25 July 2016By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Abstract: Internal Islamic State documents, including documents obtained by
the author and published here for the first time, shed new light on how the
Islamic State has come under strain as it is degraded by coalition air strikes
and loses territory. The internal records make clear these pressures have been
felt in the group's military, financial, and administrative domains, forcing
it to take measures to react and adapt. But while the so-called Caliphate has
come under pressure, there is little prospect of any collapse anytime soon.
Populations under Islamic State rule are accustomed to poor living standards,
exacerbated by years of civil war, and will likely stomach further decreases
in quality of life for the time being rather than rebel and risk a brutal
crackdown.
In assessing the success of the strategies of the U.S.-led international
coalition against the Islamic State, a crucial question is how the Islamic
State's statehood project is functioning on the ground in Iraq and Syria. Does
it operate successfully as a self-proclaimed state that can endure? Or are
there signs that the Islamic State is facing increasing internal challenges
over time that may pose a risk of collapse from within? One may also posit
that the reality lies somewhere between these two alternatives. The stakes are
high. Since the Islamic State, unlike al-Qa'ida and its various regional
affiliates, places such great emphasis on its image as state, the collapse of
the project in Iraq and Syria may put the Islamic State's entire future as an
international movement into doubt.
The approach of this paper is to rely not only on broader open-source data and
collected testimony but also hundreds of internal Islamic State documents that
have been compiled by this author over time. Many of these internal documents
were first collected from the realms of social media, posted by sources of a
variety of orientations both pro- and anti-Islamic State, such as personal
accounts run by Islamic State members and supporters within the entity's
territories, as well as media activist pages dedicated to coverage of a
particular area under Islamic State control. Over time though, it appears that
the Islamic State itself has sought to restrict the dissemination of
unauthorized information, aiming to ensure that as much of the information as
possible that is broadcasted within its territories and to the outside world
comes solely through its official channels.[1] Meanwhile, Islamic State
crackdowns on perceived spies and unauthorized media activity may deter or
prevent activist groups from obtaining documents. In these circumstances, this
author has also sought to obtain internal documents from connections
established through prior travel to northern Syria.
Some documents discussed in this paper are being published here for the first
time and are attached at the end of this article.[a] Though the available
documents can offer some very valuable insights into the internal workings of
the Islamic State, it must be recognized that they cannot be thought to
represent anything close to the majority of documents in circulation within
Islamic State territory. It will therefore be up to the future liberators of
remaining Islamic State territories—particularly key strongholds such as Mosul
and Raqqa—to capture and archive documents for subsequent research, to gain a
fuller understanding of Islamic State development over time.
Looking at the available evidence, three key internal challenges facing the
Islamic State concern its military power, financial resources, and
administrative competence. Of course, these problems do not exist in isolation
but rather are interlinked. Once these challenges are examined, one must then
ask what they mean for the future viability of the Islamic State's statehood
project.
Military Pressures
Looking at the broad
military picture, it should be clear that the era of major, rapid advances for
the Islamic State within Iraq and Syria has come to an end. The last series of
significant gains for the Islamic State came in May 2015. That was when the
Islamic State captured the Anbar provincial capital of Ramadi, which involved
a mobilization within the Syrian holdings of the Islamic State to reinforce
the fronts in Anbar and Salah al-Din provinces in Iraq, and a lightning
advance through the Homs desert that saw the Islamic State take Sukhna and
Palmyra from the Assad regime, in addition to a further push westward in north
Aleppo countryside toward the important border town of Azaz, which once
constituted an "emirate" back when the Islamic State called itself the Islamic
State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).[2]
Even so, already around the spring of 2015, a sober assessment would have
regarded the military situation for the Islamic State as one of stalemate; the
Islamic State had lost all strongholds in the Iraqi provinces of Diyala and
Babil as well as the town of Tikrit and had suffered considerable casualties
in the failed campaign to take the Kurdish-held border town of Kobani in
Syria.
The last development in particular meant that the YPG forces and its rebel
auxiliary allies were able to advance with considerable ease toward the key
border town of Tel Abyad in Raqqa province, which fell out of Islamic State
hands in mid-June 2015.
