instability in Iraq - which had
arisen thanks in no small part to the actions of the JRTN - to accomplish some
of its most daring operations yet. The most notable of these was the Abu Ghraib
prison break in July 2013, in which hundreds of jihadi veterans of the
insurgency against the US were released, significantly strengthening ISIL's
ranks. To better scrutinise any seeming alliance of convenience and
co-ordination between ISIL and the JRTN, it is necessary to more closely examine
the events of late 2013/early 2014, as the security situation in Iraq descended
into a full-blown insurgency with the loss of government control over
significant cities, beginning with Fallujah and culminating with Mosul, Tikrit,
and other towns in the north and west of the country in the summer of 2014.
Descent into chaos
The fall of Fallujah from government control in early January 2014 can be
ascribed in large part to failures on the part of then Iraqi prime minister
Nouri al-Maliki, who decided to dismantle the Ramadi protest site by force in
December 2013 on the grounds that it was a base for ISIL, despite the fact that
ISIL militants had only occasionally appeared when the site was largely empty
and the protests were dissipating on their own. Later that month, security
forces arrested Sunni member of parliament Ahmad al-Alwani, killing his brother
and five of his guards during the operation, causing widespread anger across
Anbar province. In an attempt to ease tensions, the army was ordered to withdraw
from Fallujah and Ramadi in the hope that the local police could deal with the
situation, but the result was that ISIL - in co-ordination with other
insurgents, including the JRTN - exploited the security vacuum to seize control
of Fallujah and parts of Ramadi, although Ramadi was re-taken by security forces
and pro-government militias several days later. Media coverage at the time
tended to portray Fallujah as having fallen under ISIL control, when in reality
a variety of Sunni militant groups had taken over the city in conjunction with
ISIL, including the JRTN, the IAI, Jaish al-Mujahideen, and the 1920s Revolution
Brigades.
ISIL of course would have an interest in downplaying the presence of the other
smaller factions, and vice-versa. On account of the other factions, though, ISIL
initially had to adopt a more conciliatory approach, not targeting the families
of local police. In line with its approach in Syria whenever it entered an area
where other factions were present, it also set up a Virtue and Vice
Committee/Islamic court. Gradually, ISIL began to subsume its rivals through a
mixture of co-option and coercion, providing incentives to pledge allegiance, so
that by May-June 2014 it had become the dominant group in the city. Evidence for
the JRTN's presence in Fallujah was found on the IAAI's media channel. For
example, on 10 January, the IAAI uploaded a video featuring insurgents in
Fallujah, one of whom proclaimed that its aim was to conquer Baghdad, and that
they were not members of Daesh, a pejorative term for ISIL based on its Arabic
acronym.
Throughout the beginning of 2014, the IAAI also released videos of
self-proclaimed "Military Councils for the Revolutionaries of the Tribes" in a
variety of locations across Iraq, playing on typical JRTN themes of superficial
cross-sectarianism, including supposed Kurdish and Shia tribal councils. In
mid-January it also announced the formation of a unifying body known as the
General Military Council for Iraq's Revolutionaries (GMCIR), which features a
political wing where the participation of the JRTN is openly acknowledged. It is
also clear that the GMCIR includes other insurgent factions ideologically close
to JRTN, such as the 1920s Revolution Brigades.
Like the fall of Fallujah, the capture of cities in the north of Iraq - above
all Mosul and Tikrit - was not the work solely of ISIL, which changed its name
to the Islamic State in June 2014. Indeed, the wider insurgency beyond the
Islamic State initially seemed ecstatic about the lightning offensive across
northern and western Iraq. However, rather than a case of co-dependence between
the Islamic State and other factions, as had been the case for some time in
Fallujah, it is clear these advances against the government were being
spearheaded by the former - which by then represented by far the most powerful
insurgent force in the country - and the other factions were trying to ride this
wave in a bid to carve out their own spheres of influence. However, the Islamic
State was no longer in the business of compromise and issued a charter for Mosul
in mid-June, shortly after capturing the city, making clear that not only had
the era of "Safavid" government passed, but also that of Baathism.
Furthermore, in a statement issued by its newly formed "Committee to Administer
the Affairs of the Mosques" in Mosul, the Islamic State explicitly affirmed that
it would not tolerate any other group displaying banners. Within approximately
one month, following on from the group's declaration of a caliphate on 29 June,
a sophisticated administration was emerging within Mosul, with various declared
diwans (Islamic State departments), such as the Diwan al-Taaleem, issuing
examination timetables for Mosul University's various colleges.
