Has al-Maqdisi Softened on the Islamic State? Four Scholars And A Fatwa
09 November 2016By Cole Bunzel
Two months ago, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the leading Jihadi-Salafi scholar
known for his fierce opposition to the Islamic State and support for al-Qaida,
released an essay that was widely interpreted as a softening of his position
toward the Islamic State. As Hassan Hassan recently pointed out, al-Maqdisi
has made other pronouncements of late that would seem to point in the same
direction, including a December 2015 tweet in which he said: ''There is nothing
to stop me from reassessing my position towards the [Islamic] State and
enraging the entire world by supporting it…''
But is al-Maqdisi really ready to reassess his position? The answer is no,
though he has added a little nuance and hope to it over the past year. In the
same tweet, al-Maqdisi conditioned his potential reassessment on ''the Islamic
State reassessing its position toward excommunicating, killing, and slandering
those Muslims who oppose it.'' He knows that this is not in the offing.
Al-Maqdisi has actually always been a bit softer on the Islamic State than
some of his peers in the jihadi scholarly community. The differences between
them and himself come out clearly in his most recent essay, but have actually
been on display in his writings for almost a year now. The differences center
on two key questions: Should the Islamic State be considered a group of
Kharijites (in reference to the radical early Islamic sect by that name)? And
should it be fought proactively or only in self-defense? Al-Maqdisi is against
labeling them as Kharijites, and he is against fighting them proactively. It
is a position with potential implications for the future unity of the
Jihadi-Salafi movement—or so he would like to think.
Four scholars and a fatwa
In assessing al-Maqdisis position, it is helpful to view him in the company
of three other jihadi scholars of like mind, age, and stature: Abu Qatada al-Filastini
(b. 1960), Hani al-Siba'i (b. 1961), and Tariq 'Abd al-Halim (b. 1948). Like
al-Maqdisi (b. 1959), Abu Qatada is of Palestinian origin and lives openly in
Jordan; al-Siba'i and 'Abd al-Halim are Egyptians living openly in London and
Canada, respectively. In September 2015, in the first installment of his (very
boring) six-part audio series on ''the Islamic Spring,'' al-Qaida leader Ayman
al-Zawahiri singled out these four for praise, describing them as strong
supporters of al-Qaida amid the controversy surrounding the Islamic State. Yet
while Zawahiri lauded these ''scholars of jihad'' for remaining ''steadfast upon
the truth,'' they were not all on the same message when it came to confronting
the so-called caliphate.
The differences between them began to surface in the aftermath of a fatwa
issued jointly by al-Maqdisi, Abu Qatada, and several others in early June
2015. Al-Maqdisi had already, a year earlier, denounced the Islamic State as a
''deviant'' group that should be abandoned in favor of al-Qaida. This fatwa was
his first public statement on the permissibility of fighting the group. It was
prompted by the Islamic States assault on certain Syrian Islamist groups in
the Suran area of Hama, Syria. Describing the Islamic State as ''the Baghdadi-ists''
(al-Baghdadiyyin), it authorized repelling their assault on the grounds that
doing so was legitimate ''defense of the assault of those assailing Muslim
lands.'' Whether the assailants were Muslim or not was beside the point, the
fatwa stated. The Islamic State was oppressive, aggressive, and flawed in
methodology.
For al-Siba'i and 'Abd al-Halim, however, the fatwa did not go nearly far
enough in condemning the Islamic State. Responding on social media, the two
Egyptians decried the term ''Baghdadi-ists''—a weak insult and an offense to
Baghdad—and called for a more proactive approach. Al-Siba'i wrote that
fighting the Islamic State should not be limited by the principles of
defensive warfare, as this would all but ensure further aggression by the
group. Its fighters would retreat to safety only to return once again ''to cut
off heads and blow things up in homes, mosques, and markets.'' 'Abd al-Halim
made the same argument, adding that the Islamic State should be fought so as
''to root them out'' and that its members ought to be described as Kharijites.
