20 December 2016By Tore Hamming
This is the second Q&A of the interview series with Ahmed Al Hamdan
(@a7taker), a Jihadi-Salafi analyst and author of ''Methodological Difference
Between ISIS and Al Qaida''. Al Hamdan was a former friend of Turki bin Ali,
and a student of Shaykh Abu Muhammad Al Maqdisi under whom he studied and was
given Ijazah, becoming one of his official students. Also, Shaykh Abu Qatada
al Filistini wrote an introduction for his book when it was published in the
Arabic language. The interview series contains contains five themes in total
and will all be published on Jihadica.com. You can find the first Q&A here.
Tore Hamming:
In July 2016, Jabhat al-Nusra broke away from AQ and established Jabhat Fatah
ash-Shaam with the blessing of the senior AQ leadership. In his most recent
speech (Brief Messages to a Supported Ummah 4) Zawahiri furthermore encouraged
Jihadi factions in Iraq to unify and fight IS and Iran. Is the approach of a
popular front not necessarily with allegiance to AQ, but simply being
sympathetic to the movement, becoming the future for AQ?
Ahmed Al Hamdan:
There is a mistake in the question, as al Zawahiri did not seek the factions
in Iraq to unite to fight the Islamic state, not in episode 4 nor in any part
of the series.
Secondly: we must understand that wars and battles are magnets which attract
Jihadi thinkers and I do not think that you would find a battle front or any
popular movement whose people are not sons of the Jihadi movement. And we must
understand that al Qaeda do not look to the matter from the perspective of
upholding its name and achieving its organisational goals and if that was
indeed the case, then they would not have accepted the breaking of ties with
al Nusra for the benefit of the Muslims in Syria.
Generally, al Qaeda feel that its presence in some of the fields is a
hindrance and that it is used as a justification by the enemies to give a
pretext for international forces to intervene. And we believe that the West
does not just have a problem with what it calls terrorism, rather it has a
problem with any Islamic project. When it is announced that Al Qaeda is
present in any geographical area you cannot be certain of this claim. However,
when the West have no other excuse to intervene and suppress the Islamic
projects then it will enter and strike the Islamic groups when this claim (of
an al Qaeda presence) can be reasonably verified.
And al Qaeda do not like to announce their presence in some areas for a number
of reasons:
To expose the Western hostility to every Islamic project and show that their
problem is with Islam and the establishment of the Shariah and not with a
specific group, and to remove the usual argument used by the Western countries
for intervention.
To find more room to manoeuvre, and
to create places to move financial support and aid – meaning you will not find
some traders in some of the states because there is a difficulty finding
support in needy States in which battles and war are taking place. Likewise,
you will not find some of the independent support, that is that it will be
difficult to assist you or support the Jihadi groups in a region in which you
are fighting, due to fear of being described with or connected with terrorism.
[1]
Stopping the Western countries from being able to
cause provocation between the factions as some of the factions will accuse a
specific group because of its alleged affiliation to al Qaeda. The world has
mobilised against us and that is the reason for the complexity of our cause,
and there is problems and enmity between groups, and the enemy benefits from
this from the beginning and so Al Qaeda does not reveal itself.
These matters are not my own conclusions, rather they have been
mentioned by Al Qaeda leaders themselves and those close to them. For example:
Shaykh Ayman al Zawahiri said ''the guidance from the general command was that
we do not publicly announce the presence of Al Qaeda in Syria and this matter
was agreed even with our brothers in Iraq and so we were surprised by the
announcement which has provided the Syrian regime and the Americans a chance
which they hoped for, then this will cause the normal people of Syria to ask:
what is with this al Qaeda that have brought disaster upon us? Is Bashar not
enough? Do you want to bring the Americans upon us also?''[2]
Shaykh Abu Yahya al Libi said in his letter to Majeed al Majeed, the leader of
the Abdullah Azzam Brigades about the beginning of armed actions in Syria: ''I
have written about that to the brothers in the Islamic State more than a few
times regarding some outlines and to summarise the points which were made:
there is not to be any public appearance there under the name of any Jihadi
group, especially those which are famous and well known.''[3]
And the leadership of al Qaeda in the Islamic Magrib said in ''The Azwad
Document'' after taking control of the northern part of Mali: ''And the third
benefit: lies in mitigating upon ourselves external and international pressure
and it is extremely important that we look at our Islamic project in Azwad as
one that begins small and in front of it there are many stages which it must
pass through to be able to mature and become strong. And presently it is still
in its early days crawling on its knees and it has not yet stood upon its
feet. So is it wise to begin now by loading it down with weights which will
totally transform it before it stands upon its feet, in fact this may lead to
choking and preventing its breath. If we really want it to stand upon its feet
in this world full of enemies and predators, then we must make things easy on
it and take its hand and help it to stand. So based upon this view we adopt
the understanding of neutralizing opponents and avoiding provocation,
hostility and the policy of agitating the enemies.''[4]
So I think that adopting this policy was why the al Qaeda branch, which was
ruling, took the name Ansar ad Deen instead of Al Qaeda so as to avoid
provocation and antagonizing and irritating the enemies. And in fact the
absence of the name al Qaeda allowed many preachers to issue statements in
condemnation of the French invasion of Mali without the difficulty of this
being used to link them to Al Qaeda. And so you are able to get people
supporting al Qaeda without them knowing, or else they know and there is
nothing to prevent them.