Subsequently, the Islamic State has lost control of the industrial town of
Baiji to the north of Tikrit, Ramadi, and Kubaysa in Anbar; the town of Sinjar
in Ninawa province that constituted an important point in the most
conventional Raqqa-Mosul route; the town of al-Shaddadi in Hasakah province;
and Palmyra. While elsewhere it is true that the Islamic State still makes a
gain at the local level from time to time, such as cutting off the Assad
regime's supply route to Aleppo via the town of Khanaser,[3] these Islamic
State initiatives are usually reversed within a short period of time.[4]
Between January 2015 and mid-March 2016, IHS Jane's estimated that the Islamic
State had lost 22 percent of its territory holdings in Syria and Iraq.[5]
Thus, one cannot doubt that militarily, the overall trends have now gone
against the Islamic State for almost a year. Despite the motto of remaining
and expanding, an audio message[6] released by Islamic State leader Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi in late December 2015 seemed to acknowledge the hardships the
Islamic State was facing on account of the numerous forces arrayed against it.
He predicted an increase in "seditions" and "tragedies" but asserted that this
situation is that of "the victorious sect in every era." Even so, the desire
to show an appearance of constant momentum is clear. To this end, the group's
latest major initiative has involved the opening up of a front against rebels
in the southern Syrian province of Deraa via a linked group known as Liwa
Shuhada' al-Yarmouk. LSY was recently reorganized under the leadership of a
Saudi emir dispatched by the Islamic State even as it officially denies any
Islamic State connection.[7] Initial gains for LSY, cooperating with another
jihadist group called Harakat al-Muthanna al-Islamiya (HMI), seemed impressive
with the capture of the localities of Tasil and Sahm al-Jowlan, while HMI took
control of Sheikh Sa'ad, Adwan, and Jalin. But these advances have all been
reversed[8] as more rebel forces have become involved in the fight.[9]
Previous frontlines against LSY were mostly maintained by the southern Jaysh
al-Fatah led by Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.[10]
In the context of territorial losses, it is noteworthy that the Islamic State
has tried to prevent and/or reverse enemy advances on multiple occasions
through mobilization calls. These mobilization calls, which appear in the form
of internal documents, have largely failed. Examples include a bid to stop the
Assad regime, Iranian proxy militias, and Russian airpower from breaking the
Islamic State's long-standing siege of Kweiris airbase to the east of Aleppo
city;[11] a mobilization call in southern Hasakah following the loss of al-Shaddadi;[12]
and a mobilization call to stop the fall of Palmyra.[b] These mobilization
attempts suggest the Islamic State is experiencing manpower problems. This was
reflected on a wider level when the Islamic State issued a general amnesty for
deserters at the beginning of October 2015.[13] The personnel shortages were
also evidenced by an Islamic State document that emerged last year. Issued in
Deir ez-Zor province in eastern Syria, the document indicates that a number of
Islamic State members had been seeking false medical reports from doctors in
order to avoid frontline duty.[14]
Likely factors behind these manpower problems include high attrition rates in
fights that ultimately yielded no success like Kobani and Baiji,[15] a
reduction in the foreign fighter flow through the loss of major border areas
like Tel Abyad and tougher Turkish policies to prevent fighter influx, and
reductions in benefits for Islamic State fighters, the last of which is linked
to financial problems facing the group.
Financial Pressures
Although the Islamic State
conveys in its propaganda the impression of a comprehensive, functioning state
model, which might be reinforced by a superficial overview of the range of
internal documents uncovered, one should not forget that the evidence points
to the bulk of the Islamic State's financial resources going toward
military upkeep, primarily in the form of providing fighters' salaries and
benefits as well as maintaining bases. Using calculations from a sample budget
from Deir ez-Zor province obtained and published by this author[16] and other
reporting,[17] it can be estimated that roughly two-thirds of Islamic State
expenditure has gone toward military upkeep.
Logically, therefore, one could surmise that the most effective way to reduce
costs amid financial crisis would be to cut back on salaries and benefits for
fighters, though it should be noted that economic conditions for Islamic State
fighters are not the same everywhere. For example, circumstances are much
better in the north of Syria as opposed to the south. Here it should be noted
there is still a degree of uncertainty as to the exact scales of salaries
among Islamic State members and fighters, and how they may vary, if at all, by
rank and region. While claims have routinely circulated of basic wages of $400
a month for local fighters[18] and $800 a month for foreigners,[19] the only
reliable evidence so far comes from documents pointing to a scheme of a basic
wage of $50 a month, with an additional $50 for each wife, $35 for each child,
$50 for each sex slave, $35 for each child of a sex slave, $50 for each
dependent parent, and $35 each for other dependents (see Item A).[20][c] There
may also be other salary additions such as a daily food allowance, heating
costs and bonuses for performing certain duties.
