''Come Back to Twitter'': A Jihadi Warning Against Telegram
30 November 2016By Cole Bunzel
It is hard to avoid a feeling of déjà vu. Back in 2013, an established al-Qaida
ideologue lamented the decline of the jihadi web forums, warning users against
migrating to social media platforms Twitter and Facebook and calling for a
revival of the forums as the ''main theater'' of internet jihad. The appeal of
course failed to persuade, as the platforms, and Twitter in particular, surged
in popularity and left the forums in the dust. Fast forward three years, and
again things are changing. Now, a jihadi author is lamenting the decline of
the social media platforms, warning users against migrating to Telegram, an
encrypted messaging service, and calling for the revival of Twitter and
Facebook as the locus of web-based jihad.
The al-Qaida ideologue from 2013, while ultimately unpersuasive, was right on
one count. He predicted that a day would come when the social media platforms
would ''shut their doors in our faces.'' And indeed, the crackdown on the
jihadis of Twitter has finally come. (Even my ghost accounts for following
them are being deleted.) Yet those targeted have not gone running back to the
forums, as this ideologue would have liked. Rather, they have gravitated
towards the new hot commodity, Telegram, which has gradually replaced Twitter
as the primary online home for the Islamic State and its supporters. Not
everyone, however, is so pleased with the relocation.
The Warner
One of those speaking out is the pseudonymous Abu Usama Sinan al-Ghazzi, a
pro-Islamic State writer who authored a short essay last month titled ''O
Supporters of the Caliphate, Do Not Withdraw into Telegram,'' published by the
al-Wafa Media Foundation (wafa meaning ''faithfulness''). Al-Ghazzi, whose
name suggests a Ghazan origin, has been writing in support of the Islamic
State since at least July 2013, when he penned a post calling for greater
coordination of media efforts between the Islamic State and its supporters.
The importance of the online support network is a running theme in his
writings. In his 2013 post, he described the need to fight back against ''the
greatest campaign of disinformation…history has known,'' urging his readers
''not to be satisfied with fighting [alone]; rather, confront [the enemies]
with both the tongue and the spear.'' While not a particularly distinguished
author, al-Ghazzis work deserves attention for being published by an
important media outlet.
Al-Wafa belongs to an elite group of semi-official media organizations that
promote the Islamic State online, previously by means of Twitter but now
mostly via Telegram. (Al-Wafas decline on Twitter is captured by the pictures
of pears it is currently using to hide from the censors.) The other big two
organizations are the al-Battar Media Foundation (Battar meaning ''saber'') and
the al-Sumud Media Foundation (Sumud meaning ''steadfastness''). The three are
known primarily for their ideological output in the form of essays, poems, and
books, and they often work hand-in-hand with the Islamic States official
media organizations. For example, al-Battar is responsible for producing the
transcripts of Islamic State speeches and videos, and al-Sumud has the
privilege of publishing the new poems of the Islamic States official poetess,
Ahlam al-Nasr, every week or so. When the Islamic State launches a concerted
media campaign across its provinces, such as its December 2015 campaign
calling for jihad in Saudi Arabia, the semi-official organizations also
participate. In the Saudi campaign, they released dozens of essays by dozens
of anonymous authors, all encouraging jihad there.
It is unclear how many of these authors, like Ahlam al-Nasr, reside in the
lands of the caliphate, but occasionally they claim to be speaking from there,
or they seem to possess insider knowledge. Neither is the case with al-Ghazzi,
though he certainly speaks for more than just himself on the subject at hand.
The Warning
In his essay, al-Ghazzi bemoans the fact that Twitter and Facebook have been
losing members to Telegram. This shift, as J.M. Berger has explained, can be
traced to September 2015, when the Telegram service introduced a feature
called broadcast channels, which added Twitter-like functionality to an app
that was previously much like WhatsApp. For many jihadis, Telegrams arrival
was a welcome development, providing a permissive environment for
communicating and spreading their message online at a time when Twitter was
deleting their accounts more rapidly. But for al-Ghazzi, it was unwelcome,
even disastrous.
The Telegram frenzy began, in al-Ghazzis telling, at a crucial time in the
online war between the ''crusaders'' and the Islamic State and its supporters.
The two sides were engaged in an all-out war for control of the Twittersphere,
a war that al-Ghazzi believed his side was winning. The crusaders were being
forced to delete thousands and thousands of accounts, but to no avail. Unable
to do anything more, the crusaders had ''surrendered to reality.'' Then along
came Telegram, and the jihadis began abandoning the battlefield.
The allure of Telegram was the security and stability it offered relative to
Twitter. The chances of ones account being deleted were much lower, as they
still are. ''Many of the brothers preferred Telegram over other [platforms],''
al-Ghazzi explains, ''in view of the small number of deletion operations to
which the supporters were exposed on Telegram.'' Another attraction was the
ability to hide from those who might report one to the censors. On Telegram,
channel operators can ''change the channels…into private channels,'' so as to
avoid being targeted for deletion. Here al-Ghazzi is referring to the two
different kinds of broadcast channels that Telegram offers.
For those unfamiliar, here is how Telegram defines channels: ''Channels are a
tool for broadcasting public messages to large audiences. In fact, channels
can have an unlimited number of members.'' And heres its explanation of the
difference between public and private channels: ''Public channels have a
username. Anyone can find them in Telegram search and join. Private channels
are closed societies—you need to be added by the creator or get an invite link
to join.''
Most of the channels supporting the Islamic State, in my experience, are of
the private kind. This means they are not accessible to the broader public.
When a new private channel is formed, the other Telegram channels circulate an
invitation link that usually expires within hours. The result is that the
Islamic States supporters on Telegram are a rather isolated community. They
create an echo-chamber. (Only some of the private channels maintain parallel
public channels, as do al-Wafa and al-Sumud, but not al-Battar.)
It is this introverted orientation of Telegram that, according to al-Ghazzi,
makes it so unattractive. Among Telegrams ''negatives'' he lists the fact that
channels are limited to ''a specified group and faction determined by the owner
of the channel,'' and that ''searching for channels is not allowed.'' ''The other
platforms,'' by contrast, such as Twitter and Facebook, ''are open to the
masses,'' which means they can reach a much larger audience. Telegram, in other
words, is bad for outreach.
Al-Ghazzi sums up his warning thus: ''Do not withdraw into Telegram.'' And he
ends with a plea: ''Come back to Twitter and Facebook, for our mission is
greater than this and deeper. Those we seek to reach, we will not find them on
Telegram in the way desired, as we will find them on Twitter and Facebook.''
The Warned
Al-Ghazzis essay raises the question whether the Islamic States supporters
will heed his warning or not. For the moment, the answer seems to be not. His
appeal looks to be going the way of the ideologues who warned against
migrating to Twitter and Facebook back in 2013. Momentum is clearly in
Telegrams favor. The jihadis, it seems, are just not willing to create new
Twitter accounts every day when there exists a perfectly good alternative that
goes little patrolled.
The more diehard pro-Islamic State Twitter accounts are also, like al-Ghazzi,
complaining of a lack of dedication to the platform. ''O supporters of the
Islamic Caliphate,'' a prominent account tweeted a few days ago, ''be you warned
against laziness and negligence on your battlegrounds!'' Less prominent
accounts are also complaining. One tweeted two weeks ago: ''Where are the
supporters, where are their accounts? Where is our power on Twitter that the
nations of polytheism were being terrified by?'' These are expressions of
nostalgia. Twitter has ceased to be the jihadi playground it once was—at least
for fans of the Islamic State.
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