03 March 2016By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed
Practically and metaphorically we can say that Egypt has experienced two
revolutions in the past five years; the first ousted Hosni Mubarak and the
second deposed Mohamed Morsi and stopped the Muslim Brotherhood from being
involved in political action. The third revolution attempted and failed to
achieve a new street revolution in Egypt in order to change the current regime
and reinstate Brotherhood rule.
In order to start a third revolution, the Brotherhood launched the biggest
media and political campaign in its history. Internationally, it worked hard
to win over human rights organisations, research centres, western government
institutions including the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in the European Union
and the United States. The campaign succeeded and their case was featured in
the news and they gained the sympathy of some international non-governmental
organisations. In order to restore the ''legitimacy of the Muslim Brotherhood's
rule'', forums were held and some Western governments tried to pressurise the
Egyptian government to cancel the ban on the Brotherhood's political activity
but did not succeed.
Why did the third revolution fail? Because it was unable to mobilise the
Egyptian street against the government and did not succeed in convincing the
international community to punish it. External pressures failed to stop trials
or secure pardons for any of its imprisoned leaders.
The media campaign failed despite its magnitude. New television channels were
launched specifically to mobilise the street and many large channels,
newspapers and websites teamed up with the new stations. Vigorous Facebook and
Twitter campaigns targeted the youth and urged them to go out and instigate
change, and contracts with western public relations companies were signed in
solidarity with the Brotherhood against the Egyptian regime. However, despite
these campaigns, they were unsuccessful.
I think that the Brotherhood knows that it is unable to bring about rapid
change through the street or coups. As an ideological movement, it believes in
the theory of change from the roots through education, media, culture,
mosques, unions and charitable social activities. This time, however, it
jumped into the battlefield and took advantage of the opportunity presented by
regional differences despite the different goals.
Both the Brotherhood and regional powers made large errors in calculation. The
Brotherhood's belief that it could confront the Egyptian army and the state
was a mistake. It believed that it could oust the president in the same way
that Mubarak was ousted in the January 2011 revolution. This belief shows that
it does not understand what really happened in January 2011. If the army had
not been supportive of the operation to oust Mubarak, the revolution probably
wouldn't have been successful.
Did the Brotherhood leaders, whose role in those historic events was limited
and came too late, really believe that they would be able to bring one million
Egyptians out of their homes and onto the street to achieve a third
revolution? Despite the stimulus, encouragement and incitement, the promised
demonstrations did not take place.
They might justify their failure by saying that the security forces prevented
people from descending onto the streets. However, security forces tried to
prevent the demonstrators five years ago but they still protested and ousted
Mubarak. It is clear that Egyptians are tired of the Brotherhood and are fed
up of the chaos being spread in the region- they want to give the current
government a chance.
The leaders of the Brotherhood must know the impossibility of success in the
face of the Egyptian central state but felt that the existence of external
Arab, regional and western support presented a rare opportunity.
I imagine that their recent failure will set them back ten years. There is no
place for the Brotherhood in Arab politics unless they decide to embrace new
ideas such as the abolition of the concept that it is an international
organisation. This concept goes against nationalism. To be Jordanian or
Kuwaiti or Yemeni or Saudi is a requirement for belonging to a modern state.
The movement must also be enlightened about many social issues. Finally, the
Brotherhood needs a revolution within the movement itself.
Al Rashed is the general manager of Al -Arabiya television. He is also the
former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al- Awsat, and the leading Arabic weekly
magazine, Al Majalla. He is also a senior Columnist in the daily newspapers
of Al Madina and Al Bilad. He is a US post-graduate degree in mass
communications. He has been a guest on many TV current affairs programs. He
is currently based in Dubai.
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EsinIslam.Com
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