Some internal documents point to reductions in "perks" in recent months. The
clearest example was a salary cut of 50 percent announced for all fighters in
a Raqqa province document issued sometime in November-December 2015, pointing
to the "exceptional circumstances" the Islamic State was going through as the
justification.[d] In addition, a document (Item B) captured from the Islamic
State in north Aleppo countryside, dated to October 2015 and signed by the
deputy wali of Aleppo [Islamic State provincial governor] notifies the local
emirs of a directive (no. 86) from the General Governing Committee,[e] which
affirms that:
"In view of the brothers' use of transport and vehicles belonging to the Dawla
outside of operation times, which is causing an unjustified waste in the Bayt
Mal al-Muslimeen [financial treasury], reaching the point of forbidden excess,
it has therefore been decided to direct all brothers not to use vehicles
affiliated with the Dawla in case of personal needs except by permission from
one's emir, and in the event of contravention, an inquiry will be held—by
God's permission—with those who infringe on the regulation..."[21]
In a similar vein, pointing to problems of electricity maintenance, a
notification issued in the same month by the wali of Aleppo refers to another
directive (Item C) from the General Governing Committee, with the decision:
"to cut the service line of 24/24 electricity from all the houses of the
mujahideen brothers in the wilaya and preserving it for the bases only, and
that is in accordance with the regulations with the public services centre on
account of the effect on the main transformers and realizing fairness between
the soldiers of the Islamic State and the subjects of the Amir al-Mu'mineen,
may God protect and cultivate him."[22]
Besides cost-cutting measures, financial strain is also suggested by the
Islamic State's devising of new methods for generating income. For example,
when the Islamic State initially took over Mosul in June 2014, fees for
repentance were imposed on former army and police personnel. In September
2015, new repentance fees were introduced for those who had worked in the
electoral commission.[23] Around the same time, students wishing to attend
schools under the auspices of the Islamic State Diwan al-Ta'aleem were
required to pay the costs for any printing of textbooks that had been issued
as part of the new curriculum to begin in academic year 2015-2016.[24]
More recently, another barometer of the financial strain on the Islamic State
is that with the diminishing value of the Syrian pound,[25] the circulation of
the U.S. dollar has become ever more important. The manipulation of currency
exchange rates has become another way the Islamic State generates income.[26]
Despite all the Islamic State propaganda about its new "gold dinar" currency,
there is no evidence that this monetary unit is in real circulation.
The reasons for financial strain on the Islamic State overlap to a degree with
the causes of problems of cohesion in the Islamic State's ranks, such as
reduced border access to Turkey, tougher border policies, and coalition
airstrikes. These strikes have most recently targeted Islamic State "cash
storage" points[27] and the oil industry.[f] In addition, since around August
2015, the Iraqi government has ceased to pay salaries of government workers
living inside Islamic State territory on the grounds that the Islamic State
was using these payments to generate income via taxation.[28] The Iraqi
government's suspicion appears to be confirmed by an Islamic State document
from Anbar that recognizes the importance of delivery of Iraqi government-paid
salaries. The document, dated July 2015, orders the removal of a confiscation
order on the house of a certain Nafi' Hussein Ali, on the grounds that he is
"cooperative in assisting and facilitating the delivery of salaries of those
affiliated with the education administration in the wilaya."[29] Finally, one
may also tie financial strain to the lack of significant territorial gains for
some time, as the lack of acquisition means fewer opportunities to generate
income through confiscations—a strategy that seems to play an important role
in Islamic State financing, based on the aforementioned leaked financial
accounts from Deir ez-Zor province.