The spat attracted some media attention, with one site making a collage of the
four scholars.
Resisting the Kharijite label
The battle lines seemed clear enough. Al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada were on one
side, al-Siba'i and 'Abd al-Halim on the other. But there was also a minor
difference between al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada concerning the appropriateness of
pronouncing the Islamic State Kharijites. Al-Maqdisi refrained from doing so,
while Abu Qatada did so liberally. The difference, however, as both have
admitted, was only surface deep.
In late June 2015, following the jointly issued fatwa, Abu Qatada issued
another fatwa on the same subject, which al-Maqdisi endorsed. Titled ''A Fatwa
Concerning Defending Against the Assault of the Kharijites,'' it came in
response to some Libyan questioners facing a conundrum. Jihadis themselves who
were fighting the Islamic State, they had qualms about wishing ill on the ''the
Kharijites'' (i.e., the Islamic State) when they came under aerial attack by
the forces loyal to General Khalifa Haftar, leader of one side in Libyas
civil war. Abu Qatada assured his correspondents that their wishes were
appropriate, but he reminded them that these ''Kharijites'' were still
preferable to the ''apostates'' constituting Haftars forces. He clarified that
by ''Kharijites'' he did not mean all those fighting on behalf of the Islamic
State, but only ''its leaders, commanders, and overseers.''
As his endorsement indicates, al-Maqdisis views were the same. But he
resisted using the Kharijite label even with Abu Qatadas qualification.
In a short essay written about the same time as Abu Qatadas fatwa, titled
''Why Have I Not Called Them Kharijites Even Till Now?'' al-Maqdisi explains his
reasoning. He begins by noting that many jihadis who oppose the Islamic State,
which he describes as ''the State Group'' (Jama'at al-Dawla), have lambasted him
for refusing to use the Kharijite label. Some have even purportedly told him
''that many men and scholars have temporized in fighting them, using the fact
that I do not call them Kharijites as evidence.'' But al-Maqdisi says it is
wrong for anyone to see in his reluctance to use the term any indication of
''praise or accommodation.'' For, he affirms, some of the groups members are
''worse than Kharijites.'' To illustrate the point, he relates part of the story
of his attempted negotiation with the Islamic State for the life of the
Jordanian pilot Mu'adh al-Kasasiba, who was immolated in a well-known video
released in February 2015. That the negotiation was a hoax dawned on al-Maqdisi
when the group sent him a password-protected file containing the video, the
password being ''al-Maqdisi the cuckold…'' (This confirms the Guardian report
with similar details.) Al-Maqdisi holds Islamic State leaders Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi and Abu Muhammad al-'Adnani personally responsible for the slight.
They are Kharijites through-and-through.
Yet for al-Maqdisi, the fact remains that not all of the Islamic States
members are Kharijites. He does not fault Abu Qatada for using the label with
qualification, but he will not use it himself since ''most people do not know
and do not understand this qualification.'' The Kharijite label might lead
people to fight the Islamic State ''in order to root them out,'' which would
only serve ''the interests of the idolatrous rulers,'' the West, and the Shia.
One must, he says, still hope that the Islamic State prevails against these
enemies, notwithstanding its deviations. One cannot ''support the apostates
against them.'' He also suggests that declining to call the group Kharijites
could help in reaching out to certain of its fighters and in encouraging them
to repent.
Not to be rooted out
In mid-March 2016, al-Maqdisi released the essay mentioned at the top of this
post. It is mostly an extended justification of his position toward the
Islamic State. He notes that ''most of [the Islamic States] enemies'' find his
position ''oppressive'' but that he is going to stick to his guns, defending
''the State Group'' against the charge of Kharijism and criticizing those who
fight it ''in order to root it out.'' According to his own account, al-Maqdisi
delayed releasing the essay several times lest it appear at a ''bad time'' and
be interpreted as justifying the Islamic States crimes. But with many in the
Syrian opposition cooperating with the West and Turkey to fight the group,
even accepting Western arms and directing the airstrikes of the U.S.-led
coalition, he decided the time was finally right. The Islamic State, for all
its faults, is still in al-Maqdisis opinion preferable to groups fighting on
behalf of democracy—a form of polytheism in his opinion—and seeking the help
of nonbelievers against Muslims—the Islamic States members still being
Muslims in his view.
