Iraqi Kurdistan's Crisis: A Failure of Strategy
05 November 2017By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
As the war against the Islamic State as an entity controlling territory comes
to a close in Iraq, control over territories disputed between the Iraqi
central government and the Iraqi Kurdistan regional government (KRG) has come
to the forefront. Forces officially affiliated with the Baghdad government, as
well as militias aligned with it on this issue, have taken control of several
key disputed sites, including Kirkuk city and Sinjar, which were previously
held by Kurdish forces. While it initially seemed that the aim of the
operations was just to assert the boundaries that existed prior to the Islamic
State surge of 2014, there are indications the rollback may go as far as the
2003 boundaries. What is the root of this crisis? And what, if anything,
should be the U.S. role?
Inevitably, much commentary has taken on a moralistic tone, lamenting a
supposed U.S. abandonment of the Kurds to the Iranians and their clients, or
getting into arguments about whether places like Kirkuk are actually Kurdish.
The issue at hand, though, is not so much right or wrong over who should
control which area as strategic failure.
The root of this crisis lies in the miscalculation by Masoud Barzani and his
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), who rule in the KRG capital of Arbil, to
insist on going ahead with the unilateral independence referendum last month.
It was clear from the outset why the referendum in the present circumstances
was problematic. Holding the referendum unilaterally in disputed territories,
for example, was sure to provoke a wide spectrum of local Iraqi opposition
transcending many sectarian boundaries, including not only Sunni and Shi'a
Arabs but also many members of Iraqi minorities such as the Turkmen and
Yezidis (the latter not necessarily identifying as ethnically Kurdish, despite
speaking the Kurdish language).
This Iraqi domestic opposition to the referendum has been the strongest and
main incentive for Iraq's prime minister Hayder al-Abadi to take action, given
his desire for political legitimacy for next year's parliamentary elections
and the risk of being undermined by actors who are far closer to Iran, such as
the previous prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, who became much more closely
aligned with Iran from 2010 onwards. The perceived need for Abadi to
outmaneuver more pro-Iranian hardliners in Iraq is likely the main explanation
for the U.S. position, which did not actively oppose the reassertion of
federal government control over places like Kirkuk, even as Iran is also
exploiting the situation in a bid to dampen as far as possible the prospect of
a Kurdish state, fearing a ripple effect among its own Kurdish populations.
Besides strong local Iraqi opposition, there was by no means a unanimous
consensus among the KRG's various factions to hold the referendum, with the
main reservations existing within the area's other main political faction
historically (the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK], which is tied to the
Talabani family and controlled Kirkuk city) and the opposition Gorran
movement. There were suspicions, for instance, that the referendum was merely
being used by Barzani, whose original legal mandate as KRG president had
expired in 2015, to gain legitimacy to consolidate his power. Iran has
exploited internal Kurdish divisions in the current crisis through ties to the
PUK in particular.
In the long-run, there have been serious questions as to how viable an
independent Kurdistan can actually be given the KRG's trajectory in recent
years. For now, unable to survive on its own financially, the KRG has
generally remained reliant on Baghdad for funding in order to pay salaries of
government workers and personnel. The calculation by Barzani has been that the
region can come to sustain itself through essentially being Turkey's economic
vassal, relying on independently exporting oil to Turkey and using that
country to gain access to the sea and wider markets. This outlook, of course,
was the biggest incentive for KRG control of Kirkuk and its environs, given
the oil resources there.
Yet even with the KRG's full control and development of these resources, it
could never be as lucrative as Iraq's vast oil fields in the south, and global
oil prices have been falling anyway as worldwide production has increased. In
addition, despite the economic ties Ankara developed with the KRG, it was
always clear Turkey opposed the idea of an independent Kurdish state,
preferring to keep the KRG as a client region economically dependent on it
while remaining officially a part of Iraq. After all, like Iran, Turkey fears
a ripple effect among its own Kurdish population.
In short, facing opposition from its neighbors, financially weak and
internally divided, Barzani had very little leverage on his side, and it was
obvious that a unilateral independence referendum at the present time would
not have been able to change that. Contrary to what Dexter Filkins of the New
Yorker writes, to the more sober observer it did not even seem to be the case
that the dream of an independent Kurdish state was "tantalizingly within
reach."