Deficiencies in Administration
Despite the
image of a comprehensive bureaucracy, questions exist as to the true level of
competence in governing. It would appear that a particular problem for the
Islamic State has been brain-drain, especially in the realm of medicine and
health. Indeed, on multiple occasions, the Islamic State has issued ultimatums
for medical staff at Mosul University and medical professionals more widely
who have fled: if they do not return, then their property will be
confiscated.[30] Even so, these ultimatums do not seem to have stopped outflow
of medical professionals. For example, a document (Item D) from January 2016
obtained from a pharmacist who fled from Mosul to the rebel-held area of Azaz
in north Aleppo countryside shows that many doctors and pharmacists have been
clearing out their clinics and shops by selling medicine and equipment to
customers outside the Islamic State wilaya of Ninawa in order to raise money
to flee Islamic State territory and minimize Islamic State confiscation of
material upon fleeing. All of this has reduced potential revenue for the
group.[31]
In part, problems of medical brain-drain derive from the nature of Islamic
State restrictions, such as the prohibition against dealings with pharmacies
outside Islamic State territory, a ban on importing Iranian medical goods, the
requirement to obtain licensing from the Islamic State's health department
(the Diwan al-Siha), and an insistence on gender segregation in the treatment
of women's health issues except out of absolute necessity and despite a
shortage of female doctors.[32] Furthermore, a notification from the
deputywali of Aleppo in October 2015 (Item E) draws attention to directive no.
86 from the General Governing Committee, highlighting the observation of a
"number of instances of unjustified and illegitimate attacks by some of the
soldiers of the Dawla on members of the citizenry, and their arrogance against
them in the name of the Dawla, especially those among them working in the
public interests like doctors and pharmacists, as well as those working in the
realm of services like electricity and water employees and others besides
them."[33] This fits in with the widespread perception of Islamic State
fighters as a privileged class, many of whom (particularly the foreigners)
treat the wider populace with contempt,[34] which likely contributes to the
brain-drain.
Other Islamic State documents obtained by this author point to shortcomings in
agriculture and water usage. In June 2015, a general notification was issued
by the agricultural department calling for the creation and conservation of
reserve grain stocks on account of the "economic war" being waged by the
coalition against the Islamic State.[35] Further, directive no. 103 from the
General Governing Committee in October 2015 (Item F) points to "the existence
of a deficiency in the agricultural cadres in the [agricultural] centers, and
the [Agriculture] Diwan's urgent need for the Diwan to be technocratic, as a
service to the public interest."[36] Finally, in relation to water, the
anti-Islamic State activist group Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently recently
publicized a document from Raqqa in the name of the Services Department (Diwan
al-Khidamat) calling for water to be cut off one day every three days as part
of implementing a water conservation culture.[37]
Remaining and Contracting
The evidence surveyed
above indicates that there are significant internal challenges facing the
Islamic State's statehood project, which prompts a larger question of whether
these challenges might lead to a collapse of the Islamic State from within.
The author's estimation is that such a prospect remains unlikely for the
foreseeable future. On a more general level, the local populations in Iraq and
Syria under Islamic State rule are accustomed to poor living standards,
exacerbated by years of civil war, and can show resilience even with a
decrease in quality of life as the Islamic State faces internal challenges.
More specifically, one needs to avoid overstating and sensationalizing the
scale of the internal challenges. For example, considering finances, it is
certainly true that the Islamic State is experiencing diminishing returns in
taxation (e.g. with the loss of Iraqi government-paid salaries for workers),
confiscation opportunities, and oil revenues (although the petroleum
industry's financial value has always been somewhat overstated in reporting[g]),
but the group would be unlikely to reach a fatal tipping point unless access
to the outside world were completely shut off. Even if access to the Turkish
border ceased entirely, such a goal is impossible to achieve in reality.
This is because despite the fact that the Islamic State is officially at war
with all of its neighbors, pragmatism in the war zone environment means that
there is still a flow of people and goods and, therefore, cash in and out of
Islamic State territory. For example, a document dated March 2016 obtained by
this author (Item G) outlines how a driver from the Azaz area has been taking
passengers into Islamic State-held territory via a crossing in the village of
Dabiq.[38] Generally speaking, those living in Islamic State territory must
obtain a permit from the Diwan al-Hisba in whatever wilaya they live in if
they wish to travel outside Islamic State territory for a limited period of
time.[39] But Syrians in particular who live outside Islamic State territory
and wish to visit for business purposes in particular can come to Islamic
State areas on a temporary basis without any real Islamic State bureaucratic
hindrance, a prospect that is also made attractive by a relatively decent
"security" environment to do business as compared to the more chaotic and
dangerous rebel-held areas.
When it comes to commerce, directive no. 102 from the General Governing
Committee from October 2015, obtained by the author (Item H), permits the
export of "all agricultural and grain products except wheat, and the
facilitating of their passing through the entry points of the Islamic State to
the outside in order to encourage producers and make markets inclined to their
production."[40] This signals a clear desire by the Islamic State leadership
to generate cash flow and revenue through expansion of its agriculture market
with the outside world.
