The Paris Attacks Reflect Intelligence Failure -- Not a Change in ISIS Strategy
09 December 2015By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
The recent attacks in Paris carried out by the Islamic State have led to
widespread speculation about a possible shift in strategy on the part of
ISIS. Taken in conjunction with the downing of a Russian passenger plane over
the Sinai and the bombings in the predominantly Shia Dahiyeh suburbs of
Beirut, it is argued that ISIS is lashing out at the "far enemy" as it comes
under pressure on the home fronts in Iraq and Syria, such as its recent loss
of control of Sinjar, a town that formed part of a key route connecting the
de facto ISIS capitals of Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq.
Further, Iranian-backed forces -- including Lebanese Hezbollah and Syrian
President Bashar Assad's army, backed by Russian airstrikes, were able to
break the long-standing ISIS siege of Kweiris airbase to the east of Aleppo
city despite ISIS mobilization calls in Aleppo province to counter the
offensive. On a more general level, internal documents suggest that ISIS is
facing problems of cohesion in its military ranks, as the General Supervisory
Committee issued an amnesty for deserters last month, whereas the normal
ruling for fleeing from battle without appropriate justification is
execution.
While it certainly is valid to point to these developments as setbacks for
ISIS, they are too ephemeral in nature to tie them to the Paris attacks in
particular. The sophisticated nature of the Paris attacks would have required
planning and procurement of provisions predating ISIS's latest setbacks.
Though it will still take time for more precise details to emerge, nothing so
far definitely shows that the Paris attacks differ significantly from prior
failed plots involving sleeper cells operating in Europe -- including
returned foreign fighters in their ranks -- with suspected links to low to
mid-level ISIS operatives in Iraq and Syria.
In fact, Abdelhamid Abbaoud, a key figure in the Paris attacks, was openly
flauntinghis role in establishing cells to conduct attacks in Europe in an
interview with ISIS's magazine Dabiq in February. If he was assigned a
general role by the highest echelons of ISIS to conduct attacks in Europe,
this assignment apparently took place almost a year ago.
Concerns regarding these networks have long been on the radar of Western
intelligence services, and the fact the Paris attacks came to fruition
represent a significant failure in detection more than anything else. The
reason we have come to associate ISIS with lone wolf attacks rather than
well-planned operations is because lone wolf attacks are usually harder to
foresee and easier to carry out.
A similar analysis of the problem of sleeper cell networks applies to the
situation of ISIS in Lebanon. Lebanon is a target for ISIS as it constitutes
a part of the greater al-Sham region over which ISIS claimed geographical
coincidence when it officially declared its expansion beyond Iraq in April
2013. Indeed, the Dahiyeh suburbs were already the subject of ISIS-claimed
bomb attacks in January 2014. Only the Russian aircraft downing can be tied
to recent developments as ISIS seeks to gain credibility for fighting back
against the Russian intervention in Syria that has provoked widespread anger
among Sunni Muslims.
As for the recent setbacks for ISIS within Iraq and Syria, they do not
represent a decisive shift away from the overall reality of stalemate that
was apparent months ago amid proclamations that ISIS was on the march and
"winning," following the capture of Palmyra and Ramadi. Even now, ISIS has
more recently made advances further west through the Homs desert with the
capture of the town of Muhin from regime forces. In addition, there are still
no effective ground forces to challenge ISIS control of the most important
population centers of Raqqa and Mosul cities, as well as the majority of Deir
az-Zor province and the towns of western Anbar province and eastern Aleppo
province.
The larger fallacy in viewing the attacks in Paris and elsewhere as a shift
in strategy is the premise that the ISIS state-building project and the
notion of attacking the far enemy are mutually exclusive. In fact, the latter
is meant to complement the former in undermining the ability of ISIS's
enemies to harm its state structure. ISIS hopes to confuse enemy consensus on
what to do about the terrorist group, as many ponder whether any intervention
is justified at all given the risk of retaliatory terror attacks or fear
"mission creep." ISIS hopes to sow division and discord on the enemies' home
fronts. It wants to instill terror in its enemies and reinforce Muslim versus
non-Muslim divides in civilian populations.
Looking toward to the question of responses to these attacks, it is tempting
to look to the intense French airstrikes launched on Raqqa as the way
forward. However,reports indicate that no major damage has been inflicted on
ISIS military assets by these strikes as ISIS has learned to keep them out of
the sight of coalition bombing. The U.S. has also decided to go after trucks
carrying oil in ISIS territory in the belief that oil is the key lifeline for
ISIS funding. Such a policy reflects a serious over-estimation of the
contribution of oil to ISIS income, which actually relies far more on
confiscation and taxation.
Worse, the U.S. bombing overlooks the fact that those who transport oil from
ISIS-controlled oil fields are not necessarily affiliated with ISIS. The end
effect instead is likely to be significant humanitarian harm -- not only to
civilians in ISIS territory but also those living in rebel-held areas of
Syria, which suffered a major fuel crisis when last cut off from trucks
delivering oil from ISIS-held territory on account of an ISIS-imposed
blockade in the early summer.
In short, one should have no illusions that simply intensifying airstrikes
and more tough talk can lead to the defeat of ISIS. As before, we must have a
realistic view of the true scale of commitment required to defeat ISIS:
namely, an extensive international presence on the ground to enforce a
political settlement acceptable to all major actors and to assist a massive
nation-rebuilding project. Unless international consensus emerges for such an
undertaking, one must not harbor pretenses about destroying ISIS.
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