And in the first Abbottabad Papers, Shaykh Usamah bin Ladin advised Al Shabab
al Mujahideen to conceal their connection to Al Qaeda and he stated the reason
and said: ''it will increase the vigilance of the opponents against you if the
issue is public, as happened with the brothers in Iraq and Algeria. And the
second matter: some of the Muslims in Somalia are suffering from extreme
poverty and malnutrition as a result of the ongoing war in their country and
so I would urge you to listen to one of my speeches in the gulf states on
effective and important development projects which are not expensive and which
we previously tested in Sudan. So if the Mujahideen do not appear publicly to
be united with Al Qaeda then this will strengthen the position of businessmen
who want to help their brothers in Somalia and bring success to these projects
to relieve hardship from the dispersed Muslims in Somalia and ensure the
survival of the people amongst including the Mujahideen.''[5]
As for the future of Al Qaeda and what al Qaeda wants? Do they want to control
and subject everyone to them? Or do they want to be part of any new Islamic
government through mutual consent with other groups?
The foundational strategy of Al Qaeda is not to establish an Islamic state in
the presence of a strong cohesive international system and in the first
Abbottabad papers Shaykh Usamah bin Ladin spoke a lot about this strategy and
here is some of his words: ''we must keep in mind at this time that organised
work to establish a Muslim state begins by exhausting global disbelief as it
has a strong hostility towards the establishment of any Islamic emirate and
what indicates the heightened hostility of the West to an Islamic emirate of
any size is the emirate of Shaykh al Khataabi which he established in Morocco
before draining the crusaders to the point that they could not dominate the
Muslim lands so the crusaders increased their power and surrounded the emirate
in order to strike it. The head of global disbelief today has a large
influence upon the countries of the region, it is their lifeblood and
supporting base and has the power which enabled it to defeat Saddam and the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, even though it was significantly weakened. Yet
it still has the power to defeat the government of any true Islamic state in
the region at this present time and so it is necessary to continue to drain
and exhaust it, to the point where it is weak and is not able to defeat any
state which is established. Then you must take into account the need to unite
all the efforts and energies of the Muslims who refrained from jihad either
with an excuse or without and then the establishing of a Muslim state is begun
with the permission of Allah, and if needed the matter is delayed for a few
years.''[6]
However, al Qaeda does not oppose the establishment of an Islamic state by
other groups before such a time, but its own outlook and strategy is one of
not establishing an Islamic state before the weakening or fall of the
international system. For example, al Qaeda did not reject the state of the
Taliban and did not say we are against it because of the presence of the
international community. On the contrary it supported this Muslim country even
though it opposed its strategy about the creation of states.