On a wider level, failings in administration do not necessarily point to
prospects of a successful internal revolt. The internal security apparatus of
the Islamic State—embodied in its Diwan al-Amn—has proven efficient in
tracking down and killing those deemed to be spies, and open revolt, as
exemplified in the Sha'itat tribal uprising in Deir ez-Zor province back in
the summer of 2014, has been ruthlessly crushed.[41] In Libya, as the Islamic
State is developing administration in the Sirte area on the model of Islamic
State bureaucracy in Iraq and Syria (from which some senior personnel have
been dispatched to Libya[h]), there has been similar success in suppressing
internal rebellion. In contrast, the "Distant Provinces Administration" of the
Islamic State has had difficulty managing internal dissent within the Yemeni
affiliates of the Islamic State,[i] which have struggled to compete with al-Qa'ida
in the Arabian Peninsula and its front group Ansar al-Sharia.
Militarily, there still remains some way to go before one can reasonably speak
of a prospect of the defeat of the Islamic State. In considerable part, this
is because of weakness and division among the Islamic State's enemies
outweighs the group's own military deficiencies. For example, a key goal of
the coalition in the more immediate term must be to expel the Islamic State
from the remaining border areas with Turkey in north Aleppo countryside, and
the main ground partners in this regard are either the Hawar-Kilis operations
room backed with Turkish support and composed of a number of local Syrian
rebel groups to the west of Islamic State holdings[j] or the Kurdish YPG-led
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) currently based around the Tishreen Dam to the
southeast of the Islamic State stronghold of Manbij in eastern Aleppo.
A notable dilemma exists here. On the one hand, further acquisitions by the
SDF along the border with Turkey are unacceptable in Ankara's eyes, and the
SDF's ambitions of linking the Afrin canton to the west of Azaz with the
Kobani and Jazira cantons entail removing the remaining rebel presence in
north Aleppo countryside. On the other hand, it seems doubtful that the
Hawar-Kilis operations room, like the Marea operations room[k] that preceded
it, can control the entire remaining border area. Though it achieved a
celebrated milestone in expelling the Islamic State from the border locality
of al-Ra'i,[42] the Islamic State quickly launched a counteroffensive and
regained al-Ra'i and a number of other villages, reverting the situation back
to a stalemate. Assuming the Hawar-Kilis operations room and SDF based around
Tishreen Dam come into territorial contact, there will likely be conflict
between the two sides, something that the Islamic State may exploit to regain
ground. The regime may also attempt to move beyond Kweiris airbase and seize
Islamic State-held Aleppo province strongholds like al-Bab, Deir Hafer, and
Maskanah, potentially opening an active front against the Hawar-Kilis
operations room at some point.
Besides these problems facing the coalition in north Aleppo countryside,
serious questions remain over retaking the two key Islamic State strongholds
of Raqqa and Mosul, which can be viewed as the de factoSyrian and Iraqi
capitals of the Islamic State, respectively. Here, one can only logically
expect much more vigorous Islamic State defenses against potential assaults,
likely involving the elite Jaysh al-Khilafa/Jaysh Dabiq, which has already
taken on a role of entrenching the defenses around Raqqa in the wake of the
loss of Tel Abyad and much of the northern Raqqa countryside.[43]
Moreover, in the case of Raqqa in particular, there are no viable ground
partners to retake the city. The main candidate for consideration so far has
been Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa (The Raqqa Revolutionaries Brigade) based in the
northern Raqqa locality of Ayn Issa, but it is of questionable military
effectiveness, remains dependent on the YPG for survival,[l] and recently had
to dissolve its tribal army project dedicated to fighting the Islamic
State.[44] Otherwise, the only other potential contender for Raqqa may well be
the Assad regime, depending on how it assesses its future moves in tandem with
Russia following the retaking of Palmyra.
In short, the documentary evidence confirms the current coalition approach has
brought about significant losses for the Islamic State and put it under
pressure on multiple fronts, but any predictions of the Islamic State's
collapse are premature.
Item A: Salary scheme of $360 per month for an Islamic State member with two
wives and six children in Wilayat al-Baraka (Hasakah province). It was part of
a cache of documents left behind in al-Shaddadi in Hasakah province after the
Islamic State lost control of the area to the Syrian Democractic Force (SDF).
It was provided to the author by a Syrian Kurdish journalist who visited al-Shaddadi
in February-March 2015.
