Earlier this month, as Russians marked the 25th anniversary of the fall of the
Soviet Empire, there was much talk of an end to what many in Moscow claim was
a ''parenthesis'' that is now closing.
In other words, in 1992 Russia, as the core power in the USSR, ceased to be a
superpower but is now regaining that status thanks to Vladimir Putin. The
claim that ''the Russian phoenix'' is rising from the ashes of the Soviet
Empire is supported by reference to Putin's success in annexing Crimea,
shaving off a chunk of eastern Ukraine and calling it Novorossiya (New
Russia), swallowing 20 per cent of Georgia's territory, turning Iran into a
client state, and emerging as a major player in war-torn Syria.
More importantly, perhaps, Russia's new status has been acknowledged if not
openly endorsed by the Obama administration with the Secretary of State John
Kerry musing about ''our Russian partners'' on a range of issues from the fake
nuclear deal with Iran to the tragedy in Syria.
As far as the ''Phoenix is back'' tune makes some Russians feel better, no
harm is done. After all, nations, like individual human beings, need a bit of
fantasy to add spice to life. However, there is a danger that taking that kind
of talk too seriously could feed the monster of hubris with potentially
disastrous consequences not only for Russia but also for the world.
A more sober assessment of Russia's position might help Moscow avoid making
the classical mistake of overestimating its strength. Gauging Russia's real
power has been a challenge for policymakers in Moscow and European capitals at
least since the Napoleonic wars.
The French statesman Talleyrand put it this way: ''Russia is never as strong
as she thinks and not as weak as her adversaries hope.'' Russia's points of
strength in terms of geopolitics are obvious.
In territorial size, the Russian Federation, spanning two continents, is the
largest nation on earth. In population, Russia is in 10th place, just behind
Bangladesh. When it comes to hard power, Russia is only surpassed by the
United States. It has enough firepower to destroy the planet several times
over.
In the past few years, partly thanks to Obama's success in preventing the
United States from playing a leadership role, Russia has been able to project
power at no great task. Russia uses a lot of the little power it has while
America, under Obama, is prevented from using even a little of a lot of power
it has.
Defeating the infant Georgian army wasn't too difficult. And carpet-bombing
civilians in Aleppo, who cannot retaliate, was even easier. However, the
Russian colossus may have a foot of clay. With falling birthrates, its
demographic outlook appears bleak. This is important because, throughout
history, one condition of rising empires has been a robust demography.
The Russian economy is also in poor shape. Falling oil revenues, the mounting
cost of absorbing annexed territories, the vast sums needed to destroy Syria
and keep Bashar Al-Assad presiding over the ruins, an unprecedented level of
flight of capital, structural corruption, western sanctions and a drying up of
Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) have led to a perfect storm of economic
meltdown.
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates for this year,
Russia has the world's 17th largest economy with a gross domestic product
(GDP) estimated at $1.267 trillion, a significant fall since its peak of $2.2
trillion in 2013 when oil prices were almost twice higher.
Thus, one theory is that Putin is projecting power in easy places to divert
attention from his regime's domestic woes. One indication of that was the big
noise Moscow made about having Assad sign a 49-year treaty to grant Russia
permanent aero-naval bases on the Syrian coastline. Only a few mischief-makers
in Moscow asked whether there was any guarantee that Assad would still be in
power 49 years from now or whether there would even be a Syria.
Putin's behavior may lead to a change of public opinion in NATO countries,
and, perhaps even China and Japan, in favor of spending more on arms. Right
now average expenditure on arms for NATO is about 1.25 per cent of the GDP of
the 28 members. The new Trump administration wants that increased to 2 per
cent. If that happens and Putin tries to match it, in an undeclared arms race,
he would have to devote 45 per cent of Russia's GDP to that particular chorus
girl.
Last time something like that happened was in the USSR under Mikhail
Gorbachev, with the result that the empire collapsed under the weight of its
own contradictions. Even now, Russian military forces are stretched from the
Norwegian frontier to the far-reaches of Siberia in a futile Desert of Tatars
for imaginary invaders. At the same time, the Chinese are quietly colonizing
Siberia. In 2015 the number of Chinese settlers was estimated at 3.4 million
and rising.
Another flaw in Putin's imperial plan is Russia's failure to attract any
allies apart from the remnants of the Ba'athist regime in Damascus. Even the
mullahs of Tehran have refused to enter into a formal alliance with Moscow.
Putin has repaid them by vetoing their demand to join the Shanghai Group, a
club led by Beijing and Moscow supposedly to combat terrorism.
While Russia has no allies, the US has many, most of them neglected or even
antagonized under Obama. Apart from the 27 NATO allies, the US has military
accords of various natures with 46 other nations across the globe, and
military bases in every continent.
Putin's dream empire has yet another flaw. Few outsiders, apart from Edward
Snowden, would like to settle in Russia or put their money in Russian banks.
In contrast, even now thousands of Russians immigrate to Western Europe and
North America each year. Those who don't immigrate send their money to London,
Frankfurt, New York and, more recently, even Cyprus.
One suggestion is that western democracies should let Russia have all the rope
it wants to hang itself. Rebuilding Syria alone could cost $1.5 trillion.
Empire building is a bad habit, and a very expensive one in our times.
Amir Taheri was born in Ahvaz, southwest Iran, and educated in Tehran,
London and Paris. He was Executive Editor-in-Chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran
(1972-79). In 1980-84, he was Middle East Editor for the Sunday Times. In
1984-92, he served as member of the Executive Board of the International Press
Institute (IPI). Between 1980 and 2004, he was a contributor to the
International Herald Tribune. He has written for the Wall Street Journal, the
New York Post, the New York Times, the London Times, the French magazine
Politique Internationale, and the German weekly Focus. Between 1989 and 2005,
he was editorial writer for the German daily Die Welt. Taheri has published 11
books, some of which have been translated into 20 languages. He has been a
columnist for Asharq Alawsat since 1987. Taheri's latest book "The Persian
Night" is published by Encounter Books in London and New York.
Add Comments