Al-Maqdisi reiterates his view that the Islamic State is not to a man a group
of Kharijites, and argues that, even if it were, this is irrelevant. For even
the Kharijites were still Muslims, he says, claiming the support of the
majority view of Sunni Muslim scholars throughout history.
What has upset him in particular is the use—or misuse—by certain opposition
groups in Syria of two Islamic texts concerning the Kharijites. The first is a
statement attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, who says of the Kharijites that
''if I could reach them, I would kill them as the the 'Adites were killed.'' The
'Adites, as described in the Quran, were a recalcitrant Arabian tribe who
rejected the preaching of the Prophet Hud, one of Muhammads prophetic
predecessors. The importance of Muhammads statement lies in its suggestion
that he would fight the Kharijites aggressively, not just in self-defense. The
second text is a fatwa to the same effect by Ibn Taymiyya, the
fourteenth-century Hanbali scholar from Syria whose writings form the
theological backbone of Salafism. Ibn Taymiyya describes the Kharijites as
worse than mere political ''rebels,'' ruling that they should be pursued until
destroyed. Both texts thus suggest a ''rooting out'' approach to the Kharijites.
Al-Maqdisi argues that such texts are inapplicable to the case of the Islamic
State. He rejects the comparison of the group with the early Kharijites for
the reason that the Islamic State has good intentions—indeed better intentions
than many of its opponents in the Syrian theater—while the early Kharijites
did not. In his view the Islamic State is seeking, however misguidedly, to
implement Gods law, and so possesses ''an exculpatory interpretation'' (tawil).
This is in contrast with the early Kharijites, who rebelled against Gods law.
Al-Maqdisi also expresses hope that the Islamic State can reform itself,
noting the potential for more moderate elements in the group to take over. ''I
know,'' he says, ''as the Shaykh [Abu Qatada al-Filastini] knows, that in the
[Islamic] State are those who oppose al-'Adnani and even hope that he and
those extremists like him will fade.''
As was to be expected, the Islamic States opponents censured al-Maqdisi for
allegedly softening his position toward it. In early April, he responded with
a statement printed in the Jordanian press, avowing that he had not changed
his mind at all: he still condemns the Islamic States actions in terms of
spilling Muslim blood and believes that Muslims should fight it in
self-defense.
An eternal olive branch
In considering al-Maqdisis hopeful outlook, one should recall just how wrong
he has been about the Islamic State before. In early 2014, he thought he could
bring about a reconciliation between the Islamic State and al-Qaida. He wrote
to al-Baghdadi and one of his chief religious authorities, Turki al-Bin'ali,
only to be spurned. A year later, he was duped by the group for a whole month
into thinking he was negotiating for the pilot al-Kasasiba, only to be spurned
again. His read on the Islamic State does not appear to be very good. The
optimist in him cannot help but ceaselessly extend the olive branch.
It is also important to note that al-Maqdisi has failed to set the tone of al-Qaidas
messaging vis-à-vis the Islamic State. Just this week, Ayman al-Zawahiri
deployed the Kharijite label against the group for the first time, describing
it as ''neo-Kharijites.'' Zawahiri still called for unity among jihadis in the
face of the ''crusader'' aggression, but the hardening of his rhetoric seems at
odds with al-Maqdisis more hopeful expressions. The Syrian al-Qaida affiliate
Jabhat al-Nusra, meanwhile, has long referred to the Islamic State as
Kharijites, even using the Prophets statement about the 'Adites. The jihadi
civil war is nowhere near over.
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