Item B: Preventing unnecessary use of Islamic State vehicles outside of
operation hours. It was obtained in November 2015 from the north Aleppo
village of Delha after the Islamic State lost control of it to Syrian rebels.
The document was provided to the author by a media activist working with the
rebel forces fighting the Islamic State in north Aleppo.
Item C: Reduction in electricity access for fighters' homes; obtained from
same source and same location as Item B.
Item D: Prohibition on removal and sale of medicine and medical equipment
outside of the wilaya. The document was provided to the author in March 2016
by a pharmacist who fled Mosul and reached the Azaz area in north Aleppo
countryside on the border with Turkey.
Item E: Observation by General Governing Committee on misconduct by fighters;
obtained in November 2015 from the north Aleppo village of Delha after the
Islamic State lost control of it to Syrian rebels. The document was provided
to the author by a media activist working with the rebel forces fighting the
Islamic State in north Aleppo.
Item F: Directive no. 103 from the General Governing Committee; obtained from
documents left behind in al-Shaddadi in Hasakah province after the Islamic
State lost control of the area to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The
document was provided to the author by a Syrian Kurdish journalist who visited
al-Shaddadi in February-March 2016.
Item G: Visitor's pass for driver from Azaz area through crossing at Dabiq
(name redacted to protect driver's identity); obtained by the author in March
2016 from a contact in Azaz who knows the driver.
Item H: Directive no. 102 from the General Governing Committee; obtained from
documents left behind in al-Shaddadi in Hasakah province after the Islamic
State lost control of the area to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The
document was provided to the author by a Syrian Kurdish journalist who visited
al-Shaddadi in February-March 2016.
Substantive Notes
[a] The travels in northern Syria involved a visit to the Azaz area in north
Aleppo countryside in December 2014. Considering the area's strategic
importance on the border with Turkey and its current status as a de facto safe
zone despite being a frontline region in the fight against the Islamic State,
Azaz has served as a useful hub for establishing connections inside and
outside of Islamic State territory to obtain documents. In addition, the
author has a contact in Hasakah province who has helped find documents left
behind by the Islamic State as it has lost ground to the Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF) coalition. Though it is not possible to verify the exclusive
documents featured in this paper by sending them to Islamic State members and
officials to check their authenticity, the documents bear Islamic State
stamps, formats and language use consistent with prior observed specimens, and
there are no reasonable grounds to dismiss them as spurious. In contrast,
known forgeries are poorly crafted and can be readily identified according to
political motives on the part of the forgers. For instance, a recurring
forgery motif in Iraq features Islamic State orders for a scorched earth
policy and the committing of atrocities in order for Iraqi forces to be
accused of war crimes. See Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, "Guide to Islamic State
Document Hoaxes," Jihad Intel, December 24, 2015.
[b] The existence of this mobilization call was ascertained by the author from
a refugee from Palmyra who had fled to the Azaz area in the north Aleppo
countryside and had a copy of the document, though the person refused to hand
it over/allow it to be photographed.
[c] Over the course of February-April 2016, the author also spoke with three
members of the Islamic State-linked LSY on the subject of salaries, all of
whom affirmed an identical scheme of $50 per month as a basic starting salary
with an additional $50 if one has a wife and $35 for each child. In terms of
further specifics, one clarified that the additional $35 per child does not
apply for the male child who is over 15 years of age and able to carry a
weapon. Another said that if one performs ribat [frontline duty] and is not
married, there can be bonuses. The third interviewee said that there is no
difference in salary scheme between an emir and an ordinary member.
[d] One should be careful about extrapolating from this document. Economic
circumstances are not the same for all Islamic State fighters everywhere, and
it may be that in Raqqa province in particular the fighters constitute a
particularly heavy financial burden, leading to the reduction in payments
after tallying the various requirements. Conversely, one of the LSY members
said he had not heard of a salary reduction. Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Islamic
State Administrative Documents (cont.)," Specimen 12Q.
[e] The General Governing Committee has the authority to issue general
directives to Islamic State wilayas[provinces] and government departments [diwans].
[f] The oil fields themselves are controlled by the Islamic State and any
investment in them requires allegiance to the Islamic State Caliph, whereas no
such allegiance is required for someone to purchase oil from these fields and
then refine or sell the oil inside or outside of Islamic State territory.
Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, "Principles in the Administration of the Islamic
State: Full text and translation," Guardian, December 7, 2015.