The various problems facing the KRG did not stop foreign supporters and
lobbyists of the KDP from insisting the referendum was some kind of "historic
opportunity" or painting inaccurate pictures of how the KRG's economy was
faring. These advocates only helped to reinforce this bad decision-making by
telling the KDP what it wanted to hear. Indeed, they have done their clients a
considerable disservice and failed in their role as advocates. Good advocates
not only support their clients' fundamental cause (in this case, an ultimately
independent Kurdistan) but also advise their clients on sound strategy. It
would have been far better to encourage dramatic internal political and
economic reform within the KRG to give the entity a better hand for eventually
negotiating over disputed territories with Baghdad, so that an actually viable
independent Kurdistan could emerge from an amicable divorce with Iraq.
Unfortunately, though, much damage has already been done. Having lost many of
the disputed territories, economically isolated by its neighbors and
internally divided even further now, the KRG's overall position is even weaker
than before.
Looking forward, what should the U.S. response be? Those who lament the
supposed abandoning of the Kurds suggest the U.S. should have actively taken
the KRG's side on the issue of disputed territories and supported the
unilateral independence referendum. But what would such policies have actually
entailed or accomplished? Airstrikes against Iraqi government forces? On the
strategic level, KDP advocates often argue that a U.S.-supported independent
Iraqi Kurdistan would be an effective counter-balance against Iran. There is
little evidence to back up this argument. Given the area's geographical
position, this Kurdish state's role in wider regional politics would be
marginal, having little impact on issues like the rivalry between Iran and
Saudi Arabia and the theaters where it plays out. Nor would this Kurdish state
act as an obstacle to Iran's reach towards the Mediterranean, or have leverage
over the government in Baghdad.
Even with full U.S. support in these circumstances, the prospects of realizing
a viable independent Kurdistan are still dubious. An independent Kurdistan
would require buy-in from at least one of its neighbors in order to be
economically viable. It is difficult to see how that buy-in could be gained
through U.S. support. One might argue that Turkey would be the most viable
candidate for U.S. outreach to encourage this buy-in, but why should Turkey
listen to the U.S.? After all, the past few years have seen general U.S.
disregard for Turkish concerns about military support for the Kurdish YPG in
Syria against the Islamic State: the YPG, linked to the Kurdistan Workers
Party, is regarded by Turkey as a terrorist organization. That is not to say
the U.S. support for the YPG has necessarily been wrong, as there were no
other viable ground forces in Syria to support as the Islamic State surged in
2014. Yet it must be understood that that support has had consequences for
U.S.-Turkish relations, and those consequences would be relevant were the U.S.
to support a unilateral pro-independence policy for Iraqi Kurdistan.
The only logical U.S. policy is to pursue a midway course between the KRG and
Baghdad. There is an important U.S. interest in preventing Iraq's government
from becoming totally aligned with Iran at the expense of any U.S. influence.
It is impossible to remove Iranian influence in its entirety from Iraq or
prevent Iraq from having friendly economic ties with Iran, but an Iraq in
which Iran faces some limitation and competition with American influence is
far more preferable to one totally dominated by Iran, which would be the
outcome of simply throwing in the American lot with the KDP and the path it
has pursued.
There is also a U.S. interest in continuing to maintain ties with the KRG.
Right now, therefore, the goal must be to act as a mediator between the two
sides, encouraging an immediate return to negotiations over the disputed
territories with a focus on taking into account the concerns of local
populations in these areas, rather than giving unconditional tacit or explicit
support to one side. While those words might sound like a trope and Barzani in
particular is in a terrible position for negotiations, there is no viable
alternative.
The initial U.S. calculation with regards to the Iraqi government's retaking
of Kirkuk city was understandable, but there is a risk of things going too far
in the moves on disputed territories. Accordingly, the U.S. should use its
leverage with Abadi, who has already done enough to bolster his legitimacy, to
urge for military manpower and efforts to be redirected towards retaking the
remaining border areas with Syria from the Islamic State and securing those
areas to undermine the Islamic State's future insurgency prospects. More
broadly, the security/internal stability angle is probably the best one to
play up for the encouragement of a return to negotiations over disputed
territories.
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