Returning to the future of al Qaeda, does it want a state which exploits any
popular movement and will use that popular movement in its interests? The
answer is no. Al Qaeda does not see this as a successful method for a number
of reasons, such as:
Al Qaeda believes that any state which is established alone will not last long
and will soon fall due to the enemies ability to defeat it – as we will
mention soon – and this failure would lead to alienating the people and they
would not help it again later. And this has been their outlook throughout the
contemporary period. Abu Bashir al Wuhaishi sent a letter to Shaykh Usamah
saying that the group in Yemen had the ability to enter Saana and take control
of it and Shaykh Usamah replied to him ''regarding what you have said about now
being the time to enter Saana; we would like to establish Islamic law in it if
we were capable of maintaining that, however while the main enemy has been
weakened economically and militarily both before 9/11 and after it, it still
has the ability to destroy any state which is established and so we dont want
to put ourselves and our families in Yemen in that situation at this time,
before first preparing the conditions. And if we did that then we would be
like the one who built a house in front of the torrent and if the river flowed
through it then it would knock it down and then if we again wanted to rebuild
the house a second time we would have alienated the people and they would not
help us again.''[7]
They do not have the ability to
manage everything on their own and based on what Shaykh Abu Yahya al Libi said
to Abu Hamza al Muhajir ''know my beloved brother that the success of
establishing a state cannot be achieved by your efforts alone no matter what
you think about your adequacy and efficiency. And the matter is more great and
serious so that it needs more than your efforts alone and its fronts are
numerous and varied so include your brothers – who you know- within it, and
there is no other way to do so except by your serious efforts in that. So make
them a cornerstone in your project and included within its directives.''[8]
Your involvement of the other groups along with you in the
management of the new state means the dispersion of the ranks of your enemy
and so they will not be able to unite in the same way that they would be able
to if you alone are in control.
Not to alienate other
parties by excluding them as then they will turn on you or help the enemy. By
allowing them to participate you then win them to your ranks. You will find
that all of this is found in the speeches of the leaders of Al Qaeda, for
example what was said by Shaykh Atiyatullah al Libi to Shaykh Abu Musab al
Zarqawi:
''Therefore, you, as a leader and a jihadist
political organization who wants to destroy a power and a state and erect on
its rubble an Islamic state, or at least form the building block on the right
path towards that, need all of these people; and it is imperative for someone
like this to get along with everyone in various degrees as well, for the
brothers are of varying calibres, in my opinion. You also have the tribal
leaders and the likes from the upper echelons of society, and they are of
different levels as well, so the good among them who is close to us, we should
consult them in some of our matters and give them value and give them some
praise and involve them in some matters and vest them with some things because
they love prestige. In this way we should try not to cause them to believe
that we are going over their heads or infringing upon them in political and
social leadership, or that we are overstepping them and not considering them
and not giving them value and not taking them into account. Rather, we should
make them feel that we want to work with them to establish the religion,
liberate the country and the people, establish the Islamic state and the rule
of the Shariah of the most merciful etc. and that, in our opinion, they have a
large role to play, as we need every Muslim and every person to play a part in
this. In the meantime, we should call them to commit to the Shariah and to all
that is best and of merit, and we should advise them against what is wrong and
from all bad deeds, and we should try to perfect them and encourage them.
Whenever the people feel that we value them and appreciate their efforts and
that we respect them and want the best for them and that we sympathize with
them, this is what will draw their hearts to us.'' [9]
And Shaykh Ayman al Zawahiri also said to Al Zarqawi: ''The Americans will exit
soon, God willing, and the establishment of a governing authority – as soon as
the country is freed from the Americans – is not dependant on force alone.
Indeed, its imperative that, in addition to force, there be an appeasement of
Muslims and a sharing with them in governance and in the Shura Council and in
enjoining what is good and prohibiting what is evil. In my view – which I
continue to reiterate is limited and has a distant perspective upon the events
– this must be achieved through the people of the Shura, who possess authority
to determine issues and make them binding, and who are endowed with the
qualifications for carrying them out. They would be elected by the people of
the country to represent them and overlook the work of the authorities in
accordance with the rules of the glorious Sharia. And it doesnt appear that
the Mujahedeen, much less the al Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers (Iraq), will
lay claim to governance without the Iraqi people. Not to mention that that
would be in contravention of the Shura methodology. That is not practical in
my opinion.''[10]
And from the practical examples of this on the ground is the participation of
the civilians from the people of Hadramaut in the local council to administer
their area when al Qaeda in Yemen had control of that city. And the leader of
Al Qaeda, Khalid Batarfi said in an interview with the editor and chief of the
Mukalla daily, Sand Baysob, in January 2015 when he was asked does the council
in Hadramaut follow you. He answered:
''Your view about this peoples council is wrong. This council meets itself and
it consists of scholars of the city and its surroundings and we do not get
involved in the formation of this council nor in choosing its members. All the
people know the members from whom the council is chosen and they are from the
scholars of the city and its surroundings. It is not a front for us as you
have stated in the question, rather it is a separate entity which contributes
to the management of the city and we have agreed with them on three basic
items to work for:
That the reference is the Book and the Sunnah
That the council is to administer the people
That the council does not have links to any party or with any internal or
external agenda
And we were ready and still are ready to hand over all the city headquarters
which the council needs for the administration of the city, however the
council needed more time to arrange its paperwork and find enough strength to
protect these facilities. So we began to surrender them gradually as requested
and any delay was due to them and not to ourselves. We consider the
involvement of the people of a land in the management of their land as a
religious duty and it is included within the issue of consultation and so we
will not dictate general matters of the nation and we will not give ourselves
the right to determine such matters alone.''