[g] For example, see Erika Solomon, Guy Chazan, and Sam Jones, "ISIS Inc: How
oil fuels the jihadi terrorists,"Financial Times, October 14, 2015. The report
estimates a daily revenue of $1.5 million from oil based on ranges given for
number of barrels of oil produced per day (34,000-40,000) and price per barrel
($20-45). However, no documentary evidence is given to support these
statistics. Documents that do exist with respect to this field put the price
per barrel estimate into doubt. These documents show oil sold per barrel at
prices well below $20. See, for instance, al-Tamimi, "Archive of Islamic State
Administrative Documents," Specimens 5T and 5U, as well as al-Tamimi, "Archive
of Islamic State Administrative Documents (cont.)," Specimens 13Z, 14A, and
14B.
[h] The most senior known case is that of Abu al-Mughira al-Qahtani, who was
killed in an airstrike in November 2015.
[i] The affair was publicized in a series of documents leaked by AQAP
supporters over the course of December 2015-February 2016, highlighting
protestations by a number of officials and fighters against the conduct of the
overall wali of Yemen appointed by al-Baghdadi. However, the central
leadership rejected the complaints and ordered the protestors to operate under
the wali's leadership. When this order was rejected despite the dissenters'
affirmation of continuing allegiance to the Islamic State, the Distant
Provinces Administration issued a notice ordering the expulsion of perceived
ringleaders and those who wished to continue in their dissent. While it is not
possible to tell how many exactly persisted in their dissent and how many
returned to the fold, it is clear the affair has hindered the Islamic State's
ability to compete with AQAP. Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, "Dissent in the Islamic
State's Yemen Affiliates: Documents, Translation & Analysis," aymennjawad.org,
February 29, 2016; Asa Fitch and Saleh al-Batati, "ISIS Fails to Gain Much
Traction in Yemen," Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2016.
[j] Hawar-Kilis is a village on the border with Turkey to the east of Azaz.
The main factions involved in the operations room are Faylaq al-Sham, Liwa al-Hamza,
Liwa al-Mu'atasim, Division 99, Division 51, and Sultan Murad. Personal
interview, media activist based in Azaz, March 2015.
[k] The Marea operations room, named for the town of Marea in north Aleppo
countryside, was the previous U.S.- and Turkish-backed plan to take the fight
to the Islamic State. It de facto ceased to exist in the face of the regime's
success in cutting off the route between Aleppo city and the Turkish border by
breaking the sieges of the Shi'a villages of Nubl and Zahara', together with
Afrin SDF advances to the west of Azaz that most notably took the town of Tel
Ref'at. Key components of the Marea operations room included the Shami Front,
Faylaq al-Sham, Kata'ib al-Safwa, Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki, Division 16,
Suqur al-Ghab, al-Fawj al-Awal and Jaysh al-Mujahideen. However, the
operations room was disorganized, and the leader Yaser Abd al-Raheem therefore
resigned in January 2016 in the weeks preceding the regime and SDF advances. "Marea
operations room: its aims and achievements," El-Dorar, December 16, 2015;
"Resignation of the leader of the 'Marea' operations room in protest at the
'absence of coordinated operation,'" Orient News, January 2, 2016.
[l] The brigade was formed in 2012 and participated in the capture of Raqqa.
It joined Jabhat al-Nusra in a bid to protect itself from the Islamic State in
late 2013. It was expelled from the city in January 2014 and split from Jabhat
al-Nusra, which officially announced the end of relations in April 2014. Liwa
Thuwar al-Raqqa sought protection with the YPG in the Kobani area and ever
since has been formally allied to it. Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa has experienced
tensions with the YPG, but the group has more recently adopted a more
conciliatory tone toward the YPG, which saved it from destruction at the hands
of the Islamic State. See Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, "Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa:
History, Analysis & Interview," Syria Comment, September 14, 2015; personal
interview, Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa spokesman, December 2015; and for the more
recent conciliatory tone, Sardar Mlla Drwish, "Raqqa brigade continues to
raise the flag of the Syrian revolution," Al-Monitor, March 18, 2016.
Citations
[1] Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi,
"Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents," Specimens 11Q and 12F,
aymennjawad.org, January 27, 2015; personal interview, Omar Fawaz, a former
pro-Islamic State media activist based in Mosul who published some Islamic
State documents and texts, March 2016.
[2] Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents," Specimen
5V.
[3] "The Dawla organization seizes Khanaser, south of Aleppo," Al Jazeera,
February 23, 2016.