A similar pattern of the marginalisation of the JRTN and other non-Islamic State
militants emerged even in places where the JRTN would be expected to have had
more influence, including Tikrit - the spiritual heartland of Baathism - with
other groups pushed out to the rural peripheries. The fate of JRTN forces in
places such as Mosul was best summarised by an account given to IHS Jane's in
late December 2014 by a Mosul resident, "They are present but have no influence;
some of them gave allegiance, some of them were detained, and some of them
fled." Were the 'alliance of convenience' more than a short-term, pragmatic
gambit, the Islamic State might have made some concessions to JRTN
sensibilities, but in fact the group indulged in all its worst excesses to the
anger of the JRTN, including the destruction of shrines and heritage sites -
which was particularly offensive to the JRTN's Sufi image - the genocidal
targeting of Yezidis, and the displacement of Christians from Mosul.
Consequently, the JRTN distanced itself from these Islamic State actions in its
statements, while sticking to its standard practice of not mentioning the
Islamic State by name and blaming its deeds on supposed agents of the Baghdad
government and Iran.
JRTN decline
As the JRTN's influence declined in the face of the Islamic State's local
dominance, the group tried to portray itself as defiant on the path of the
so-called 'revolution' despite its clear distancing from the Islamic State's
worst actions. In mid-to-late 2014, unverified local reports emerged that the
US-led international coalition against the Islamic State was reaching out to the
JRTN in a bid to form a local Sunni force to combat the Islamic State - although
this has since been denied by US ambassador Brett McGurk. In a statement
circulated on JRTN social media pages, but not its official website, this
outreach was portrayed as a sign of desperation and a list of JRTN demands was
posted, reflecting the US' inherent inability to come to an understanding with
the JRTN. The actual party in desperation was the JRTN, however, which in the
past six months has tried to turn to Saudi Arabia and aligned Arab states in a
bid to bolster its position - largely through the provision of funding. This has
been reflected in effusive praise for the deceased Saudi King Abdullah as a
champion of the cause of the "Arab Islamic Ummah", congratulations extended to
the new monarch King Salman, and a eulogy to the Jordanian pilot Muaz al-Kasasbeh
who was burnt alive by the Islamic State, portraying him as a "martyr" carrying
out the obligatory duty of defending the "Arab Islamic Ummah" and its heritage.
Most recently, the JRTN has declared its firm support for the Saudi-led
coalition's Operation Decisive Storm against Zaidi Houthi militant group Ansar
Allah in Yemen, hailing it "the great historic operation" to halt Iranian
expansionism. The IAAI also released a song praising the operation.
In an audio message attributed to Douri in April, prior to reports of his
claimed death, he clearly distances himself from 'takfiri' thought - a reference
to the Islamic State - and hails the old pan-Arab nationalism of former Egyptian
president Gamal Abdel Nasser, while trying to tie his cause to that of Saudi
Arabia. The veracity of his claimed killing is now readily in doubt following
another audio message released in May. As far as dating the speech goes, it is
almost certainly from after the reported claims of his killing, as he makes
reference to a controversy postdating his alleged death over the status of the
town of Nukhayb in Anbar province. In this recording, the denunciation of the
Islamic State is even clearer, as he condemns the June 2014 massacre of Shia
security forces by Islamic State militants at Camp Speicher in Tikrit and makes
clear that there is no alliance between the JRTN and the Islamic State, stating
about the latter, "They declare the Baath to be kuffar [disbelievers]."
Undoubtedly part of this speech reflects justifiable pushback against portrayals
of the Islamic State as Baathism resurrected. It also seems that Douri is not
under any illusions about the Islamic State's strength relative to his group, as
he speaks of the current fighting in Anbar and how 90% of the province is under
the control of the Islamic State and affiliated "armed men".
In conclusion, therefore, the JRTN cannot be seen as the local Sunni force that
will turn the tide against the Islamic State. It has become totally marginalised
and reflects a bygone era of Iraq's Sunni insurgency, which used to be much more
diverse. Now is the era of the Islamic State, and policy-making and analysis
must do away with notions that the Islamic State is maintaining localised power
and territorial control in Iraq because of any 'alliance of convenience' with Baathists, or that the Islamic State is somehow Baathism in disguise. The fact
that senior figures within the group might have had a past in Saddam Hussein's
security apparatus does not automatically make those figures Baathists in secret
alliance with the JRTN. Rather, the true ideological forerunner lies in the
Islamist and Salafist ideas that gained currency in the last decade of Hussein's
rule thanks to the regime's efforts to seek an Islamic facade, fused with the
brutal jihadism brought to Iraq by the founder of the ISI's predecessor Al-Qaeda
in Iraq (AQI), Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and his contingent following the US-led
invasion.
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