The Fitna in Deraa and the Islamic State Angle
26 June 2016By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
International attention has justifiably focused on the recent Islamic State
[IS] attacks in Brussels, but at the same time within Syria the most intense
round of infighting among rebel factions in the southern province of Deraa has
broken out. This fighting is said to be tied to the existence of IS cells and
affiliates in Deraa, though IS itself has not said anything about the events
on its official media channels, and to date there is no wilayat Deraa ('Deraa
province') declared in the area. So who are the groups involved? And how far
are they connected to IS if at all?
The most prominent aspect of the infighting is a continuation of the war in
the southwest corner of the province between Liwa Shuhada' al-Yarmouk (Yarmouk
Martyrs Brigade- LSY) and Syrian al-Qa'ida affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, which is
a leading player along with Ahrar al-Sham in a southern Jaysh al-Fatah
coalition in imitation of the successful rebel alliance that expelled the
Assad regime from Idlib province in spring 2015. The war itself traces back to
clashes between Jabhat al-Nusra and LSY in December 2014 on the grounds that
the latter had links with IS.
Though there was widespread skepticism of that notion at the time, it is
apparent from LSY's own media output, discourse and actions since the initial
clashes that it has open affinity with IS. Even so, LSY continues to deny in
its own statements that it has links with IS, and on this basis many reports
still characterize LSY as just pro-IS and/or a 'wannabe.' However, it is most
likely that the LSY denials are encouraged by IS for fear of jeopardizing the
project of building links and influence in Deraa. The reality is that LSY's
connections began around the summer of 2014, after the MOC operations command
in Amman suspended support for LSY and IS announced its Caliphate. These first
links were established online and through visits to IS territory.
A key figure in these initial interactions was the LSY Shari'i official Abu
Muhammad al-Masalama, a veteran of the Afghan jihad who returned to southern
Syria and eventually joined LSY. He was assassinated in November 2014. If one
understands his role in establishing the connections between LSY and IS, it
becomes clearer why Step News Agency described him in an obituary as "an
important leader among the supporters of the Dawla organization in Deraa."
More recently- and relevant to the latest developments- LSY announced
thesurprise appointment of a Saudi as its new amir: Abu Abdullah al-Madani.
The move was unusual because the Deraa environment is much less welcoming than
the north of Syria for muhajireen, partly because of local hostility but also
because of the watchful eye of Jordanian intelligence and tight border
controls. In keeping with the public denial of an IS connection, LSY framed
the appointment of Madani as the owing of allegiance to him. However, he was
actually sent by IS on account of the poor administrative skills of Abu Obeida
Qahtan: a Palestinian-Syrian veteran of the Afghan jihad who was among the
founders of LSY and succeeded the original leader al-Khal following his
assassination in November 2015. The reshuffling of the leadership can perhaps
be tied to plans for the new offensive LSY has launched, capturing the
localities of Tasil and Sahm al-Jowlan from Jabhat al-Nusra and the rebels.
A group cooperating with LSY in the latest round of fighting is Harakat al-Muthanna
al-Islamiya (Islamic Muthanna Movement- HMI). Whereas LSY, despiteal-Khal's
radical background, was initially founded as an FSA-brand group, HMI was
founded from the outset in 2012 as a Salafi jihadi group, headed by former
Sednaya detainee Aamer Ayyub al-Masalama. That said, aware of local
sensitivities and wishing to build popular support, HMI has always maintained
a policy of rejecting muhajireen.
HMI is suspected by many of having links with IS- and for this reason has been
on the radar of Israeli intelligence- but one does not see the open display of
affinity that comes out in LSY. What may be considered as relevant evidence
does not necessarily point one way or another. For example, a statement was
issued by HMI in spring 2015 on the subject of IS: while HMI made clear it
does not accept IS' Caliphate declaration, the group praised IS for having
fought "the states of kufr [disbelief] and their aides from the apostates,"
and took a stance of neutrality on the fighting between IS and other factions,
praying for an end to fitna. In addition, critics of HMI see IS affinities in
its tactics of assassinations of rivals and running of secret prisons, which
culminated in open clashes with a number of FSA Southern Front factions in
January 2016, contributing to the fall of Sheikh Maskeen to the regime. HMI
also rejects the authority of the Dar al-'Adl, which is the main judicial
authority among southern rebels, and has not participated with Jabhat al-Nusra
and southern Jaysh al-Fatah in the war on LSY.
On the other hand, the group issued an internal directive in 2015 warning
against reckless takfiri behaviour and was actually one of the first to clash
with LSY in summer 2014 as LSY began establishing links with IS. Also, there
is a degree of localization as regards HMI's involvement in the latest
fighting. For example, there are no signs of clashes between HMI and other
rebels in Deraa al-Balad, the southern half of the provincial capital. The
local outlet Naba' media told me that this is because "members of al-Muthanna
in the city have announced that they are only obligated to fight the regime."
As for the rejection of the Dar al-'Adl, under which HMI initially worked but
withdrew about a year ago, it should also be noted that Jabhat al-Nusra
similarly rejects the body for its use of the Unified Arab Code, which
combines civil and Shari'a law as opposed to jihadist groups' vision of rule
solely by God's law.