[4] "The regime recovers Khanaser in the face of the route to Aleppo being cut
off," alsouria.net, February 25, 2016.
[5] Columb Strack, "Islamic State loses 22 per cent of its territory," IHS
Jane's, March 15, 2016.
[6] Purported audiotape of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, "So Wait, We Too are Waiting
with You," released on Islamic State social media accounts, December 26, 2015.
[7] Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, "Liwa Shuhada' al-Yarmouk appoints a new leader,"
aymennjawad.org, March 14, 2016.
[8] Maysara al-Zo'abi, "The revolutionaries seize the locality of Tasil in
west Deraa countryside," All4Syria, April 8, 2016.
[9] Maysara al-Zo'abi, "Military factions form an operations room to pursue
Da'esh members in Deraa," All4Syria, March 24, 2016.
[10] Sam Heller and Avi Ascher-Shapiro, "Rebels Ignored the Islamic State in
South Syria, and It's Come Back to Haunt Them," VICE News, April 6, 2016.
[11] Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, "The Archivist: 'Go Forth, Lightly and Heavily
Armed:' New Mobilization Calls by the Islamic State in Aleppo Province,"
Jihadology, October 30, 2015.
[12] Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, "Archive of Islamic State Administrative
Documents (cont.)," Specimen 13W, aymennjawad.org, January 11, 2016.
[13] Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents," Specimen
9I.
[14] Ibid., Specimen 8A.
[15] On the difficulties of the Baiji front, see: "Extremists in Mosul Come Up
With New Ways To Ensure Iraqi Followers 'Pure of Heart,'" Niqash, November 12,
2015.
[16] Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, "The Archivist: Unseen Islamic State Financial
Accounts from Deir az-Zor Province," Jihadology, October 5, 2015.
[17] Sam Jones and Erika Solomon, "ISIS Inc: Jihadis fund war machine but
squeeze 'citizens,'" Financial Times, December 15, 2015.
[18] S.B., "Where Islamic State gets its money," Economist, January 4, 2015.
[19] Yaroslav Trofimov, "In Islamic State Stronghold of Raqqa, Foreign
Fighters Dominate," Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2015.
[20] Jones and Solomon, Item A.
[21] Item B.
[22] Ibid., Item C.
[23] Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, "Repentance: Financial Income for the Islamic
State," aymennjawad.org, September 28, 2015.
[24] "Extremists Release New School Textbooks, Curriculum in Mosul," Niqash,
October 29, 2015.
[25] Suleiman al-Khalidi, "Syrian pound falls below 500 per dollar," Reuters,
March 24, 2016.
[26] Stephen Kalin, "Islamic State rigs currency rates in Mosul to prop up
finances," Reuters, February 22, 2016.
[27] "Feb. 13: Coalition airstrike destroys Daesh bulk cash storage and tax
collection HQ near Mosul," CJTF Operation Inherent Resolve, YouTube, February
18, 2016.
[28] "Widespread humanitarian crisis after the Iraqi government's decision to
cut off the salaries of employees in the 'Dawla' organization's areas," al-Quds
al-Arabi, February 12, 2016.
[29] Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents (cont.),"
Specimen 14G.
[30] Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, "The Archivist: Critical Analysis of the Islamic
State's Health Department," Jihadology, August 27, 2015.
[31] Item D.
[32] Al-Tamimi, "The Archivist: Critical Analysis of the Islamic State's
Health Department."
[33] Item E.
[34] Lauren Williams, "In IS-ruled Raqqa, new class divide creates tensions
with Syrians," Middle East Eye, July 10, 2015.
[35] Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents," Specimen
4V.
[36] Item F.
[37] Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents (cont.),"
Specimen 14C.
[38] Item G.
[39] Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents," Specimen
12B.
[40] Item H.
[41] Shelly Kittleson, "Tribal massacre victims forced to negotiate with IS,"
Al-Monitor, July 22, 2015.
[42] Hugh Naylor, "Turkish-backed rebels in Syria make major gains against
Islamic State," Washington Post, April 8, 2016.
[43] "IS replaced 'Wilayah Raqqa' units with 'Jaysh Khilafa' units;
fortification of the city continues," Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently,
June 24, 2015.
[44] "After the escalation of disagreement with the 'Kurdish units, Liwa 'Thuwar
al-Raqqa' dissolves 'The Tribes Army,'" alsouria.net, January 4, 2016.
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