And another example of that is the cooperation between Ansar ad Deen in Mali
and the Azwad National liberation movement in their joint management to rule
by the Shariah in the northern region of Mali and al Qaeda never considered
ruling alone. [11]
In summary: what is the situation or the future which al Qaeda want? It is
that there is an Islamic Caliphate established by election, consultation and
the satisfaction of the people. And it is not that al Qaeda imposes itself
upon everyone else.
And the benefit for which al Qaeda works is not that of any group or a party,
rather the benefit of the Islamic nation is placed before every other benefit,
even if that is the benefit of the group itself. Based on that Shaykh Usama
bin Ladin, May Allah have mercy upon him, said:
''The benefit of the group comes before the benefit of the individual and the
benefit of the state comes before the benefit of the group and the benefit of
the nation comes before the benefit of the state.'' [12]
And based upon that benefit or end, it is necessary to participate alongside
others and allow the nation to choose its ruler, not to impose yourself, as
Shaykh Usamah bin Ladin said:
''And we Muslims believe that it is the right of the nation to choose its own
leader and we believe in consultation.'' [13]
And Dr Ayman al Zawahiri said:
''And so we say clearly to our Muslim nation in general and our people in Syria
specifically, that al Qaeda will never rob you of your right to choose the
Muslim ruler whom you are pleased with, as established by the Book of Allah
and the Sunnah of his prophet peace be upon him. And if Allah enables the
ruling of Islam in Syria soon with his permission and if the Ummah chooses a
ruler who establishes the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His prophet peace be
upon him, then he is also our choice. Then after that we want all the Muslim
Ummah to agree upon one Khalifah whom they are pleased with.'' [14]
He also said:
''We have stated time and time again that if the people of Syria set up an
Islamic government and chose for themselves a leader, then their choice is our
choice, because we, by the grace of Allah, do not seek power, rather we seek
the rule of the Shariah and we dont want to rule the Muslims but we want the
Muslims to be ruled by Islam. We have never stopped calling for the unity of
the Mujahideen in Syria and their uniting upon the establishing of a guided
Islamic Mujahid government which spreads justice and seeks consultation, which
returns the rights and aids the weak and which upholds jihad and frees the
lands, which strives to free Al Aqsa and revive the Khilafah upon the
Prophetic methodology. And there will be no organizational affiliation in
these great days – with the permission of Allah- which the Nation hopes for,
the nation of which we are a part of, not guardians of.'' [15]
Moreover, the outlook of al Qaeda is to appoint a ruler who is subject to a
consultative council, i.e. not an absolute ruler.
And Shaykh Usama bin Ladin said about that:
''The right in choosing a leader belongs to the Nation and it has a right to
hold him to account if he deviates and the right to remove him if he does
something which necessitates that.'' [16]
And as for the future which al Qaeda hopes for itself: it is that it
disappears and ceases to exist along with the rest of the Islamic group when
an Islamic state is established.
_________
Footnotes:
[1] For example the two Kuwaiti Shaykhs who are both Mujahideen veterans
issued a statement on the 14th of March 2016 seeking in it the breaking of
ties between Jabhat al Nusra and Al Qaeda and they gave reasons saying: ''The
benefit of a merge between Jabhat al Nusra and other factions, many who are
qualified to so so and have the right to. Also to transform the Jihad from the
Jihad of a group to th Jihad of an Ummah and to create freedom of movement for
Jihadi supporters as the name Al Qaeda as a bogeyman enables the hypocrites
chase them and harass them''
[2] The seventh meeting with as Sahaab Foundation entitled: ''Reality, between
pain and hope'' May 2014.
[3] Letter to Shaykh Majeed al Majeed P.4, 10th March 2012.