Analytically, it is perhaps most appropriate to see a HMI as similar to Jund
al-Aqsa, whose leadership rejects the IS Caliphate but insists one can only
fight IS in strict self-defence, while some of its members sympathise with IS
and have even defected. That said, the analogy is not exact because Jund al-Aqsa
has foreign members in its ranks. Like Jund al-Aqsa, HMI's approach as regards
to dealing with rivals and implementing Shari'a should be seen as more
hardline than that of Jabhat al-Nusra. A pro-LSY source from the Yarmouk
Valley in southwest Deraa described to me the stance of HMI on IS in this way:
"The amirs of Harakat al-Muthanna are totally removed from the manhaj of the
Dawla [Islamic State]. But there are some members who support the Dawla and
adopt its manhaj...the problem is in the current amirs and Shari'i officials
for Harakat al-Muthanna." Abu al-Waleed al-Baridi, whose allegiance is to IS
but has served as LSY's deputy Hisba amir, said that the cooperation with HMI
in the current fighting is a new thing, and that some Shari'i officials within
HMI had previously defected to IS and went to Raqqa and al-Sham (i.e. IS'
formal territories in Wilayat Dimashq). From my own interactions with HMI
members, it is clear to me they support a Caliphate project- not necessarily
that of IS- but maintain an anti-fitna stance with regards to IS.
On this reading, one can perhaps interpret the cooperation with LSY, which has
most notably involved blowing up bridges to prevent Jabhat al-Nusra and the
rebels from reinforcing lines, as local opportunism. Indeed, some days before
the latest clashes, an unofficial Telegram account in HMI's name announced
theestablishment of a Shari'i court in the western region of Deraa province.
Could one perhaps see a fragmenting of HMI along regional lines within Deraa
in the near future? The possibility should not be discounted. In this context,
it seems possible that LSY will try to absorb the western Deraa HMI into its
ranks, just as it absorbed the remnants of the Jaysh al-Jihad coalition in
Quneitra that was destroyed by rebels last year on accusations of links with
IS.
In fact, fragmentation is precisely what has happened to another group
suspected of IS loyalties: Jama'at Bayt al-Maqdis al-Islamiya (The Islamic
Bayt al-Maqdis Group- JBMI). Contrary to common image, JBMI is not a
Palestinian group (an idea based on the Bayt al-Maqdis reference- 'Holy
House/Jerusalem'), but primarily draws on Syrians from Deraa and Quneitra with
some muhajireen from Jordan, while its leadership base is in the Deraa
locality of Jasim. Suspicions of IS links have primarily pointed to the
group's use of a flag similar to that of IS (the design is identical, except
for JBMI's name inscribed on the bottom). This line of evidence by itself is
insufficient to demonstrate an IS link. That said, the group undoubtedly had
at least some IS sympathisers in its ranks, one of the reasons for its recent
fragmentation. Besides not coming to the aid of LSY or HMI in the latest
fighting,around a month ago JBMI joined an operations room with a number of
FSA factions, including Jaysh al-Yarmouk, Fallujah Hawran Division and Farqat
Usud al-Sunna. According to a defector from JBMI who joined LSY, "When they
formed the room we in Quneitra gave them a deadline of days to disavow this,
but they rejected because of the Shari'i official Abu Omar al-Shami's
involvement in the leadership. So after that we decided to disavow the group."
Most of the defectors, according to this source, did not join LSY but have
chosen instead to "sit in their homes," and now only 60-70 members remain in
JBMI.
Finally, it is worth highlighting that one of the first incidents in the
latest round of fighting took place in the Deraa town of Inkhil. This involved
the dismantling of an IS cell that was outwardly a group called Ansar al-Aqsa
(Supporters of al-Aqsa). According to a source from the al-Furqan institute
(an educational group) in Inkhil, the group was "an Islamic formation, the
majority of whom had left Nusra and were saying that they were independent,
but in the end it was established that they were connected with the [IS]
organization." The reason for leaving Jabhat al-Nusra in the first place was
apparently because they rejected fighting LSY. In any case, the source added
that the main factions in the town- the FSA Hamza Division and Mujahideen of
Hawran Brigades- acted with assistance from Jabhat al-Nusra against the group
and expelled it from the town. As for HMI, the source said it only has a small
presence in Inkhil not exceeding 15 members. Pointing towards a worsening
situation, a pro-IS post in which the media director for LSY was tagged on
Facebook portrayed the Inkhil events as just the beginning for the rebel
forces.
Looking forward, more rebel factions are now getting involved in the fight
against the groups deemed to be IS cells within Deraa, but it is questionable
how far they will be able to reverse LSY's recent gains. Two things are likely
though. First, there are likely to be further prominent casualties on both
sides, with LSY, HMI andJabhat al-Nusra each having lost at least one major
military commander in the latest fighting. Second, IS itself will only
officially announce a presence in Deraa/Quneitra if LSY can succeed in
establishing a contiguous territorial connection with IS, and in that regard
these southern holdings will likely be integrated into Wilayat Dimashq. In
short, it is evident that IS is opening a much more active southern front
against the rebels as it has otherwise failed to gain decisive ground in Syria
for a many months now.
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