Syria: A Booby-Trapped Gift and Mischievous Partners - The Difficulties Of The Establishment Of A "Russian Syria"
15 February 2018By Ghassan Charbel
Months ago journalists used to hear realistic statements on Syria.
"Practically, there can be no solution in Syria except through Russia" and "A
'Russian Syria' is better for the region than an 'Iranian Syria'." For some
time, it appeared that the "Russian Syria" was accepted by the Americans,
Europeans, the region and Arabs. It became clear that this acceptance depended
on Russia devising a political solution that would reduce Iran's influence in
Syria. Some believed that any solution based on the redistribution of power
among Syrian forces would inevitably diminish the possibility of the emergence
of an "Iranian Syria."
Vladimir Putin has not been hesitant in reassuring his visitors or those he
met outside his country. Despite his habitual cautious rhetoric, he was giving
out assurances. His visitors used to leave meetings with him assured that he
had understood their fears and demands. The fear of ISIS, its brutality and
concerns of its expansion pushed everyone towards preferring the Russian
solution, especially after it became clear that Washington was in no way ready
to use its military force to oust the Syrian regime or force it to accept
"political transition."
After ISIS was contained, the difficulties of the establishment of a "Russian
Syria" began to emerge. The recent Israeli-Iranian clash in Syria and Turkey's
campaign in Afrin confirmed these difficulties.
Weeks ago, it became clear that a solution to establish a "Russian Syria" was
losing ground. The ability of Russian jets to carry out heavy strikes in Syria
was much more powerful than Sergei Lavrov's ability to draft a solution for
Syria. This solution should bring together the Syrian regime and opposition,
the US, Europe, Israel, Iran, Turkey and the Arabs.
Had the "Russian Syria" had the first and final word in Syria, then the
parties involved would not have acted in the way they did. They would not have
crossed what were believed to be red lines drawn by Russia. The red lines
include Iran sending a drone to fly over Israel and the latter's retaliation
that saw it carry out air strikes deep into Syrian territory and its
announcement for the first time that it had struck Iranian positions there.
The Syrian forces had employed their rocket arsenal to down an Israeli jet, a
move that they had previously avoided.
The problem with Lavrov's solution is that the Kremlin is trying to achieve
coexistence between contrasting interests and opposing policies. It wants to
imply that the solution is slowly being devised and that it is taking into
account all the concerned players.
The Kremlin wants to cater to Israel's demand that Iran and its allies be kept
away from its borders, while also taking into consideration Tehran's
interests. There is no doubt that the Iranians are counting on time to
demonstrate that the "Iranian Syria" runs much deeper than the advocates of
the "Russian Syria" believe. Tehran is in no way willing to accept a solution
that would weaken its Syrian link in the crescent that it has carved out for
itself. If Tehran were to one day show flexibility over the presence of its
militias and missile factories close to Israel, then it would rather use this
card in its dispute with the US, which is preparing to impose painful
sanctions on the Iranian economy.
Iran is not the only difficult partner. The Syrian regime, which was saved
from collapse by Russia, can also be a very difficult partner. If during its
days of weakness, the regime had refused to discuss the "political
transition," then what would its attitude be like now after overcoming this
danger? Moreover, those who believe that the Syrian forces would ultimately
prefer to rely on Russia's presence to reduce Iranian hegemony may be
mistaken. They seem to have forgotten that the Iranian presence in Syria is
not recent and it is actually much more familiar with the country's structure
and regime.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is preparing to welcome both the Russian and Iranian
presidents in Istanbul, is not an easy partner for anyone. His army's presence
in Kurdish Syria gives him the right to sit at the dialogue table later on and
perhaps link his military withdrawal from Syria to the withdrawal of others as
well. This possibility could gain ground if an improvement in ties between
Ankara and Washington is achieved. The obsession to break up the Kurdish belt
on the Syrian border is not Turkey's sole concern, but it also realizes the
meaning of the establishment of an "Iranian Syria" that complements Tehran's
decisive role in Iraq. Turkey's invitation to sponsor the Sochi peace course
obligates Moscow to understand Ankara's demands, especially since Turkey is an
important economic partner for Russia.
We should also not underestimate the importance Putin is placing on preserving
good ties with Israel. The issue is not strictly linked to Russian Jews who
immigrated to Israel, but it is also part of Putin's realization that Israel
is a mandatory path to ease tensions with the US, should ties with it not
improve.
The US is meanwhile lying in wait for Russia to discover the challenges and
problems of what it believed to be an unprecedented victory in Syria. It is
waiting east of the Euphrates with all of its soldiers and advisors. It is
hoping that this region will prosper and that it can be set as an example. It
trusts that Russia will not be able to launch Syria's reconstruction plan
because it is incapable of coming up with a convincing solution to concerned
countries. It believes that Moscow's partners will ultimately become a burden
on it.
An "Iranian Syria" is unacceptable and a "Russian Syria" is not easy to
achieve. A "Syrian Syria" is not being considered at the moment. Putin will
try to stop the clash of opposing countries over Syrian soil. The solution
however does not appear within reach and the Syrian people's suffering is
likely to continue. At one point in the past Barack Obama had made light
before his aides of the importance of Putin's victory in Syria. He had ruled
out the ability of the Syrian leader to reconcile all the contradictions in
and outside his country. He did not rule out that the Kremlin would realize
late that the Syrian gift is booby-trapped and expensive. Syria houses many
problems. A booby-trapped gift and mischievous partners.
Ghassan Charbel is the editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper
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