Iran: The French Souffle Fails to Rise - Iran To Reduce Its Footprint In Syria And Yemen
01 April 2018
By Amir Taheri
According to those in the know in Paris, France's Foreign Minister Jean-Yves
Le Drian is a smart soft-soaper capable of persuading a mule out of its hind
legs.
A provincial politician, Le Drian emerged from relative obscurity towards the
end of President Francois Hollande's much maligned presidency. As Defense
Minister in Hollande's government, Le Drian was quickly established as the
star of a moribund administration.
While other ministers turned round vacuous illusions, Le Drian won a
reputation as a "doer" (in French faiseur) by winning huge contracts for the
sale of the latest French combat aircraft, le Raffale, to a number of
countries including Brazil, Egypt and India, thus providing some good news for
Hollande's bad-news tenure.
Le Drian was Socialist enough to survive several Cabinet reshuffles but not
too Socialist to remain on board as the party's sinking ship.
Knowing when to abandon ship, Le Drian was the first senior politician to jump
on Emanuel Macron's presidential bandwagon at a time few rated the young
aspirant's chances above that of a snowflake in June.
When Macron won against all odds, Le Drian was upgraded to Foreign Minister
with the understanding that, as the new regime's elder statesman, he would
have a say in other aspects of domestic and foreign policies.
So, this week as Le Drian headed for Tehran for what some described as
"crucial talks", the consensus in Paris was that if anyone can persuade the
mullahs to temper their ardor it would be the Breton miracle-worker.
According to sources in Paris and Tehran, in talks with Iranian officials, Le
Drian used his hitherto successful method of "give-and-take".
The method is simple.
The Frenchman asks his interlocutors what is it exactly that they want.
Once that has become clear he would raise the question of how much of what
they want is achievable, how and when? The trick is to keep the interlocutors
focused on real, tangible things rather than chimeras and abstractions. The
next step is to link what the interlocutors want to what the French want and
show a high measure of compatibility, leading to a deal that gives both sides
most, if not all, of what they want.
By all accounts Le Drian's recipe failed in Tehran.
The soufflé that had risen in so many countries across the globe failed to
rise.
Le Drian's failure is the latest in a string of such forlorn bids by big,
medium and small powers trying, in the words of former US President Barack
Obama, to "bring Iran into the dance."
There are many reasons for such failures.
The first is the fact that we have two Irans: one is Iran as a nation-state
with the normal interests, fears and aspirations of any typical nation-state,
and the other is Iran as a revolution with the irrational dreams and ambitions
of all revolutions.
This duality means that Iran cannot develop a coherent policy on any issue,
domestic or foreign as the interests and aspiration of the two Irans, Dr.
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, do not always coincide.
Because Iran has a problem with itself it is bound to have problems with
everyone else.
When Le Drian asks Tehran officials: What is it that they want, they are
unable to provide a clear answer. And because they cannot answer, they behave
as if they want everything, rather any identifiable desiderata.
The classical demands of a nation-state behaving as such are not legion.
A nation state wants, respect, security, demarcated borders, trade, access to
natural resources, share of markets, economic cooperation, cultural exchanges
etc. All those demands can be and in the case of almost all 198 members of the
United Nations are routinely fulfilled. The Islamic Republic is one of the few
exceptions along with North Korea, Venezuela and Zimbabwe until the fall of
Robert Mugabe.
A revolution, however, feeds on its messianic pretensions.
It cannot seek to become part of a grey status quo which would extinguish
whatever is left of its embers. It has to remain defiant, clenched fist and
all, claiming a purity it never had but always boasted about.
The second mistake Le Drian made, as countless others did before him, was to
believe that he was negotiating with authentic decision-makers. However, the
fact is that in the Islamic Republic the President and his ministers are
essentially actors playing such roles in an ever-revised script.
It is clear that in the Khomeinist system Iran is ruled by a "deep state"
headed by the "Supreme Guide" and a handful of military and civilian advisers
forming a parallel government in "The House of the Leader" (Beit-e-Rahbar).
If you hope for results you ought to talk directly, and exclusively, to Ali
Khamenei. This is what Russian President Vladimir Putin did when he flew to
Tehran, drove directly from the airport to Khamenei's house, and spent several
hours with him before driving back to the airport for a return flight to
Moscow. Putin wasted no time with his nominal counterpart President Hassan
Rouhani let alone the actors playing ministers.
If our information is correct Le Drian wanted two things.
The first was a pledge by Iran not to develop long-range missiles capable of
carrying nuclear warheads- a demand advanced by US President Donald Trump and
backed by Macron. The fact is that neither Rouhani nor his Foreign Minister
Mohammad-Javad Zarif know much about the missile project, let alone being in a
position to agree to a "freezing phase."
The puppeteer has ordered them to respond to such demands with a firm "no".
End of discussions.
Le Drian's second demand was for Iran to reduce its footprint in Syria and
Yemen.
Again, this is something above the pay-grade of either Rouhani or Zarif, who
don't even know how much money Iran is spending on maintaining the Syrian
despot Bashar al-Assad in his Damascene hideout. There are no figures for that
in the official budget presented by Rouhani. The reason is that funds for
"exporting revolution" come from the Special Account of the "House of the
Leader". Money poured into that account comes from a variety of sources
including a one percent ring-fenced tariff on all imported cars.
The "House of the Leader" also owns some of the 32 companies that trade in
Iranian oil and petroleum products at home and abroad and, being classed as
private sector, avoid public scrutiny.
Le Drian wanted things from those who don't have them, ignoring those who
could deliver the goods but won't because of a traditional carpet bazaar
scenario in which you start by asking a small discount on a carpet you like
but end up buying at twice the price a carpet you don't want.
Amir Taheri was the executive editor-in-chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran
from 1972 to 1979. He has worked at or written for innumerable publications,
published eleven books, and has been a columnist for Asharq Al-Awsat since
1987
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