How Iran Tried to Turn Arab States into Fading Ghosts
18 November 2017By Amir Taheri
If history is a stage on which the fate of nations is played out, knowing when
to step in and when to bow out is of crucial importance. Being in the wrong
place at the wrong time and, even worse, in the wrong context, could lead to
loss and grief.
These may have been some of the thoughts that Lebanon's outgoing Prime
Minister Saad Hariri may have had in mind when he decided to throw in the
towel rather than pretending to exercise an office without being able to do so
in any effective manner. Hariri realized that he was in office but not in
power.
Whatever the reason for Hariri's departure, I think he was right to withdraw
from a scenario aimed at turning Lebanon into a ghost of a state with a ghost
of a president and ghost prime minister and parliament.
That scenario was written in Tehran in the early 1980s with the creation of
the Lebanese branch of Hezbollah by then Iranian Ambassador to Damascus
Ayatollah Ali-Akbar Mohtashami-pour. The original idea had taken shape in 1975
when Ayatollah Hadi Ghaffari created the first branch of Hezbollah in Tehran
to fight the Shah. By 1977 clandestine branches had been created in Turkey and
Kuwait.
The hope was to fade out political frontiers, often created by accidents of
history or designs of empires, and replace them with religious frontiers. The
aim was to create an archipelago of Shi'ite communities across the Middle
East, linked together through a network of religious-political organizations
controlled by Iran.
The rationale for this was that throughout Islamic history, the element
binding people together was allegiance to a version of the religion (Arabic :Mazhab)
rather than political concepts such as citizenship of a state.
The fall of the Shah and the seizure of power in Tehran by mullahs gave the
scheme a new impetus by putting Iran's resources at its disposal.
However, very soon it became apparent that the grand design could not be
realized without destroying or at least weakening Western-style state
structures already in place. The states targeted had more or less strong armed
forces that would resist an Iranian takeover.
This was precisely what happened in Turkey, where attempts by the Hezbollah
branch to make a splash were crushed by the army.
In Iraq, premature takeover bid by Khomeini gave Saddam Hussein an excuse to
invade Iran and start an eight-year war.
In Syria, according to the memoirs of General Hussein Hamadani, who led the
Iranian military contingent there, the national army did all it could to
prevent Tehran from creating power bases of its own. The situation in Syria
changed only when the nation was plunged into civil war by President Bashar
al-Assad's ruthless repression of peaceful protests.
The mullahs learned from their experience in Iran.
Soon after they seized power by a combination of freakish circumstances,
Khomeini realized that he would never win the loyalty of existing state
structures while being unable to destroy them altogether.
Thus, he developed the strategy known as "parallelism" (movazi-sazi in
Persian).
He created the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a parallel to the
national army. Islamic courts were set up as parallels to state courts based
on laws inspired by the Napoleonic Code. The Majlis (parliament) found its
parallel in the Assembly of Experts.
Applied to other Middle Eastern countries, this strategy was known as "tohi-sazi"
or "emptying of content".
The first place this was put into practice was Lebanon.
Iran created a Shi'ite militia to "parallel" the regular Lebanese army. Then,
through Hezbollah, Tehran also recruited allies among other Lebanese
communities and transformed the Lebanese parliament into a toothless bulldog.
Finally, Tehran succeeded in propelling its candidate into the presidency, and
secured effective power of veto in the Council of Ministers.
All that costs a lot of money.
According to the current Iranian national budget, Iran is spending an average
of $60 million a month in Lebanon, most of it through Hezbollah. Consequently,
as President Hassan Rouhani said in a speech last month, nothing can be done
in Lebanon without Iran's say-so.
The Lebanese branch of Hezbollah has given Iran value for money to the point
of sustaining thousands of casualties in combat in the 2006 mini-war with
Israel and, more importantly, the campaign to crush Assad's opponents in
Syria.
In Iraq, the Iranian scheme has had partial results.
Tehran has created the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of 17 Shi'ite
militias, plus the Islamic Peshmergas (Kurdish fighters hired by Tehran) to
parallel the Iraqi national army and the military force of the Kurdistan
Autonomous Government.
Tehran also exerts political influence through at least part of the Ad-Daawa
(The Call) party. However, Iran's hope of doing a second Lebanon in Iraq has
not succeeded because many Iraqis resent Iranian domination while the grand
ayatollahs of Najaf regard the Khomeinist regime in Tehran as an abomination.
The mullah's scheme in Syria has also run into trouble because of Russian
intervention and President Vladimir Putin's determination that Syria's future
is decided in Moscow and not in Tehran.
Tehran's scheme has had partial success in Yemen.
Iran's surrogates, the Houthis, succeeded in creating a parallel army in the
shape of Ansar Allah but failed to fully clip the wings of the regular army.
The Houthis also reduced President Ali Abdullah Saleh to a shadow of his past
but could not fully get rid of him. On top of that the Saudi-led coalition's
intervention has dealt a decisive blow to Tehran's hope of doing a second
Lebanon in Yemen.
In the case of Qatar and Oman, Tehran used Finlandization, allowing them to
enjoy tranquility in exchange for splitting the Arab ranks and toeing the
mullahs' line on key issues.
When Muhammad Morsi took over as Egypt's elected president, Tehran tried to
sell its scenario in Cairo as well.
Former Foreign Minister Ali-Akbar Velayati was sent to Egypt with a letter
from 'Supreme Leader" Ali Khamenei. In it Khamenei called on Morsi to disband
the Egyptian army and create a parallel military force to "guard the
revolution". The proposed scheme was never applied either because, as Velayati
and Khamenei claim, Morsi rejected it or the Egyptian army pre-empted it by
deposing Morsi.
Hariri's resignation may be a sign that the Arabs are no longer prepared to
grin and bear it as Tehran dismantles their state structures by creating
doubles to their armies and transforming their governments into puppets with
their strings pulled from the Iranian Embassy.
Tehran's scheme for dominating the Arab states may have reached its limits;
the rapid advance of the mullahs may now be followed with a roll-back. And
that could mean the return of political frontiers and loyalties based on
citizenship not religious sect.
Amir Taheri was the executive editor-in-chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran
from 1972 to 1979. He has worked at or written for innumerable publications,
published eleven books, and has been a columnist for Asharq Al-Awsat since
1987
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