[4] General guidelines for the Islamic Jihadist project in Azwad. P.5, 20th
July 2012
[5] The collected messages and directives of Shaykh Usamah bin Ladin, P.731,
6th August 2010
[6] The collected messages and directives of Shaykh Usamah bin Ladin, P.767
[7] The first Abbottabad documents, index number: SOCOM-2012-0000016
[8] Letter to Shaykh Abu Hamza al Muhajir P.3
[9] Complete works of Shaykh Atiyatullah al Libi P.1791
[10] Letter to Abu Musab al Zarqawi P.9
[11] For the full terms of the joint agreement refer to the official statement
released by Al Qaeda in the Magrib entitled ''A media message and invitation''
Dated Wednesday 3rd Rajib 1436 / April 22nd 2015 by Al Andalus Foundation.
[12] The collected messages and directives of Shaykh Usamah bin Ladin, P.735
[13] The collected messages and directives of Shaykh Usamah bin Ladin, P.685
[14] ''Belief cuts down arrogance'' by As Sahab Foundation, August 2013
[15] ''Go to Jihad in Syria'' As Sahab Foundation, February 2016.
[16] The collected messages and directives of Shaykh Usamah bin Ladin, P.528
Brief analysis of answer
Initially, I should offer an excuse for referring to the wrong speech by al-Zawahiri
in my question. Although Ahmed Al Hamdan says Zawahiri did not make the call
to unite in any of his speeches, he did indeed call for re-organisation of
Jihadists in Iraq in the third (and not fourth) speech of the ''Brief Messages
to a Supported Ummah'' series. In the speech titled ''Fear Allah in Iraq'' he
said that Jihadists in Iraq should follow the example of Jabhat al-Nusra (Jabhat
Fath ash-Shaam) in Syria and embedd in the opposition.
Although not stating it directly, Al Hamdan confirms the analysis most western
analysts and academics subscribe to regarding Jabhat al-Nusras break with al
Qaeda. Not officially being an al Qaeda affiliate would ensure Jabhat Fath
ash-Sham more room to manoeuvre and facilitate easier access to funding and to
unite with other groups. This is something al Qaeda is indeed very aware about
and as Al Hamdan says ''you are able to get people supporting al Qaeda without
them knowing.''
Perhaps not since its emergence, but at least during the previous decade, al
Qaeda has followed a much more people-centric and staged process to the
establishment of the caliphate than what we are currently witnessing with the
Islamic State. Al Qaeda considered the establishment of an Islamic state a
long process, where the ambition was to exhaust the enemy to an extent that
ensured the control of conquered territory could be kept despite opposition.
Al Hamdan is also correct to point out that al Qaeda has paid more attention
not to alienate other parties by exclusion. This is particularly evident in
Syria and in Yemen.
Al Hamdan does, however, pay too much tribute to al Qaedas 'moderate – in
lack of a better word – approach. He uses a quotation from Zawahiri stating
that they are not guardians of the Muslim nation, but that is exactly what al
Qaeda strived to be initially as a Muslim vanguard movement and, I will argue,
continues to consider themselves as. Compared to the Islamic State, surely al
Qaeda has chosen a more moderate and pragmatic approach in the areas it is
fighting. This is partly a result of them learning from experience and because
its senior leaders always have stressed the importance of public support.
Although al Qaeda continuously stresses the staged process to the caliphate,
they are not as against its emergence in the immediate future as Al Hamdan
says. In his 2007 speech with Al Sahab Media titled ''Review of Events'', al-Zawahiri
praised the Islamic State of Iraq in its efforts to unify the Jihadi groups in
Iraq and setting up a state. He even says that ''my brothers in the jihad
movements in Iraq must realize that the signs of the Caliphate state have
begun to loom on the horizon''. After carefully assessing the contemporary
public sentiments and analysing the conflicts they are engaged in, al Qaeda
has decided on a strategy of gradualism as the smartest way to proceed. This
does not imply that al Qaeda will simply leave the future destiny of Syria,
Iraq or Yemen in the hands of any candidate or group that has the support of
the public if this actor is not sympathetic to al Qaedas view of the world.
The group has fought a strenuous struggle for more than 15 years and will not
simply leave it to the people to decide.
As a follower of Jihadi movements, it is interesting to see how the
description of al Qaeda in western media has changed substantially in the past
five years. This is mainly a result of the emergence of an even more radical
group, but also due to al Qaedas strategic choices in this period. No matter
the exact reason, this is exactly what al Qaeda wanted. As Al Hamdan said, al
Qaeda will get people to support them without them even knowing.
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